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ABSTRACT 
An Investigation of Excessive Reassurance Seeking in OCD 
Chris L. Parrish, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2009 
Excessive reassurance-seeking (ERS) is a common problem among individuals dealing 
with emotional and/or psychological difficulties. Prior research on ERS has focused 
almost exclusively on the potential consequences of this behaviour in the contexts of 
Depression and Hypochondriasis, and this research has shown that ERS contributes to 
interpersonal difficulties and emotional distress. Despite anecdotal evidence that ERS is 
a hallmark feature of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), comparatively few studies 
have examined OCD-related ERS. The goal of the present research was to examine 
various cognitive, behavioural and affective processes that may be involved in the 
perpetuation of ERS, specifically within the contexts of OCD and Depression. Given the 
purported functional equivalence between OCD-related reassurance seeking and 
compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002), the current investigations also aimed to compare 
ERS and repeated checking activity across a number of important domains (i.e., content, 
precipitating factors, function and termination criteria). Toward these goals, Study 1 
employed a semi-structured interview with clinical (OCD and Depression) and non-
clinical individuals to examine factors involved in the onset, maintenance and termination 
of ERS and repeated checking. Results revealed that individuals with OCD tend to seek 
reassurance about perceived general threats (e.g., fire, theft), whereas ERS tends to be 
focused on perceived social threats (e.g., abandonment, loss of support) among depressed 
individuals. Clinical participants reported greater anxiety, sadness and perceived threat 
iv 
in association with ERS and repeated checking than healthy control participants. Study 2 
examined how manipulations of threat, responsibility, and ambiguity of feedback 
impacted upon non-clinical participants' anxiety and compulsive urges (to seek 
reassurance and to check) in a series of experimental vignettes. Consistent with 
hypotheses, higher levels of perceived threat, responsibility and ambiguity of feedback 
were associated with greater anxiety and compulsive urges. Results also suggested that 
perceived threat and responsibility partially mediated the effects of ambiguity of 
feedback on anxiety, urges to check, and (for threat) urges to seek reassurance. The 
collective results of these studies are discussed in terms of cognitive and behavioural 
models of OCD, and directions for future research are suggested. 
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In recent years, there has been a rising interest in research aimed at elucidating 
factors involved in the onset, maintenance, and consequences of excessive reassurance 
seeking (ERS). Articles devoted to this topic have appeared predominantly in the 
depression literature (e.g., Burns, Brown, Plant, Sachs-Ericsson, & Joiner, 2006; Coyne, 
1976; Haeffel, Voelz, & Joiner, 2007; Joiner, Alfano, & Metalsky, 1992; Joiner & 
Metalsky, 2001; Joiner, Metalsky, Katz, & Beach, 1999; Starr & Davila, 2008), although 
examinations of the short and long-term impact of reassurance provision are also found in 
writings on Hypochondrias / health anxiety (Hadjistavropoulos, Craig, & 
Hadjistavropoulos, 1998; Kellner, 1992; Warwick, 1992; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1986), 
chronic pain (de Jong et al., 2005; Linton, McCracken, & Vlaeyen, 2008), and various 
other medical issues (e.g., Howard et al., 2005; Lucock, Morely, White, & Peake, 1997; 
Salmon, 2006). 
The importance of ERS as a potential contributor to interpersonal and emotional 
difficulties was first highlighted by Coyne (1976), who posited that mildly depressed 
individuals tend to seek excessive reassurance regarding issues related to self-worth (e.g., 
"Do you still love me?"; "Do you think I am a failure?"), thereby alienating others and 
unwittingly confirming their negative self-perceptions (and thus, increasing their 
vulnerability to depression). A growing body of evidence has supported this theory, as 
depressotypic ERS has been demonstrated to lead to interpersonal rejection (e.g., by 
causing others to become frustrated with repeated demands for reassurance) and 
increased depressive symptoms (see Starr & Davila, 2008, for a meta-analytic review). 
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Similarly, ERS in other contexts has been demonstrated to contribute to unnecessary 
health costs (e.g., due to increased and unnecessary medical consultation in the case of 
health anxiety; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1986), and the long-term exacerbation of 
compulsive behaviour (i.e., increased demands for additional reassurance; 
Hadjistavropoulos et al., 1998; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1986; Warwick, 1992). In fact, 
evidence suggests that feedback aimed at reassuring health anxious individuals and other 
medical patients can paradoxically exacerbate physical and/or psychological symptoms 
(e.g., Howard et al., 2005; Lucock et al., 1997; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1986; Salmon, 
2006), which has led some authors to question the utility of repeated reassurance 
provision under these circumstances (Linton et al., 2008; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1986; 
Warwick, 1992). 
Notably, ERS is one of the most frequent and problematic strategies used by 
individuals with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) to (temporarily) diminish 
anxiety induced by their obsessions (e.g., Abramowitz, Franklin & Cahill, 2003; Clark, 
2004; Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997; Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1996; Steketee, 
1993; Tolin, 2001). Accordingly, cognitive-behavioural treatments for OCD (e.g., Clark, 
2006; Salkovskis, 1999; Steketee, 1993) often include deliberately withholding 
reassurance from clients during exposure to anxiety-provoking situations, in order to 
promote increased tolerance of uncertainty. Such interventions are based on the widely-
accepted hypothesis that ERS serves to maintain anxiety in the long run, by preventing 
fear extinction / habituation and reinforcing maladaptive beliefs (e.g., ' i f I am unable to 
obtain reassurance, something terrible is bound to happen") (Abramowitz et al., 2003; 
Clark, 2004; Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1999). However, scant research has been 
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conducted to test this hypothesis, and the specific mechanisms underlying OCD-related 
ERS have yet to be examined. Therefore, a detailed investigation of reassurance-seeking 
behaviour, particularly in the context of OCD, is clearly warranted. 
In relation to OCD, ERS can be defined as the repeated solicitation of safety-
related information from other individuals about a threatening object, situation or 
interpersonal characteristic, despite having already received this information. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that ERS is especially common among individuals with checking 
compulsions, whose concerns tend to focus on themes of perceived threat and 
responsibility for harm (Rachman, 2002; Rachman and Hodgson, 1980; Salkovskis, 1985, 
1999). For example, they may repeatedly ask others to reassure them that they (or others) 
remembered to perform a threat-reducing task ("Are you sure you locked the door?"), 
that they performed a task correctly ("Did you hear the stove 'click' when 1 turned it 
off?"), or that they have not accidentally caused, or been responsible for, harm occurring 
to others ("Are you sure that I didn't hit anyone when I was checking my rear-view 
mirror?"). Rachman (2002) conceptualizes reassurance seeking in this context as a form 
of "checking by proxy" (p. 627), and states that: 
... neutralization, compulsive acts (i.e., checking) and reassurance seeking share 
some common features and all can be construed as attempts to reduce the 
probability of a nasty event occurring or to reduce the effects of such an event. 
They also serve to reduce one's responsibility for any such anticipated 
misfortune (p. 629; emphasis added). 
Thus, ERS is hypothesized to be functionally equivalent to compulsive checking, as both 
acts are purportedly intended to achieve immediate (albeit temporary) reductions in 
anxiety and perceived responsibility for harm (Rachman, 2002, Salkovskis, 1985, 1999). 
If correct, important theoretical and clinical implications follow from this hypothesis, as 
compulsive checking has been shown to exacerbate compulsive urges (e.g., to check) and 
doubt/uncertainty in the long run (Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, 2006; Hout & Kindt, 
2003a, 2003b, 2004; Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006), and OCD-related ERS 
may be similarly counter-productive. 
Cognitive theories of compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 
1999) conceptualize this behaviour in terms of a self-perpetuating mechanism that stems 
from inflated perceptions of threat and responsibility. According to Rachman (2002), 
compulsive checking is precipitated by increases in anxiety/discomfort and urges to 
check, which stem from elevated levels of three "cognitive multipliers": perceived 
responsibility for harm, perceived probability of harm and perceived seriousness of harm. 
As noted above, Rachman postulates that compulsive checking is usually intended to 
prevent future harm from occurring due to some perceived threat. However, such threats 
are often hypothetical, vague, and never-ending (e.g., individuals might believe that 
failure to check properly and consistently might lead to unspecified eventual harm to a 
loved one). Accordingly, individuals plagued with harm-related obsessions often feel 
compelled to check repeatedly, in order to temporarily alleviate obsessional anxiety. In 
addition, because compulsive checking prevents the disconfirmation of catastrophic 
beliefs (e.g., "If I do not check the stove [again], a fire might occur"), it serves to 
maintain these beliefs, thereby increasing the likelihood of further compulsions and 
safety behaviour. Rachman's theory also stipulates that the act of repeated checking 
itself paradoxically increases one's sense of personal responsibility for harm, as well as 
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one's estimation of threat, while also impairing meta-memory and increasing doubt (for 
supporting evidence, see Coles et al., 2006; Hout & Kindt, 2004; Radomsky et al., 2006). 
Thus, it is proposed that an exaggerated sense of responsibility for preventing harm in 
conjunction with biased threat appraisals plays a critical role in both the onset and 
maintenance of compulsive checking behaviour. 
It is of theoretical and practical importance to determine whether the predictions 
derived from this theory also apply to OCD-related reassurance seeking. Given the 
proposed functional similarities between OCD-related reassurance seeking and 
compulsive checking, it is reasonable to hypothesize that both of these anxiety-
neutralizing strategies may be motivated by similar threat-related concerns, and likewise, 
that similar processes may serve to maintain these behaviours and the maladaptive beliefs 
that underlie them (e.g., "Something terrible is bound to happen unless I seek reassurance 
/ check again"). However, it is also apparent that reassurance seeking behaviour is 
distinct from compulsive checking in several respects. For example, reassurance seeking 
is generally an interpersonal process that involves the solicitation of anxiety-reducing 
feedback from other individuals, whereas compulsive checking is often carried out in 
isolation (Rachman, 1976,2002). Notably, the interpersonal context in which 
reassurance seeking is typically carried out may serve to disperse the individual's 
perceived responsibility for preventing harm (Salkovskis, 1985, 1999), whereas 
compulsive checking has been proposed to actually increase OCD sufferers' perceived 
responsibility (Rachman, 2002). In addition, the impact of ERS may be broader than that 
of compulsive checking, as it necessarily affects not only the individual with OCD, but 
also those who are involved in the individuals' reassurance-seeking rituals (e.g., friends, 
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family, co-workers, etc.). Indeed, it is not uncommon for family members of OCD 
patients to be so profoundly affected by their repeated requests for reassurance that they 
break close family ties to escape the seemingly unending requests for reassurance (de 
Silva & Rachman, 2009). Secondly, some of the potential maintenance factors for ERS 
might not be relevant to compulsive checking. For example, the manner in which others 
respond to reassurance requests seems to be an important determinant of the long-term 
consequences of this behaviour; prior research has shown that repeatedly granting 
requests for reassurance can be counter-productive, leading to subsequent and further 
increases in reassurance seeking (Salkovskis & Warwick, 1986; Tolin, 2001; Warwick, 
1992). Likewise, ambiguous feedback may perpetuate OCD-related reassurance seeking, 
given that ambiguity leads to heightened perceptions of threat in clinically anxious 
individuals and is likely to foster increased doubt and uncertainty (Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 
1991; Warwick, 1992). Thus, both the quantity and quality of individuals' responses to 
persistent requests for reassurance might influence subsequent reassurance seeking 
behaviour. Therefore, while compulsive checking and reassurance seeking are purported 
to be functionally similar in the context of OCD, these two compulsive acts also appear to 
be distinct in several meaningful ways, and as such, it is important to study each of these 
behaviours in their own right. Furthermore, potentially important differences between 
compulsive checking and reassurance seeking with respect to content, precipitating 
factors, function, and termination criteria have yet to be examined empirically. Lastly, 
there have been no systematic investigations of whether and how ERS may differ in OCD 
relative to other psychological disorders, such as Depression or Hypochondriasis. 
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In an effort to address these questions, two novel investigations were conducted: 
(i) a semi-structured interview conducted with both clinical (non-depressed individuals 
whose symptoms met criteria for OCD, and depressed individuals without OCD) and 
non-clinical (undergraduate students) participants, in order to compare ERS and 
compulsive checking across a number of theoretically and clinically important domains 
(e.g., content, function, precipitating and termination factors), and to elucidate the 
mechanisms underlying the onset and maintenance of each of these compulsions, and (ii) 
a vignette study designed to experimentally test hypotheses about the relative impact of 
perceived responsibility, threat and ambiguity of feedback on reassurance seeking and 
checking behaviour, as well as associated constructs, in a sample of non-clinical 
undergraduate students. These studies represent an initial attempt to increase our 
understanding of factors that contribute to OCD-related ERS, with the goal of eventually 
enabling researchers and clinicians to develop more specific and effective treatments for 
this problematic behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Why do people seek reassurance and check repeatedly? An investigation of factors 
involved in compulsive behavior in OCD and Depression 
Research examining the role of excessive reassurance seeking (ERS) in 
perpetuating emotional distress and interpersonal difficulties has flourished over the past 
two decades. The majority of these studies have appeared in the depression literature, 
where ERS has been defined as "the relatively stable tendency to excessively and 
persistently seek assurances from others that one is loveable and worthy, regardless of 
whether such assurance has already been provided" (Joiner, Metalsky, Katz & Beach, 
1999, p.270). Through this line of research, ERS has been implicated as a central process 
in the onset and maintenance of depression, and has been shown to predict interpersonal 
rejection and severity of depressive symptoms (see Starr & Davila, 2008, for a meta-
analytic review). These findings provide support for Coyne's (1976) interactional model 
of depression, which posits that depressed individuals tend to seek reassurance regarding 
the security of their relationships and their value to others (i.e., whether others "truly 
care" about them). An important tenet of this theory is that ERS behavior irritates others, 
thus increasing the likelihood of social rejection and reinforcing negative depressive 
cognitions. Perceived (or real) decreases in social support over time purportedly lead to 
ever increasing feelings of insecurity and urges to seek additional reassurance, thereby 
creating a vicious cycle. 
Despite the attention that ERS has received in depression research, comparatively 
few studies have examined the role of reassurance seeking in maintaining anxiety 
disorders. Yet, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that ERS is a common problem 
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in clinically anxious populations, particularly among individuals diagnosed with 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), and/or 
Hypochondriasis / health anxiety (Clark, 2004; Dugas & Robichaud, 2006; Freeston & 
Ladouceur, 1997; Hadjistavropoulos, Craig & Hadjistavropoulos, 1998; Morillo, Belloch, 
& Garcia-Soriano, 2007; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1986). Within the context of these 
disorders, ERS may be more broadly defined as the repeated solicitation of safety-related 
information from others about a threatening object, situation or interpersonal 
characteristic, despite having already received this information. Although there is a 
paucity of research examining the specific factors that promote ERS in anxiety disorders, 
evidence suggests that it is among the most common strategies used by OCD patients to 
try to diminish their obsessional thoughts and images (Freeston and Ladouceur, 1997), 
and that individuals diagnosed with OCD are significantly more likely than clinically 
depressed, non-obsessional anxious, and non-clinical individuals to seek reassurance 
regarding negative intrusive thoughts (Morillo et al., 2007). Therefore, an investigation 
of factors that contribute to OCD-related reassurance seeking is clearly warranted. 
Clinical descriptions of ERS in the OCD literature (Freeston and Ladouceur, 
1997; Morillo et al., 2007; Rachman, 2002; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Salkovskis, 
1985, 1999; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1985) have generally equated this behavior to other 
compulsive or "neutralizing" acts, particularly in terms of its hypothesized function. For 
example, Rachman (2002) has postulated that ERS is a variant of compulsive checking, 
and that both of these behaviors are aimed at reducing anxiety by attempting to minimize 
the likelihood of negative outcomes, and to decrease perceived responsibility for such 
outcomes. Similar to compulsive checking, ERS is hypothesized to prevent the 
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disconfirmation of catastrophic beliefs (e.g., "If I don't do everything possible to make 
sure things are safe [such as seeking reassurance and/or checking], then a disaster is 
bound to occur"), and to be reinforced by temporary reductions in anxiety and perceived 
responsibility when requests for reassurance are granted (Parrish & Radomsky, 2006; 
Rachman, 2002; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Salkovskis, 1985). Hence, like checking 
behavior, ERS is routinely targeted in response prevention treatments for OCD (see 
Clark, 2004; Marks, 1981; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1985; Steketee, 1993; Tolin, 2001). 
However, examinations of whether ERS and compulsive checking might be perpetuated 
via similar mechanisms or serve comparable functions are scarce. 
In a recent study conducted by Parrish and Radomsky (2006), non-clinical 
participants performed a complex manual classification task (i.e., pill-sorting) under 
conditions of high or low responsibility/threat, using a variation of Ladouceur and 
colleagues' (1995) responsibility manipulation protocol. In the high responsibility/threat 
condition, participants were told that their results would be used to develop a safe and 
reliable system for sorting and distributing medications in a third-world country. 
Participants in the low responsibility/threat condition were told that the study sought to 
determine how quickly and accurately people could sort pills according to their color and 
shape. Consistent with Rachman's (2002) theory, participants reported greater urges to 
check and to seek reassurance under conditions of high (vs. low) responsibility/threat, 
which was taken to suggest that these two behaviors may be functionally equivalent 
and/or driven by similar processes. However, this study did not directly enquire about 
the function of these behaviors, and its use of a non-clinical sample limited the potential 
generalizability of results. Of equal import, no published studies known to the authors 
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have compared factors that promote ERS in OCD vs. depression, thus highlighting the 
need to elucidate the unique and shared factors that contribute to this behavior among 
obsessive-compulsive and depressed individuals. 
Reassurance seeking may arise from distinct concerns and/or serve different 
functions among obsessive-compulsive and depressed individuals, as different cognitive 
biases and beliefs are associated with OCD (e.g., perceived threats of physical 
harm/illness, inflated sense of responsibility, perfectionism, need for control, intolerance 
of uncertainty; OCCWG, 2005) and depression (e.g., preoccupations with potential loss, 
abandonment, worthlessness/guilt, hopelessness, rejection, and failure; Beck, 1967, 1976; 
Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). Likewise, the factors that maintain ERS in 
depression and OCD may differ according to each population's unique set of concerns 
and biases. For instance, the potential interpersonal consequences of ERS (e.g., social 
rejection, loss of social support) that are hypothesized to perpetuate this behavior among 
depressed individuals (Coyne, 1976) may instead persuade OCD patients to terminate this 
behavior. Meanwhile, certain catastrophic beliefs about the potentially harmful 
consequences of not seeking reassurance (e.g., being held responsible for illness, injury 
or other harms) may be specifically related to the maintenance of ERS in OCD. 
Cognitive (Beck, 1967, 1976) and interpersonal (Coyne, 1976; Haeffel, Voelz & 
Joiner, 2007; Joiner & Metalsky, 2001) theories of depression suggest that depressive 
reassurance seeking is likely to focus primarily on themes of low self-worth (e.g., "Do 
you think I'm boring?", "Are you sure I fit in?"), perceived threats of social loss or 
rejection (e.g., "Are you sure you're not mad at me?", "Do you still love me?"), and/or 
the potential for failure due to personal incompetence (e.g., "Do you think I can handle 
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this job/activity?"). Coyne's theory further implies that depressed individuals' 
reassurance seeking episodes are likely to be triggered by depressed mood, doubts 
regarding personal worth, and/or perceived or real loss (e.g., of social support). 
According to this framework, ERS is used by depressed individuals to determine whether 
others "truly" care about them and to attempt to secure their relationships. Thus, it 
follows that reassurance seeking episodes should cease once the depressed individual 
feels that they have gained sufficient evidence of caring from others that their mood 
improves and/or the perceived likelihood of (further) social rejection or abandonment is 
minimized. 
In contrast, cognitive-behavioral models of OCD emphasize the key roles of 
inflated perceptions of responsibility and over-estimations of threat in the maintenance of 
this disorder (e.g., Salkovskis, 1985, 1999; Rachman, 1998, 2002; see also OCCWG, 
2005). Thus, individuals with OCD may tend to seek reassurance about perceived threats 
of harm resulting from accidents or mistakes (e.g., "Did you see me lock the door?", "Are 
you sure I didn't run over anybody?"), health- or contamination-related concerns (e.g., 
"Is this soap anti-bacterial?", "Did you wash your hands before preparing dinner?"), 
and/or their personal competence/abilities (e.g., "Would you tell me if I made the wrong 
choice?", "Is my work OK?"). Common triggers of ERS among OCD patients may 
include anxious mood, perceived threats to their own or others' physical integrity (e.g., 
due to risk of fire, flood, contamination-related illness, etc.), and/or doubts or worries 
about their personal competence or decision-making abilities. As noted above, it is 
hypothesized that ERS is primarily intended to decrease anxiety by reducing the risk of 
potential harm (general or health-related) and dispersing responsibility for such harm to 
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others (Rachman, 2002). Therefore, OCD-related reassurance seeking should 
presumably stop (and anxiety should decrease) once the perceived potential for harm has 
been reduced, perceived responsibility for any such negative occurrences is diminished, 
or both. However, individuals with OCD have been shown to utilize elevated evidence 
requirements when deciding whether or not to terminate a compulsive episode (Wahl, 
Salkovskis, & Cotter, 2008), thus they may feel driven to obtain evidence that the above 
conditions have been met from several different m/e/personal and /nfrapersonal (i.e., 
emotional) sources. 
To address the above questions, we developed a semi-structured interview to ask 
about the content, triggers, function and termination criteria that are involved in ERS and 
repeated checking among individuals with OCD vs. depression. The central aims of this 
study were as follows: (i) to examine similarities and differences between ERS and 
repeated checking with respect to content, triggers, function, and termination factors, and 
(ii) to examine these questions across groups of obsessive-compulsive, depressed, and 
healthy control individuals. 
Method 
Participants 
The present study included three groups of participants: (i) 15 individuals whose 
symptoms met criteria for OCD according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders - Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; APA, 2000) and who were not currently 
depressed (OCD group), (ii) 15 individuals whose symptoms met DSM-IV criteria for 
Major Depressive Disorder (with an episode occurring within the past month) and who 
did not suffer with OCD (MDD group), and (iii) 20 healthy control participants (HC 
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group). All participants were assessed using the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule 
for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994; see below for description). 
Non-clinical participants were volunteer undergraduate psychology students from 
Concordia University, in Montreal, Canada. They were recruited via classroom visits and 
an internet-based Psychology Department participant pool. Participants were excluded 
from the HC group if they reported any current or prior psychiatric disorders, or if they 
denied engaging in any reassurance-seeking or checking behavior during the previous six 
months. As a result, 4 of 24 potential HC participants were excluded from the study after 
completing the ADIS-IV, due to current substance dependence (n = 1), a history of OCD 
and GAD (n = 1), or a total absence of reassurance seeking and checking activity during 
the previous six months (« = 2). 
Clinical participants were recruited through advertisements in local newspapers 
(see Appendix A), and by contacting members of a clinical participant registry who 
indicated interest in research. One-hundred-forty-three candidates were screened using a 
brief telephone interview adapted from the ADIS-IV (Brown et al., 1994). Individuals 
were excluded from the study if they met diagnostic criteria for Bipolar or Psychotic 
Disorders, co-morbid OCD and MDD, or current alcohol and/or substance dependence, 
while those who met the appropriate diagnostic criteria and who reported persistent 
reassurance-seeking and/or checking (n = 34; 23.8%) were invited to the laboratory to 
complete the ADIS-IV. Following the diagnostic interview, 30 of these individuals (15 
OCD, 15 MDD) qualified to participate in the study. Clinical participants were 
remunerated for their time, and HC participants received course credit or entry in a draw 
for a cash prize. 
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Participants' diagnoses and demographic information are displayed in Table 2.1. 
One (6.7%) participant in the OCD group and 3 (20.0 %) participants in the MDD group 
were currently receiving psychotherapy. The number of participants taking psychotropic 
medications in the OCD and MDD groups was 4 (26.7 %) and 8 (53.3%), respectively. 
In the OCD group, the mean Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; 
Goodman et al., 1989) total score was 19.40 (SD = 3.31), while the mean subscale scores 
for obsessions and compulsions were 9.13 (SD = 1.81), and 10.27 (SD = 1.91), 
respectively. The three groups did not differ with respect to their marital status, x2 (df= 
2) = 3.82, n.s., their sex ratio, %2 (df- 2) = 6.02, n.s.\ or their education level, F(2, 47) = 
0.45, n.s. However, there was a significant difference between groups with respect to 
age, F(2,47) = 13.27,p < . 001. Participants in the HC group were significantly younger 
than those in the OCD group,/? < .001, and the MDD group,/* < .01, whereas participants 
in the two clinical groups did not differ. In addition, participants in the MDD group 
reported a longer duration of illness than those in the OCD group, F(2, 45) = 5.56, p < . 
001. 
Instruments 
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, Di Nardo, & 
Barlow, 1994). 
This semi-structured interview was used to assess participants' diagnostic status. 
It assesses a variety of current and lifetime symptoms associated with anxiety and other 
(e.g., mood, somatoform, substance abuse, psychotic) disorders, according to DSM-IV 
(APA, 2000) criteria. The ADIS-IV has been widely used in both clinical and research 
contexts and it has been demonstrated to possess good to excellent inter-rater reliability 
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Table 2. 
Participants' demographic information and co-morbid diagnoses. 















Duration of illness (years) 
M(S.D.) 




Generalized Anxiety Disorder 

























Note: Means are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. Where percentages are 
reported, frequencies are shown in parentheses. OCD = Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
group; MDD = Major Depressive Disorder group; HC = healthy control group. 
a
 includes married and common-law participants, b time elapsed since official diagnosis 
received,c both participants who met criteria for Agoraphobia were also diagnosed with Panic 
Disorder, 
not all diagnostic categories that were assessed are shown. 
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when assessing depression (K=.67) and OCD (K- .85), respectively (Brown, DiNardo, 
Lehman & Campbell, 2001). 
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989). 
This 10-item clinician-administered measure consists of two subscales, which 
assess the severity of participants' obsessions and compulsions, respectively. Subscale 
scores are summed to derive a total Y-BOCS score. The Y-BOCS has been shown to 
possess excellent inter-rater reliability (all intra-class correlations > 0.85 for the total Y-
BOCS score and for each item), as well as good convergent and divergent validity 
(Goodman et al., 1989). 
Interview for Compulsive Checking and Reassurance-Seeking Behavior (ICCRS). 
The ICCRS is a semi-structured interview that was developed for the current 
study (see Appendix B). It was designed to elucidate factors that may contribute to the 
onset, maintenance and termination of reassurance-seeking and checking episodes, as 
well as to clarify the functions of these behaviors. Two primary sections examine factors 
associated with respondents' reassurance-seeking and repeated checking behavior, 
respectively. Each of these sections includes sub-sections that utilize open-ended 
questions and subjective ratings (see below). 
Development of the ICCRS 
The first step in developing the ICCRS was to create a series of open-ended 
questions to examine similarities and differences between compulsive checking and 
reassurance seeking across a number of theoretically important domains. Thus, questions 
were developed to examine content (e.g., "What sorts of things do you check/seek 
reassurance about most frequently?"), episode triggers (e.g., "What usually prompts you 
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to check/seek assurance in the first place?"), function (e.g., "What is your main 
motivation for checking/seeking reassurance?") and termination criteria (e.g., "What 
causes you to stop checking/seeking reassurance within a given episode?"). The 
inclusion of standardized open-ended questions in the ICCRS helped to reduce the 
likelihood that participants' responses would be influenced by researcher bias or 
expectations. 
In addition, a series of subjective ratings were collected using the ICCRS, to 
facilitate quantitative comparisons across groups and types of coping response (checking 
vs. reassurance seeking). Participants were asked to rate (using 0-100 scales) the 
following in reference to a recent episode of coping behavior: (1) anxiety, (2) sadness, (3) 
perceived threat, (4) perceived responsibility, (5) ambiguity of feedback/checking-related 
information, and (6) doubt regarding assurance (for reassurance section only). 
ICCRS questions and ratings were formulated by the two co-authors of this paper 
and were revised through laboratory team meetings and pilot testing with both clinical 
and nonclinical individuals, in order to maximize the efficiency and clarity of the 
interview. Two versions of the ICCRS were developed to allow administration of the 
reassurance seeking and repeated checking sections in a counterbalanced, randomized 
fashion. 
Self-report measures 
In addition to the ADIS-IV and ICCRS (and the Y-BOCS for participants in the 
OCD group), participants completed a battery of online self-report measures. These 
included individual measures of OCD symptoms (the Vancouver Obsessional 
Compulsive Inventory [VOCI]; Thordarson et al., 2004) and beliefs (the Obsessional 
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Beliefs Questionnaire-44 [OBQ]; OCCWG, 2005), as well as measures of intolerance of 
uncertainty (Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale [IUS]; Buhr & Dugas, 2002), anxiety 
symptoms (Beck Anxiety Inventory [BAI]; Beck & Steer, 1993), and depressive 
symptoms (Beck Depression Inventory-II [BDI]; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). All of 
these measures have been widely used in both research and clinical contexts, and possess 
good to excellent psychometric properties (see above citations for detailed descriptions). 
Study procedure 
Overview 
Participants were tested individually. All interviews were video-recorded using a 
Sony DCR-SR82 digital camera, and were transferred to DVD for subsequent reliability 
checks and coding of participants' responses (see below). Testing took approximately 3-
4 hours, and participants took brief (10-15 minute) breaks following each interview. 
Diagnostic assessment 
The primary author (C.P.) administered the ADIS-IV (Brown et al., 1994) to all 
participants to establish their current diagnostic status. Participants whose symptoms met 
criteria for OCD were also administered the Y-BOCS (Goodman et al., 1989) to assess 
OCD symptom severity. Individuals who were eligible for the study were invited to 
complete the ICCRS, while those who did not meet the inclusion criteria were debriefed 
and compensated for their time. 
Administration of the ICCRS 
All ICCRS interviews were administered by a senior graduate-level research 
assistant. The interviewer had extensive experience in semi-structured interviewing, and 
received approximately 30 hours of additional training prior to the study, which included: 
(i) observing 1 mock and 2 pilot interviews conducted by C.P., (ii) co-conducting 3 pilot 
interviews (with C.P.), and (iii) conducting 1 mock and 1 pilot interview alone. All pilot 
interviews were video-recorded, and portions of each interview were subsequently 
viewed and discussed. In addition, the interviewer was given a detailed set of ICCRS 
guidelines and trouble-shooting instructions (see Appendix C) to promote adherence to 
the standardized ICCRS protocol and reduce potential interviewing errors (e.g., using 
leading questions or statements, making inferences, inappropriate use of prompts and 
probes, etc.). Lastly, to reduce potential bias effects, the interviewer was neither 
informed of the study hypotheses, nor of participants' diagnostic status prior to the 
completion of the study. 
The interview began by providing participants with definitions of reassurance-
seeking and repeated checking. For the purpose of the interview, reassurance seeking 
was defined as '''asking other people to reassure you that things will be 'OK', even though 
you have already received this information in the past... reassurance seeking can be 
more subtle, such as tentatively stating that things will be 'OK' and feeling reassured if 
others do not tell you otherwise". It was stressed that reassurance seeking involves 
seeking additional feedback after having already received assurance about a given topic 
at least once. Repeated checking was defined as "visually and/or physically checking 
that something is/will be 'OK' more than once". Participants were also provided with 
OCD- and MDD-relevant examples of reassurance-seeking (e.g., "Did you see me lock 
the door?", "Do you still love me?", "Is my work OK?", etc.) and checking (e.g., stove, 
school/work assignment, appearance, etc.), and were administered a series of brief 
comprehension questions to ensure they understood these concepts. 
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Each main section of the interview initially asked participants to describe and 
form a detailed mental image of a recent episode in which they had used the coping 
strategy of interest (i.e., reassurance seeking or repeated checking), and to refer to this 
image while answering subsequent questions, in order to increase the validity of their 
responses. Participants were next asked the open-ended questions listed above. To 
ensure that participants' answers were complete, they were prompted for additional 
responses following each question until they had provided at least three responses, or 
they could not think of any additional responses. The interviewer then asked participants 
to specify which of their responses applied most frequently, to arrive at their 'principal' 
response. Next, while re-visualizing the episode they had described earlier, participants 
provided a number of subjective ratings (on a 0-100 scale, see above) regarding the 
feelings and thoughts they experienced during the episode. 
Completion of self-report measures 
After completing the interview, participants were asked to fill out a brief online 
questionnaire package which included the self-report measures listed above. Finally, 
they were debriefed, compensated, and thanked for their participation. 
Interview integrity 
An integrity check was performed to ensure consistency in the administration of 
the ICCRS, and to measure adherence to the interview protocol (see Appendix D for 
integrity check scoring system). Ten (20%) of the interviews were randomly chosen and 
scored (by C.P.) for: adherence to ICCRS scripts for participant instructions and 
feedback, proper usage of prompts and probes, and adherence to other ICCRS guidelines. 
Adherence to the protocol was 97.55% for the scored interview sample. All deviations 
from the script were minor (e.g., omitting a few non-essential words to shorten 
questions), and the interviewer did not make any inappropriate inferences or misrepresent 
any of the participants' responses. 
Coding 
All ICCRS interviews were coded for subsequent analyses, following 
recommendations outlined by Gillham (2000). Two undergraduate research assistants 
who were blind to participants' psychiatric status viewed the recordings independently 
and transcribed participants' responses to the open-ended questions onto coding sheets 
(see Appendix E). The coders were trained to categorize participants' responses by 
viewing and coding 3 pilot interviews, using guidelines provided in a coding manual 
created by the first author (see Appendix F). Coders were required to obtain a minimum 
of 95% agreement with both the interviewer and each other on all 3 pilot interviews 
before they could begin coding for the study. 
Categories for participants' responses were initially developed based on 
cognitive-behavioral theory and were refined through team research meetings and pilot 
testing. Additional categories were created as necessary, according to participants' 
responses during the interview (i.e., when responses did not fit neatly within the initial 
categories). In cases of disagreement between coders, a consensus was reached by 
consulting the interviewer's response classification. 
Results 
Symptom measures 
Participants' mean scores and group comparison statistics for the self-report measures are 
displayed in Table 2.2. A series of one-way independent ANOVA's was conducted, 
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Table 2.2. 





































Note: Group means with differing subscripts differed significantly at the 0.01 level. 
* -p < .01, ** —p < .001 (Bonferonni-adjusted for multiple comparisons). 
BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory, BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, OBQ = Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire, VOCI = Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory, VOCI 
check = checking subscale of the Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory, IUS = 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. 
where group (OCD vs. MDD vs. HC) served as the between-participants factor and 
participants' scores on each measure served as the outcome variable. Participants in the 
MDD group reported the most severe depressive symptoms (BDI) followed by 
participants in the OCD and HC groups, respectively. Depressed participants also 
reported significantly greater intolerance of uncertainty (IUS) than those in the OCD and 
HC groups, whose scores did not differ significantly from each other. In addition, 
participants in the MDD group scored significantly higher on a measure of maladaptive 
obsessional beliefs (OBQ) than those in the HC group, while neither the MDD or HC 
groups differed from the OCD group. 
Participants in the OCD group reported significantly more checking behavior 
(VOCI checking subscale) than both the depressed and non-clinical participants, who did 
not differ from each other. However, participants in both the OCD and MDD groups 
scored significantly higher on measures of total obsessive-compulsive symptomatology 
(VOCI) and anxiety symptoms (BAI) than those in the HC group. 
Reliability checks 
Diagnostic reliability 
In order to assess the reliability of participants' diagnoses, 12 (24%) of the 50 
ADIS-IV interviews were randomly selected and reviewed on DVD by a research 
assistant who had extensive experience with diagnostic assessment. The rater was blind 
to the diagnoses assigned by the primary assessor and was asked to provide a complete 
Axis I diagnostic profile for each participant. The principal and additional diagnoses 
assigned by the assessor (C.P.) and the independent rater were compared for the sample, 
and 100% inter-rater agreement was found.2 
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Coder reliability 
To assess ICCRS and coder reliability, the categorization of participant responses 
was compared between coders for 14 (28%) of the 50 interviews. Inter-rater agreement 
was excellent (95.81%) in the comparison sample. 
Descriptive analyses 
Tables 2.3-2.6 display the different themes (i.e., categories) represented by 
participants' responses to the open-ended questions on the ICCRS (a detailed description 
of response categories is available upon request). Each table indicates for each group: (i) 
the percentage of participants who endorsed each category as their principal (i.e., most 
frequently applicable) response, and (ii) the percentage of participants who endorsed each 
category at any point during their response. For the sake of clarity and conciseness, only 
categories endorsed by at least 10% of participants in any group are displayed (complete 
results available upon request), and the following analyses focus solely on participants' 
principal responses. Sample participant responses are provided throughout for illustrative 
purposes. 
Content 
As shown in Table 2.3, participants in the OCD group reported that they most 
frequently seek reassurance about potential general threats: "I'll ask [my husband], 'Are 
you sure you checked the fire alarm? ... Are you sure the stove is off?'... even though 
I've already asked"; "Germs, sharp objects ... things that go into your body I guess or ... 
things that can happen". In addition, several OCD participants reported that they most 

















































































































































































































































































































































me"; "Whether a person still cares". Similar to reassurance seeking, compulsive 
checking was also most often associated with perceived general threats: "The door in the 
back being locked, the heat being normal temperature or off... that my alarm clock is off, 
the toaster and the rice maker are unplugged, that the stove and the oven are off, that the 
water is not dripping in the kitchen"; "Whenever I mail letters or cheques or bills ... 
making sure that it went down the box, so I have to open it at least 5 times". 
In contrast to the OCD group, the most common focus of reassurance seeking 
reported by both MDD and HC group participants was social threats: "Asking my fiance 
if they love me" (MDD); "Do you love me; are you angry?" (MDD); "Do I still make you 
happy?"(HC); "Do I do anything that bothers you? ... Do I say wrong things in front of 
your friends?" (HC). In addition, several participants in the MDD group reported seeking 
reassurance mainly about personal performance and/or competence: [Doubts regarding] 
"competence in everything from my work to my ability to run my household"; "I'm 
constantly ... trying to find out if I'm meeting that standard, if I'm doing things fast 
enough". However, similar to the OCD group, a significant minority of participants in 
both the MDD and HC groups reported that they primarily seek reassurance about a 
variety of potential general threats: "Did you see me take my bus pass?"(MDD); "... are 
we OK with money and for the future?" (HC); "... if I hear (my sister) come in at 3am ... 
I'll ask her 'Did you lock the door?' ... and I'll keep asking her" (HC). 
The primary checking themes in both the MDD and HC groups were perceived 
general threats: "I check to make sure my hair straightener is off... I'm always a little 
paranoid about fire" (HC); "... the stove, the kettle, the iron, the lock" (HC); "The 
windows, and to make sure the door is locked" (MDD); "If I'm leaving the apartment, 
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things like leaving the light or the oven on" (MDD); and doubts regarding performance 
and/or correctness on tasks: "School work I tend to check over quite a few times" (HC); 
"... the correctness of written things" (MDD). 
Triggers 
Table 2.4 displays the main triggers of participants' reassurance seeking and 
checking behavior. OCD group participants reported that the principal triggers of both 
their reassurance seeking and checking behavior were anxious mood and doubts 
regarding the reduction of general threats: "I'm doubting whether or not there will be a 
safety issue that will arise from having not done something" (reassurance seeking); "I'm 
doubting ... whether I actually did it and also whether it was properly performed ... let's 
say for a tap, whether I turned it off all the way or I left it dripping or not" (checking); 
"[I'm thinking] that it's not locked and I'll be robbed" (checking); "I'll check the stove 
just to make sure it's off... I'm usually afraid that something will catch on fire" 
(checking). Additionally, several OCD participants reported that perceived social threats 
are the primary trigger of their reassurance seeking episodes: "... I was super insecure 
about our relationship"; "Is he cheating on me?", whereas their compulsive checking 
episodes were also often triggered by doubts regarding personal competence and/or task 
performance: "People will ask me; 'Are you incompetent?"; "... the fear of making a 
mistake". 
Similar to the OCD group, checking behavior in the MDD and HC groups was 
commonly triggered by perceived general threats: "I have lost my wallet more than once 
. . . I always have the urge to make sure 1 haven't lost it again" (HC); "the stove ... I think 
29 
CN »-H 
ON T j - — . 
CN 
> o i—i 
o r- I-H 
ON OS 
<n CN 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































* - > 
03 
>» 






















































































































































































it is on and there will be a fire" (HC); "... feeling maybe vulnerable or unsafe... I worry 
if I'm going to be at home and somebody is just going to just walk in" (MDD), and 
doubts regarding personal performance and/or competence: "... I'm not sure if I've done 
it correctly" (in regard to school work) (MDD); "Uncertainty or lack of confidence ..." 
(HC). However, relative to the OCD group, MDD and HC group participants reported 
that reassurance seeking was more frequently triggered by perceived social threats: "... a 
feeling that someone doesn't like me or they're angry at me or frustrated or something" 
(HC); "[I'm afraid of] him leaving me" (HC); "the doubt or insecurity I'm experiencing 
at the time with the relationship" (MDD), and doubts regarding personal performance 
and/or competence: "[I] just don't feel... competent; that I can't make that decision on 
my own"(MDD); "... if I'm not sure I did it [a work project] properly" (HC). 
Function 
Participants' motivations for engaging in reassurance seeking and checking 
behavior are displayed in Table 2.5. Among OCD respondents, the main functions of 
both behaviors were to reduce anxiety and to prevent general harm (i.e., ensure safety), as 
illustrated by the following reasons provided for reassurance seeking: "... [to ensure] 
they're not out to fire me"; "to make sure that the consequences [e.g., fire, theft] won't 
happen"; and for checking: "... [to get] assurance about... my safety [and] others' 
safety"; "I don't want my house to burn down ... [or] to get broken into". 
Similar to individuals with OCD, a majority of participants in the MDD and HC 
groups reported that their principal reasons for checking were to decrease anxiety and to 
prevent general harm: "... to make sure that I get a good grade" (HC); "I just want to 
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harm, or for people getting in a fire in my house ... just to stop it" (MDD). Likewise, a 
considerable number of MDD participants stated that the main function of ERS was to 
reduce anxiety. However, in comparison to the OCD group, a noticeably higher 
percentage of participants in the MDD and HC groups indicated that their reassurance 
seeking was primarily intended to prevent social harm; "I want the correct answer for 
what I'm asking ... [that] he's not going to leave me" (HC); "[to be reassured that they] 
are not mad at me" (MDD), or to increase self-esteem and/or receive attention: "... (to) 
boost my self-esteem"(HC); "I'm hoping that they will convince me that I look nice" 
(HC); "I would like to get some confidence back; I would like to feel better about 
myself (MDD). 
Termination Factors 
As shown in Table 2.6, the primary factors involved in the termination of 
reassurance seeking episodes among OCD respondents were interpersonal concerns: "I 
pick up social cues, like somebody is getting fed up"; "I think it's partly embarrassment, 
or the feeling that if I ask one more time ... this person is going to wonder what's going 
on", rationalization: "I know that they cannot give me any solution except talking to me"; 
"... feeling that it's ridiculous to keep on asking ... you know the answer", and reduced 
anxiety. While interpersonal concerns also contributed to the termination of checking in 
this group, the most common reason for stopping was a perceived reduction in general 
threat: "I realize it's off; "Remembering that it has been checked or that it has been 
double checked and there's no reason to go back". 
Similar to the OCD group, a large portion of participants in the MDD group 
































































































































































































































































































































































































concerns: "Fear ... like you're becoming a turn-off... fear of rejection altogether"; 
"Usually I stop because the person is getting more angry because I'm asking if they're 
angry", rationalization: "... no matter how many times I hear it, I still won't believe it ... 
so it's that sense of pointlessness", or reduced anxiety. However, the most common 
single factor contributing to the termination of depressive reassurance seeking was a 
perceived reduction in social threats: "If my friend calls me ... then it feels like I don't 
have to call her [to see if we're still friends]"; "I'm satisfied with the reassurance ... that 
they like me and appreciate me". In contrast, checking behavior was most likely to stop 
in the MDD group following a perceived reduction of general threats: "When I'm 
satisfied that it's in order and the work is good"; "When I know that it's off, I stop, 
because it's very easy to see". Additionally, several participants reported that rational 
self-statements allow them to stop checking: "[I] shouldn't be putting so much effort into 
something that's not the end of the world"; "... the realization that you just have to stop 
at some time". 
Lastly, HC group participants most commonly reported that perceived social 
threat reduction is the principal factor in terminating their reassurance seeking episodes: 
"When I see that everything [in our relationship] goes back to normal"; "... [when] I 
know that... they will be my friends no matter what". Other common themes were a 
perceived reduction in general threats: "[When I am sure] ... that everything is going as 
planned ... we have enough money"; "If they're confident that I locked it, I will feel 
more confident that I locked it", and believability of previous assurance: "... [Feeling 
reassured that] what [was] said couldn't be interpreted in any other way"; "... it's more 
than the initial answer ... it clears up the ambiguity"; "I'll probe until I get an explanation 
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that is believable to me ...". With respect to checking, the majority of HC group 
participants reported that they typically stop when they perceive a decrease in general 
threats: "Once I become convinced that it's OK ... it's a good time to stop"; "... seeing 
the door locked when I re-check". 
Comparative analyses of subjective ratings 
Participants' mean subjective ratings of anxiety, sadness, perceived threat and 
responsibility, and ambiguity (of prior feedback and checks) are shown separately for 
each coping behavior (reassurance seeking and checking) in Table 2.7. A series of one-
way independent ANOVA's was performed in order to compare ratings across groups. 
Participant group served as the independent variable, while each of the above-listed 
ratings served as the dependent variable for each analysis. Effect sizes are reported as 
Cohen's d, with small, medium and large effects represented by values of 0.2, 0.5, and 
0.8, respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
Reassurance seeking episodes 
There was a significant difference between groups with respect to the amount of 
anxiety experienced at the onset of reassurance-seeking episodes, F(2,42) = 4.11 ,p < 
.05, d = 0.63. As recommended by Field (2005), planned contrasts were conducted, 
which revealed that participants in the OCD and MDD (i.e., clinical) groups experienced 
significantly greater anxiety than HC participants, /(43) = 2.86,/? < .01, d = 0.87. 
However, the anxiety reported by OCD and MDD participants did not differ, /(43) = 0.07, 
n.s. Significant group differences also emerged with respect to the amount of sadness 
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Contrasts showed that clinical participants reported significantly more sadness than those 
in the HC group, t(43) = 2.56,p < .05, d = 0.78, and depressed respondents reported 
significantly more sadness than those in the OCD group, /(43) = 2.07, p < .05, d = 0.63. 
Lastly, the amount of perceived threat reported by participants differed according to 
group, F(2,42) = 7.16,/? < .01, d = 0.83, such that the clinical group participants reported 
significantly higher threat than those in the HC group, /(43) = 3.63, p < .05, d= 1.11. 
However, the perceived threat experienced by MDD and OCD respondents did not differ 
significantly, /(43) = 1.00, n.s. Participants in the three groups did not differ with respect 
to their ratings of perceived responsibility, F(2, 42) = 0.87, n.s., ambiguity of feedback, 
F(2,42) = 0.92, n.s., or believability of feedback, F(2,42) = 0.03, n.s. 
Checking episodes 
With respect to checking, there was a significant difference between groups in 
terms of anxiety, F(2, 42) = 4.33, p < .05, d= 0.64. Participants in the clinical groups 
experienced significantly higher anxiety than those in the HC group, /(43) = 2.90, p < .01, 
d- 0.88, whereas OCD and MDD participants' anxiety ratings did not differ, t{43) = -
0.48, n.s. Significant group differences also emerged with respect to sadness experienced 
during checking, F(2, 42) = 4.50, p < .05, d = 0.65. Specifically, clinical participants 
reported significantly greater sadness than HC participants, /(43) = 2.05,p < .05, d = 
0.62, and depressed respondents experienced significantly greater sadness than those in 
the OCD group, ?(43) = 2.19, p < .05, d = 0.67. Furthermore, there was a significant 
difference between groups in terms of perceived threat, F(2, 42) = 6.26, p < .01, d = 0.77, 
such that clinical participants reported significantly higher perceived threat than those in 
the HC group, /(43) = 3.53,p < .01, d = 1.08, although the two clinical groups did not 
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differ, /(43) = 0.17, n.s. There were no group differences with respect to perceived 
responsibility, F(2, 42) = 0.16, n.s., or ambiguity of previous checks, F(2, 42) = 0.32, n.s. 
Discussion 
The present study sought to clarify factors involved in the onset, maintenance, and 
termination of reassurance seeking and checking behavior, particularly within the 
contexts of OCD and depression. A summary and discussion of findings is presented 
below. 
Content and Triggers 
Participants' ERS and checking behavior was focused on a number of distinct 
areas. As expected, individuals with OCD reported that they primarily seek reassurance 
about perceived general threats (and to a lesser degree, social threats), whereas depressed 
individuals reported that they tend to seek reassurance about perceived social threats, as 
well as their performance/competence on various tasks. Although HC respondents were 
most likely to seek reassurance about various social threats, many individuals in this 
group reported that they primarily seek reassurance about general threats. Similar to 
ERS, the vast majority of OCD respondents reported that their checking is principally 
focused on perceived general threats, whereas checking behavior was relatively equally 
associated with general threats vs. task performance/correctness in the MDD and HC 
groups. 
Similarly, the most commonly reported triggers of both ERS and repeated 
checking among OCD respondents were elevated anxiety and perceived threats of 
general harm. In contrast, these behaviors were primarily triggered in the MDD and HC 
groups by doubts about personal performance/competence, perceived social threats (in 
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the case of ERS), and perceived general threats (in the case of repeated checking), 
suggesting that episode triggers are highly consistent with the content of ERS/checking 
within each group. 
It is evident from these findings that reassurance requests tend to differ among 
individuals with OCD vs. depression; individuals with OCD mainly seek reassurance 
about perceived general threats, whereas depressed individuals are most frequently 
concerned about perceived social threats or their performance/correctness on tasks. 
These results are consistent with cognitive-behavioral and interactional models which 
emphasize the importance of biased threat perceptions and responsibility beliefs in OCD 
(e.g., OCCWG, 2005; Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis 1985, 1999), and concerns about 
potential abandonment, loss and failure among depressed individuals (e.g., Beck, 1967, 
1976; Coyne, 1976; Haeffel et al., 2007). 
In addition, the data suggest that routine checking behavior is performed in 
relation to a greater variety of concerns among MDD and HC vs. OCD groups (see Table 
2.3). Whereas OCD respondents reported checking perceived general threats almost 
exclusively, the percentage of participants in the MDD and HC groups who primarily 
checked their performance/correctness or appearance (combined) was comparable to 
those who typically checked perceived general threats. Likewise, participants in the 
OCD group reported a greater variety of concerns in association with their reassurance 
seeking vs. their checking behavior, as ERS commonly focused on perceived social 
threats and personal performance/competence in addition to general threats. One 
potential explanation for this finding is that people may choose to seek reassurance about 
concerns that are impractical or inconvenient to personally check. It is presumably more 
difficult to engage in physical or visual checking of some types of concern (e.g., about 
potential social loss or abandonment ["Do you still love me?"], personal responsibility 
for harm ["Will you blame me if there is an accident?"], self-esteem, etc.) than others 
(e.g., general and/or health threats involving visible signs of risk, appearance-related 
concerns). Consistent with this interpretation, only 1 participant in the entire sample 
reported checking in relation to perceived social threats, whereas such threats were the 
focus of ERS for a large percentage of respondents. Likewise, individuals may be more 
inclined to seek reassurance about performance/correctness (as opposed to checking) if 
they are concerned about others' opinions regarding their abilities, whereas it may be 
more convenient and/or less socially disruptive to check visually/physically in cases 
where the individual can confidently evaluate their own performance (e.g., checking for 
simple grammar or spelling mistakes, checking the stove, locks, etc.). However, further 
research is required to explicitly assess the reasons why individuals choose one coping 
strategy (i.e., reassurance seeking vs. checking) over another in a given situation. 
Function 
As predicted, OCD respondents reported that their main reasons for seeking 
reassurance were to reduce anxiety and to prevent general harm. In contrast, the majority 
of MDD and HC participants indicated that their ERS is primarily intended to prevent 
social harm or to increase self-esteem / elicit affection from others, although several 
depressed respondents also reported seeking reassurance to reduce anxiety. All 3 groups 
endorsed anxiety reduction and general harm prevention as the principal functions of 
checking. 
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In line with Rachman's (2002) theory, these findings suggest that compulsive 
checking and ERS are functionally equivalent in the context of OCD, as both behaviors 
are primarily intended to decrease anxiety and/or prevent general harm. These results are 
also consistent with interactional models of depression (e.g., Coyne, 1976; see also 
Haeffel et al., 2007; Joiner & Metalsky, 2001; Potthoff, Holahan, & Joiner, 1995), which 
implicate ERS in the perpetuation of rejection/abandonment fears and low self-esteem via 
unintentional reinforcement of negative self-schematic beliefs. 
However, not all of our predictions were confirmed. For instance, diminishing 
responsibility for harm was rarely endorsed as a principal function of either ERS or 
repeated checking in any of the groups. This finding appears to contradict cognitive-
behavioral accounts of OCD (e.g., Salkovskis, 1985,1999; Salkovskis et al., 2000), 
which propose that inflated responsibility is central to the onset and maintenance of 
compulsive behavior. However, given that experimental manipulations of responsibility 
have consistently been shown to affect anxiety levels, compulsive urges, and/or checking 
behavior in prior research (Ladouceur et al., 1995; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Parrish & 
Radomsky, 2006; Salkovskis et al., 2000; Shafran, 1997), it is proposed that our data 
collection methods (i.e., a semi-structured interview) may have contributed to this 
counter-theoretical finding. Indeed, even if many individuals' ERS/checking behavior is 
in fact intended (at least in part) to diminish their personal responsibility for harm, they 
may have been more likely to spontaneously report the salient goal of preventing harm, 




Clinical participants frequently reported that they terminate ERS due to 
interpersonal concerns (e.g., fears of embarrassment, causing others to become 
angry/frustrated, etc.), reductions in anxiety, or rational self-talk. However, the most 
common reason for terminating ERS among depressed respondents was a perceived 
reduction in social threats. Similar to the MDD group, HC participants reported that they 
primarily terminate reassurance seeking due to a reduction in social threats, although 
general threat reductions and eliciting believable feedback were also commonly endorsed 
as termination criteria. In all 3 groups, checking behavior was most commonly 
terminated due to a perceived reduction in general threat. However, several OCD 
respondents reported that they stop checking primarily due to interpersonal concerns, 
while a number of depressed individuals reported using rational self-talk to stop 
checking. 
These findings provide mixed support for our hypotheses. As expected, 
depressed individuals reported that they tend to stop ERS once social threats appear 
diminished, consistent with their fears of social rejection/abandonment. This lends 
support to Coyne's (1976) interactional model, which implies that depressive reassurance 
seeking is intended to secure relationships and/or increase self-worth. However, contrary 
to prediction, perceived decreases in general threat were not instrumental in OCD 
respondents' decisions to stop ERS behavior according to self-report. This contrasts with 
our findings that (i) OCD-driven ERS is frequently focused on, triggered by, and 
intended to reduce general threats, (ii) OCD checking stops primarily due to a perceived 
reduction in general threats, and (iii) depressive ERS was principally related to social 
threats across all the domains of content, triggers, function and termination. This might 
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be explained by the fact that individuals seeking reassurance (as opposed to checking) are 
often unable to personally verify that a general threat has been reduced, either because of 
their inability to check or the hypothetical nature of the threat. Thus, general threat 
reduction may be an inappropriate criterion for termination under these circumstances. In 
contrast, the reassurance provider is often the source of perceived threat among depressed 
individuals (e.g., due to the possibility of rejection/abandonment), thus it may be more 
feasible for them to utilize perceived decreases in (social) threat as a primary criterion for 
termination, as was found in this study. However, these ideas are speculative, and further 
research will be required to examine these hypotheses. 
Another notable finding is that interpersonal concerns were endorsed as an 
important termination factor for ERS in both clinical groups (as well as for checking in 
the OCD group), suggesting that these individuals are acutely aware of the potential 
negative consequences of their maladaptive coping behaviors on their relationships (e.g., 
Joiner, Alfano & Metalsky, 1992). This finding is interesting in light of Coyne's (1976) 
proposal that negative feedback from others (e.g., verbal criticism, displays of anger or 
frustration, etc.) in relation to ERS undermines depressed individuals' self-esteem, and 
therefore increases their likelihood of seeking additional reassurance. While our results 
do not directly contradict this theory, they suggest that individuals might experience an 
approach/avoidance conflict in relation to ERS, such that they feel the urge to approach 
and seek reassurance from others in an attempt to secure their relationships, while at the 
same time, wish to avoid interpersonal rejection due to their persistent requests for this 
feedback. 
Lastly, several HC respondents indicated that the quality of feedback (believable 
vs. insincere, clear vs. ambiguous) they receive influences whether they will continue to 
seek reassurance. Thus, future studies might examine the relative impact of quality vs. 
quantity of feedback in determining individuals' subsequent reassurance seeking 
behavior. 
Cognitive and affective variable ratings 
Consistent with cognitive-behavioral theories of compulsive behavior (Rachman, 
2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1999), the onset of both ERS and repeated checking was 
associated with higher anxiety and threat estimations among clinical vs. non-clinical 
participants. Depressed individuals reported similar levels of anxiety and perceived 
threat as OCD respondents, suggesting that biased threat appraisals (see Beck & Clark, 
1999; Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985) may not be specific to anxiety-disordered 
populations. Rather, our findings suggest that the primary type of threat (i.e., general vs. 
social) that triggers compulsive behavior may differ between OCD and MDD groups. 
However, this finding must be interpreted with caution, since the MDD group included a 
number of individuals with comorbid anxiety (particularly GAD). 
Not surprisingly, depressed individuals reported greater sadness at the onset of 
reassurance seeking and checking episodes than both OCD and HC participants. This 
suggests that depressed mood may have served as a trigger and/or maintaining factor for 
perseverative behavior, as proposed by mood-as-input theory (e.g., Davey, Startup, Zara, 
MacDonald, & Field, 2003; MacDonald & Davey, 2005). Alternatively, this result may 
have simply been due to higher baseline levels of depression among MDD group 
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participants, given that increased sadness was rarely endorsed as a principal trigger of 
ERS or repeated checking in this group. 
Lastly, participants in all 3 groups reported fairly high levels of perceived 
responsibility and ambiguity in relation to both ERS and checking. Although no 
significant group differences emerged with respect to these variables, this suggests that 
both perceived responsibility and the quality of feedback (i.e., clear vs. ambiguous) 
received from others may be important factors in the onset of compulsive behavior. 
Accordingly, future investigations might examine how experimental manipulations of 
these variables affect subsequent reassurance seeking and checking behavior, in order to 
elucidate the various processes that underlie these compulsions. 
Study limitations 
The present study had several limitations. First of all, the sample size was 
relatively small, which limited statistical power and the generalizability of our findings. 
Thus, replication in a larger sample will be required before any firm conclusions can be 
drawn based on our results. Secondly, we relied exclusively on participants' self-report 
to assess factors involved in the onset, maintenance, and termination of ERS and repeated 
checking episodes. Problems with this approach include potential issues surrounding the 
validity of participants' responses, as well as the assumption that participants possess 
sufficient insight to recognize (and report) the factors that underlie their maladaptive 
coping strategies. In anticipation of these problems, focused imagery was used 
throughout the ICCRS to enhance participants' recollection of relevant ERS and repeated 
checking episodes. Nonetheless, our findings must be interpreted with caution. Studies 
which include experimental manipulations of factors that may influence ERS and 
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repeated checking (e.g., perceived threat, responsibility, ambiguity, etc.), and which 
employ other data collection methods (e.g., behavioral observation, interviews with 
significant others, physiological tests, etc.), will be instrumental in further advancing our 
understanding of these maladaptive processes. Lastly, despite the exclusion criteria used 
in this study, a large proportion of individuals in the clinical (particularly the MDD) 
groups presented with diagnostic comorbidity. Although it is common in real-world 
practice to encounter high comorbidity rates among clinical populations (Kessler et al., 
1994), the absence of 'pure' MDD and OCD groups limited our ability to draw firm 
conclusions about the specific effects of depression vs. anxiety on participants' ERS and 
repeated checking behavior. In particular, it is difficult to ascertain whether our findings 
in the MDD group resulted from the effects of depression, generalized anxiety, or both, 
given the high rate of GAD symptoms in this group. Accordingly, it is recommended 
that future investigations in this area recruit and compare "pure" anxious and depressive 
groups, in order to assess the specific effects of each symptom domain on the constructs 
of interest. 
Conclusion 
The present study was the first to compare factors involved in ERS and repeated 
checking in OCD vs. depression. Notwithstanding the above limitations, it provided 
empirical evidence to support leading cognitive-behavioral and interactional models of 
these disorders. In line with predictions from these theories, our findings indicate that 
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compulsive behavior is highly related to the unique cognitive and behavioral processes 
that are characteristic of OCD and depression. In addition, our results suggest some 
promising avenues for future work in this area, such as examining how quality of 
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reassurance (e.g., clear vs. ambiguous, believable vs. insincere) might impact upon 
subsequent compulsive urges and behavior. Continued research in this area will be 
instrumental in guiding both theory and practice, as researchers and clinicians strive to 
better understand the optimal methods for reducing patients' compulsive behavior. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Study 1 employed a semi-structured interview to enquire about factors involved in 
the onset, maintenance and termination of ERS and repeated checking in the lives of 
people suffering from OCD or Depression, and in non-clinical controls. This 
investigation was relatively unique in that it compared the similarities and differences 
between these behaviours across clinical (OCD and MDD) and non-clinical populations. 
In line with Rachman's (2002) proposal, the results from this study revealed that OCD-
related ERS and compulsive checking are highly related in terms of content, triggers and 
function. In addition, participants' ratings in the quantitative portion of the interview 
indicated that the onset of both of these behaviours is associated with elevated levels of 
anxiety, perceived threat, perceived responsibility and ambiguity of 
feedback/information. However, although interview methods provide a rich source of 
data from which new and testable theories can be developed, the limitations associated 
with this approach precluded our ability to infer causality from this study. That is, 
though OCD participants indicated that the variables listed above were elevated at the 
onset of reassurance seeking and checking, we cannot conclude that changes in these 
variables lead to or cause changes in compulsive urges and/or behaviour. According to 
Field and Davey (2005), the sole means by which causal direction can be established is 
through the experimental manipulation of variables purported to influence the outcome(s) 
of interest. Thus, Study 2 used a series of vignettes to manipulate experimentally those 
variables that were implicated in the onset of reassurance seeking and/or checking 
episodes in Study 1 (i.e., perceived threat, perceived responsibility and perceived 
52 
ambiguity of feedback), and to examine the impact of these variables on participants' 
anxiety and compulsive urges. 
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CHAPTER 4 
An Experimental Investigation of Factors Involved in Excessive Reassurance Seeking: 
The Effects of Perceived Threat, Responsibility and Ambiguity on Compulsive Urges and 
Anxiety 
Excessive reassurance seeking (ERS) has been reported to be a hallmark feature 
of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) by several researchers (e.g., Clark, 2004; 
Morillo, Belloch & Garcia-Soriano, 2007; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Salkovskis, 1985, 
1999; Steketee, 1993; Tolin, 2001). In the context of OCD, reassurance seeking can be 
defined as the repeated solicitation of safety-related information from others about a 
threatening object, situation or interpersonal characteristic, despite having already 
received this information. For example, individuals with OCD commonly report seeking 
reassurance about the completion and/or accuracy of anxiety-provoking tasks (e.g., "Did 
you see me lock the door?"; "Are you sure you turned the stove off completely?", etc.), 
decision-making (e.g., "Are you sure I won't regret buying this item?"), the meaning of 
their obsessions (e.g., "Does having these thoughts mean that I am going crazy?"), and 
the potential for contamination (e.g., "Has this hospital room been sterilized?"), among 
other concerns. The following statement made by an OCD sufferer provides a clear 
illustration of this process: 
It started 3 years ago when we were running late for lunch with friends. I didn't 
have time to check everything as I usually do; I could only check each thing once. 
I asked my boyfriend if the stove was off, and he said "yeah", but 1 didn't trust his 
answer completely. Through the rest of the evening, I kept asking and he kept 
saying "don't worry; it's probably fine". Now, 1 won't let him get away with that 
54 
anymore. Now, whenever I ask, he has to say, "I saw it; I heard it; I know it; and 
I promise". 
This example clearly highlights the highly ritualized form that OCD-driven 
reassurance seeking can take, such that reassurance may not be 'accepted' unless it is 
provided a certain way or a certain number of times. This also suggests that reassurance 
seeking may not always be motivated by the desire to solicit novel information. 
Importantly, these repeated pleas for assurance can place considerable strain on 
interpersonal and romantic relationships, as friends and significant others may become 
irritated with the unrelenting requests for reassurance (de Silva & Rachman, 2009; see 
also Benazon, 2000; Coyne, 1976; Joiner, Alfano & Metalsky, 1992; Joiner & Metalsky, 
2001; Prinstein, Borelli, Cheah, Simon, & Aikins, 2005). In turn, these individuals may 
be more likely to provide feedback which is perceived to be ambiguous or insincere, 
which might increase the recipient's anxiety and urges to seek further reassurance within 
a given episode, thereby creating a vicious cycle (cf. Coyne, 1976). At the same time, the 
occasional provision of assuring and believable feedback is likely to (temporarily) 
decrease anxiety, and thus, to maintain reassurance seeking behaviour over the long term 
via negative reinforcement. 
Prior research on ERS has primarily focused on its potential consequences in the 
contexts of depression (e.g., Benazon, 2000; Joiner et al., 1992; Joiner & Metalsky, 2001; 
Joiner, Metalsky, Katz & Beach, 1999; Prinstein et al., 2005; Starr & Davila, 2008) and 
health anxiety/Hypochondriasis (e.g., Abramowitz & Moore, 2007; Hadjistavropoulos, 
Craig, & Hadjistavropoulos, 1998; Haenen, de Jong, Schmidt, Stevens & Visser, 2000; 
Salkovskis & Warwick, 1986). Despite its temporary anxiolytic effects (Abramowitz & 
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Moore, 2007; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1986), ERS has been found to breed further 
reassurance seeking behaviour and to contribute to interpersonal rejection, as well as 
increase one's vulnerability to depressive symptoms (Benazon, 2000; Joiner et al., 1992, 
1999; Joiner & Metalsky, 2001; Prinstein et al., 2005). Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
similar problems may arise from OCD-related ERS (e.g., Clark, 2004; Rachman, 2002; 
Salkovskis, 1985), yet there is clearly a paucity of research in this area, and much 
remains to be discovered about the mechanisms that underlie this problematic behaviour. 
Rachman (2002) proposes that OCD sufferers may engage in ERS as a means of 
checking "by proxy", and that both checking and reassurance seeking can be 
conceptualized as "attempts to reduce the probability of a nasty event occurring or to 
reduce the effects of such an event" (p. 629). He also noted that both of these acts serve 
to (temporarily) decrease perceived responsibility for preventing harm, thus highlighting 
the shared functions of these two behaviours. Given these proposed functional 
similarities, one might predict that factors involved in the onset and maintenance of 
compulsive checking may also serve to perpetuate ERS. 
For example, cognitive-behavioural theories of compulsive behaviour (e.g., 
Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989) posit that exaggerated threat appraisals (e.g., 
over-predictions of the likelihood and seriousness of potential threats), in conjunction 
with maladaptive responsibility beliefs, lead to heightened levels of anxiety and urges to 
check. Notably, Rachman (2002) has postulated that repeated checking will only occur if 
increases in perceived threat are accompanied by an inflated sense of responsibility, 
defined as "the belief that one possesses pivotal power to provoke or prevent subjectively 
crucial negative outcomes" (Salkovskis, Rachman, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1992). 
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Rachman has also suggested that repeated checking within a given episode results in 
paradoxical (further) increases in perceived threat and responsibility, as well as decreased 
confidence in memory for previous checks (see also Hout & Kindt, 2003a, 2003b; 
Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault, 2006; Tolin et al., 2001). Therefore, compulsive 
checking is purported to activate a "self-perpetuating mechanism" (Rachman, 2002, 
p.629), in which each successive check leads to ever-increasing anxiety and urges to 
check (again). In line with these theories, a number of investigations have demonstrated 
that higher levels of perceived responsibility/threat are associated with greater checking 
behaviour and/or urges to check (e.g., Arntz, Voncken, & Goosen, 2007; Foa, Sacks, 
Tolin, Prezworski, & Amir, 2002; Ladouceur et al., 1995; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; 
Parrish & Radomsky, 2006; Shafran, 1997). Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that 
cognitive biases involving exaggerated perceptions of threat and responsibility may also 
play an important role in triggering and/or maintaining OCD sufferers' reassurance 
seeking behaviour. 
Although the primary factors responsible for the onset of compulsive checking 
and reassurance seeking (e.g., increases in perceived threat and responsibility) may be 
similar, at least some of the mechanisms by which these behaviours are maintained 
within an episode may differ. For example, Rachman's (2002) model of compulsive 
checking asserts that decreased memory confidence is a key element of the "self-
perpetuating mechanism" described above. Consistent with this theory, research has 
shown that repeated checking leads to increased doubt regarding the 
accuracy/effectiveness of previous checks and greater urges to re-check, as such 
repetitive acts are subsequently recalled with less confidence, vividness and detail (Coles, 
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Radomsky, & Horng, 2006; Hout & Kindt, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Radomsky, Gilchrist, & 
Dussault, 2006). However, meta-memory declines seem less likely to play a major role 
in the maintenance of ERS. Although OCD sufferers may solicit reassurance habitually, 
repeating this behaviour should not distort their memories regarding the prior 
performance of actions (i.e., repeatedly asking whether one has properly turned off the 
stove should not (or at least not directly) affect the vividness or detail of one's memory 
for the physical act of turning it off). Granted, repeated requests for reassurance might 
lead to increased doubt regarding the content of previous feedback (e.g., "Was it today or 
yesterday that s/he reassured me that the door was locked?"). However, given that (i) 
significant decreases in meta-memory do not emerge until a large number of action 
repetitions have been performed (Coles et al., 2006), and (ii) OCD patients may be 
reluctant to seek reassurance more than a few times within a given episode due to fears of 
social rejection (Parrish & Radomsky, 2009), meta-memory decreases are presumably 
less likely to exacerbate reassurance seeking vs. checking behaviour. 
The inherent differences between compulsive checking and reassurance seeking 
imply further possible distinctions between factors that are likely to maintain these two 
behaviours. For example, reassurance seeking is an interactive process that involves the 
solicitation of feedback from other people, whereas compulsive checking is often 
performed in isolation (Rachman, 1976, 2002). Thus, interpersonal aspects of feedback 
provision are likely to play a key role in the maintenance of reassurance seeking, whereas 
their influence on checking behaviour maybe less relevant, direct and/or powerful. For 
example, the manner in which feedback is communicated to those seeking assurance may 
directly influence subsequent reassurance seeking behaviour. Feedback which is 
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perceived as ambiguous or uncertain (e.g., due to omission of important information, use 
of vague or unclear language, hesitant tone of voice, etc.) may ultimately exacerbate this 
behaviour in the short and/or long term, particularly if it is not part of a planned treatment 
strategy (e.g., exposure to uncertainty). 
Several converging lines of evidence provide indirect support for this hypothesis, 
particularly in the context of OCD and other anxiety disorders. First of all, it has been 
shown that individuals who are clinically anxious (Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1987; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991), as well as those who are 
highly intolerant of uncertainty (Dugas et al., 2005), are more likely to interpret 
ambiguous information as threatening than healthy controls and individuals who are more 
tolerant of uncertainty, respectively. Secondly, an increasing number of studies have 
found that intolerance of uncertainty (IU) plays a central role in OCD, particularly among 
individuals with checking compulsions (e.g., Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group [OCCWG], 2005; Steketee, Frost, & 
Cohen, 1998; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003; however, see Norton, Sexton, 
Walker, & Norton, 2005; Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003, for contrasting 
results); in turn, IU leads to increased information-seeking in response to ambiguity 
(Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997). Lastly, recent evidence suggests that first-time 
mothers with high state and trait anxiety are more likely than less anxious mothers to 
exhibit a threat bias when interpreting ambiguous information, and to want to seek 
reassurance in response to these perceived threats (Challacombe, Feldmann, Lehtonen, 
Craske, & Stein, 2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that individuals with 
OCD (and perhaps Generalized Anxiety Disorder; see Dugas et al., 2005) may be 
59 
especially likely to interpret ambiguous stimuli and events (such as unclear feedback) in a 
threatening manner, and to exhibit ERS in these situations. 
In summary, several cognitive factors including biased perceptions of threat, 
inflated responsibility beliefs, and biased (i.e., threatening) interpretations of ambiguous 
feedback, may contribute to the onset and maintenance of OCD-related reassurance 
seeking. The purpose of the current study is to examine how manipulations of perceived 
threat, responsibility, and ambiguity of feedback in a series of experimental vignettes 
impact upon participants' anxiety and compulsive urges (to seek reassurance and to 
check). 
Hypotheses 
Based on the above, the following hypotheses are proposed: 1) Individuals 
should report higher levels of anxiety and compulsive urges (to seek reassurance and to 
check) under conditions of (a) high (vs. low) perceived threat and (b) high (vs. low) 
responsibility, and 2) individuals who are provided with ambiguous feedback regarding 
potentially threatening situations should report subsequent increases in their anxiety, 




One hundred seventy-six volunteer undergraduate students from the Psychology 
Department at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada, participated in this study. 
Participants' mean age was 22.95 (SD = 5.37, range = 17-54) years, and 83.0% of 
participants were female. Participants were compensated for their time with either course 
60 
credit or entry in a draw for a cash prize. Participants' scores on relevant self-report 
symptom (and other) measures (see below) are displayed in Table 4.1. 
Materials 
Experimental vignettes. 
In order to examine how manipulations of perceived threat, responsibility and 
ambiguity of feedback impact upon participants' anxiety and compulsive urges (to seek 
reassurance/check), a series of five (i.e., three target and two filler) vignettes were 
developed for this study. Each vignette was comprised of two sections: in the first 
section, participants imagined themselves in a hypothetical scenario that portrayed a 
potential threat (e.g., fire, theft, flood, wasted electricity/water, etc.), while the second 
section provided participants with hypothetical feedback (i.e., reassurance) regarding this 
potential threat (see Appendix G for sample vignette). In each of the target (as opposed 
to filler) vignettes, threat and responsibility for harm were manipulated within the body 
of the hypothetical scenario, while the ambiguity level of feedback was manipulated in 
the second section of the vignette. Thus, we constructed eight versions of each of the 
three target vignettes (i.e., high vs. low threat X high vs. low responsibility X high vs. low 
ambiguity of feedback), which resulted in eight participant conditions (each participant 
was assigned to only one condition). In addition, two filler vignettes were included in the 
study to reduce demand characteristics. The filler vignettes, which depicted somewhat 
commonplace scenarios (e.g., deciding which product to buy at the supermarket), were 
excluded from our analyses, as perceived threat, responsibility, and ambiguity were not 
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For each vignette, participants were asked to provide a series of subjective ratings 
at two points in time (i.e., pre- and post-feedback) using a 0-100 scale. The first three 
ratings served as manipulation checks for: (i) perceived threat ("How 
threatening/dangerous do you feel this situation would be?"), (ii) perceived responsibility 
for preventing harm ("How responsible would you feel for making sure that you if 
you were in this situation?"), and (iii) perceived ambiguity of feedback ("How 
ambiguous would you feel the feedback from was in this situation?"). The next two 
ratings (taken at time 1 and 2, respectively) assessed the ease with which participants 
were able to imagine the hypothetical scenario, and the feedback provided in each 
vignette, respectively. Finally, the last three ratings served as the main dependent 
variables: (i) subjective anxiety ("How anxious would you feel in this situation?), (ii) 
urges to seek reassurance ("How strong would your urges to seek reassurance be in this 
situation?), and (iii) urges to check ("How strong would your urges to check be in this 
situation?"), in relation to the hypothetical scenario. Urges to seek reassurance were 
defined as "the urge to obtain anxiety-reducing information from other individuals about 
something you are concerned about"; while urges to check were defined as "the urge to 
check something related to your concern(s) yourself. For the purpose of statistical 
analyses, participants' mean ratings (across the three target vignettes) were calculated for 
each dependent variable at both time 1 and time 2. 
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire - 44 (OBQ-44; OCCWG, 2005). 
This 44-item questionnaire measures respondents' level of agreement with a 
number of maladaptive OCD-related beliefs. Items are rated on a scale of 1-7, with 
higher ratings indicating greater agreement with each belief. The OBQ includes 3 
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subscales that represent separate cognitive constructs hypothesized to be highly relevant 
to OCD: 1) responsibility and threat estimation (15 items), 2) perfectionism and 
intolerance for uncertainty (17 items), and 3) importance / control of thoughts (12 items). 
This scale possesses excellent internal consistency among individuals with OCD 
(Cronbach's a = .95), and comparable reliability was found in a student sample 
(OCCWG, 2005). 
Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004). 
This 55-item self-report measure assesses a broad range of OCD symptoms. 
Respondents rate each item on a scale of 0-4, and higher scores indicate more severe 
symptoms. The VOCI includes 6 subscales, corresponding to the 6 factors revealed by 
factor analysis: checking, contamination, obsessions, hoarding, "just right", and 
indecisiveness. The VOCI possesses good inter-item reliability in student, community, 
OCD, and clinical control populations (Cronbach's a = .96, .90, .94, and .98 
respectively). Test-retest reliability for the VOCI total score is very high in student 
samples (Pearson's r = .91, p < 0.001; Radomsky et al., 2006). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr & Dugas, 2002). 
This 27-item questionnaire assesses several aspects of intolerance of uncertainty 
(IU) that are commonly found among individuals suffering with Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder (GAD). Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale, and higher scores indicate 
greater IU. The IUS has demonstrated excellent internal consistency (a = .94), and good 
test-retest reliability (r = 0.74) over a five-week period in a student sample (Buhr & 
Dugas, 2002). 
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Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988,). 
This 21-item self-report measure assesses the severity of respondents' somatic 
anxiety symptoms during the past week. The BAI is widely used in both research and 
clinical settings and has been demonstrated to be highly reliable in student populations 
(Cronbach's a = .91; Borden, Peterson, & Jackson, 1991). 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
This 21-item self-report measure assesses the severity of respondents' depressive 
symptoms over the course of the previous two weeks. The BDI-II is a widely-used 
assessment tool, which has been shown to be highly reliable in a large student sample 
(Cronbach's a = .91; Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). 
Procedure 
This study employed a 2 (time) x 2 (threat condition) x 2 (responsibility 
condition) x 2 (ambiguity condition) mixed design, in which threat, responsibility for 
harm and ambiguity of feedback were experimentally manipulated. Thus, eight 
experimental conditions were created, and the dependent variable ratings were collected 
at two points in time (pre- and post-ambiguity manipulation). In each of the eight 
randomly-assigned conditions, participants were administered five vignettes in total, 
including three target vignettes all within the same condition (e.g., high threat-low 
responsibility-high ambiguity) and two filler vignettes. 
All of the study measures were completed online. Research has found that the 
online administration of self-report measures of OCD symptoms and beliefs (e.g., OBQ-
44) and depressive symptoms (e.g., BD1), yields comparable results to traditional paper 
and pencil methods (Coles, Cook & Blake, 2007; Schulenberg & Yutrzenka, 2001). 
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Participants were asked to imagine themselves in each scenario as they read the 
experimental vignettes. For each vignette, participants read the first section (which 
contained the threat and responsibility manipulations), and provided time 1 ratings of 
anxiety, urges to seek reassurance, urges to check, ease of imagining the scenario, 
perceived threat, and perceived responsibility, based on how they felt while imagining 
themselves in the scenario. Next, participants imagined that they had asked for 
reassurance regarding the potential threat presented in the vignette (e.g., whether or not 
they remembered to extinguish a set of dinner candles before leaving the house). They 
were given hypothetical feedback that was either ambiguous (e.g., "I think you might 
have ... everything is probably fine.") or unambiguous (e.g., "Don't worry. I remember 
seeing you blow out the candles."), depending upon their condition. Participants then 
completed each of the aforementioned ratings a second time (with "ease of imaging 
feedback" substituted for "ease of imagining scenario"), and rated the ambiguity of the 
feedback they received. Finally, participants filled out a brief questionnaire package 
which included the other study measures (i.e., OBQ, VOCI, IUS, BAI and BDI), and 
were debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
Results 
Participant Characteristics 
Participants in the eight conditions did not differ with respect to age, F{1, 149) = 
.54, n.s., nor did they differ in terms of their mean total scores on the OBQ, the VOCI, 
the BAI, or the BDI, F's(7, 168) < 2.04, n.s. However, there was a significant difference 
between groups with respect to scores on the IUS, F{1, 168) = 2.27,p < .05 (see Table 
4.1), although this group difference was absent when pairwise comparisons were 
conducted using a Bonferroni correction. A chi-squared analysis revealed that the 
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proportion of males to females did not differ significantly across the eight conditions (x 
[7, N = 176] = 8.84,/!.$.)• 
Imagery ability 
Participants did not differ in their ability to imagine the hypothetical scenarios 
across threat conditions, F(l, 168) = 3.86, n.s. (M=77.18 [S£> = 18.41] vs. 70.99 [SD = 
23.20]), or responsibility conditions, F(l, 168) = 1.43, n.s. (M= 75.97 [SD= 19.91] vs. 
72.20 [SD = 22.20]), and did not differ in their ability to imagine the feedback they 
received across ambiguity conditions, F(l, 168) = 1.00, n.s. (M= 74.75 [SD = 22.79] vs. 
77.89 [SD - 19.71]). These group means indicate that participants were able to imagine 
the hypothetical scenarios and the feedback depicted in the vignettes with considerable 
ease. 
Manipulation checks 
As predicted, participants in the high threat conditions rated the vignettes as 
significantly more threatening/dangerous than participants in the low threat conditions, 
F(l , 168) = 82.70,/? < 0.001, r = .57 (Af = 63.62 [SD = 23.24] vs. 34.52 [SD = 18.90], 
respectively). Likewise, participants in the high responsibility conditions reported feeling 
significantly more responsible for preventing a negative outcome than participants in the 
low responsibility conditions, F(\, 168) = 47.97,/? < 0.001, r = .47 (M= 77.28 [SD -
17.34] vs. 56.50 [SD = 23.39], respectively). Lastly, participants in the high ambiguity 
conditions rated the feedback they received as significantly more ambiguous than 
participants in the low ambiguity conditions, F(l , 168) = 147.20,/? < 0.001, r = .68 (M = 
66.44 [SD = 19.56] vs. 28.50 [SD = 23.44], respectively). The medium-to-large effect 
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sizes associated with these results indicate that the threat, responsibility and ambiguity of 
feedback manipulations were all effective. 
Main analyses 
To test our hypotheses, a 4-way mixed ANOVA was conducted. Time was the 
within-participants factor; while threat, responsibility and ambiguity conditions served as 
between-participants factors. For this analysis, the dependent variable was a composite 
rating that comprised the collective mean of participants' ratings of anxiety, urges to seek 
reassurance, and urges to check. Statistically significant results from the initial ANOVA 
were further explored by conducting follow-up univariate ANOVAs for each of the 
individual dependent variables. For the sake of brevity, we use the term 'compulsive 
urges' when referring collectively to urges to seek reassurance and urges to check in the 
remainder of the article. 
Results revealed significant main effects of time, F(3, 166) = 61.04,/? < .001, r = 
.52, threat condition, F(3, 166) = 11.59,/? < .001, r = .26, responsibility condition, F(3, 
166) = 6.38,/? < .001, r = .19, and ambiguity condition3, F(3, 166) = 9.62,/? < .001, r = 
.23, on participants' composite rating. In addition, significant interaction effects were 
found for time x threat condition, F(3,166) = 4.98, p < .01, r - . 17, time x ambiguity 
condition, F(3, 166) = 62.47, p< .001, r = .52, and time x threat condition x ambiguity 
condition, F(3, 166) = 3.94,p < .01, r = . 15. However, the time x responsibility 
condition, F(3, 166) = .65, n.s., and threat x responsibility condition interactions were not 
statistically significant, F(3, 166) = 1.31, n.s., nor was the interaction between time, 
responsibility condition and ambiguity condition, F(3, 166) = 2.13, n.s. Likewise, the 4-
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way interaction between time, threat condition, responsibility condition and ambiguity 
condition was not statistically significant, F(3, 166) = .26, n.s.4 
Follow-up analyses 
Participants' mean ratings across time and condition are presented in Table 4.2. 
There was a significant main effect of time on anxiety ratings, F(\, 168) = 126.60, p < 
.001, r= .66, urges to seek reassurance,F(\, 168) = 177.41,p < .001, r- .72, and urges 
to check, F(\, 168) = 123.98,/? < .001, r = .65, such that ratings on all 3 variables 
decreased significantly from time 1 to time 2 when collapsing across all conditions. In 
addition, a significant main effect of threat condition was found for anxiety ratings, F(l, 
168) = 34.82,p < .001, r = .41, urges to seek reassurance, F(\, 168) = 26.65,p < .001, r = 
.37, and urges to check, F( l , 168) = 24.73, p < .001, r = .36, such that ratings for all 3 
variables were higher in the high vs. low threat conditions. Likewise, there was a 
significant main effect of responsibility condition on anxiety ratings, F{\, 168) = 5.14,/? 
< .05, /'= .17, and urges to check, F(l , 168) = 10.88,/? < .001, r = .25, such that 
participants' ratings for both of these variables were higher in the high vs. low 
responsibility conditions. However, the effect of responsibility condition on urges to 
seek reassurance was not statistically significant, F(l, 168) = .76, n.s. 
The time x threat condition interaction was significant for anxiety ratings, F(l, 
168) = 10.44,p < .01, r = .24, and urges to check, F(\, 168) = 4.48,p < .05, r = . 16, but 
was not significant for urges to seek reassurance, F{\, 165) = .66, n.s. Specifically, the 
decrease in participants' anxiety and urges to check from time 1 to time 2 was 
significantly greater in the high vs. low threat conditions, when collapsing across 
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interaction was significant for anxiety ratings, F{ 1, 168) = 185.15, p < .001, r = .72, urges 
to seek reassurance, F{ 1, 168) = 91.31, p < .001, r = .59, and urges to check, F{ 1, 168) = 
125.25, /? < .001, r = .65. This indicates that the amount of change in participants' pre- to 
post-feedback ratings for each of the main dependent variables (i.e., anxiety and 
compulsive urges) differed according to the type of feedback (i.e., high vs. low 
ambiguity) they received. Specifically, participants in the low ambiguity conditions 
reported significantly greater decreases in their anxiety ratings and compulsive urges 
from time 1 to time 2 than those in the high ambiguity conditions (see Figures 4.1a-4.1c). 
The 3-way interaction between time, threat condition and ambiguity condition 
was significant for anxiety ratings, F(\, 168) = 10.87,p < .01, r = .25, urges to seek 
reassurance, F(l , 168) = 9.45,p < .01, r= .23, and urges to check, F(l, 168) = 8.27,;? < 
.01, r= .22. As illustrated in Figures 4.2a-4.2c, the ambiguity of feedback manipulation 
had a larger effect on participants' anxiety and compulsive urges in the high vs. low 
threat conditions. 
Mediation analyses 
Given that the ambiguity of feedback manipulation significantly influenced 
participants' ratings of perceived threat and responsibility in the hypothetical scenarios5, 
we performed a series of tests to determine whether perceived threat and responsibility 
might act as mediators of the effects of ambiguity on anxiety and compulsive urges (to 
seek reassurance/check). The predictor variable was participants' mean rating of 
perceived ambiguity of feedback, while the outcome variables (which were analyzed 
separately) were their (time 2) mean ratings of anxiety, urges to seek reassurance and 
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ratings of perceived threat and perceived responsibility. Although the study design did 
not allow us to determine the direction of causality in this analysis (as the proposed 
mediators and outcome variable ratings were collected at the same time), the proposed 
mediation model is most consistent with leading cognitive behavioural theories of OCD 
(e.g., Rachman, 1997, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; van Oppen & Amtz, 1994). 
A bootstrapping method was employed to assess the feasibility of the proposed 
multiple mediation effects (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008, for a thorough explanation of 
this technique). We used an SPSS macro developed by Preacher and Hayes to estimate 
and compare the indirect effects (i.e., for each mediator, the product of path coefficients 
from [i] the predictor to the proposed mediator and [ii] the proposed mediator to the 
outcome) in our multiple mediation model. This analysis allowed us to measure whether 
the total effect of the predictor (i.e., perceived ambiguity of feedback) on each outcome 
(anxiety, urges to seek reassurance, urges to check, respectively) was significantly 
reduced when the mediators were added to the model. In other words, it assessed 
whether the specific and total indirect effects of the mediators were statistically 
significant for each outcome variable. This was established by examining the 95% 
confidence intervals (CI's) for the size of the total and specific indirect effects that are 
produced by the macro commands; if the lower limit of the CI for a given effect was 
above zero, the null hypothesis was rejected and it was determined that the effect was 
significant. 
Before conducting each analysis, it was first necessary to establish that the effect 
of perceived ambiguity on each outcome variable was significant when ignoring the 
effect(s) of perceived threat and responsibility (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This pre-
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requisite was satisfied in each case; significant total effects were found for perceived 
ambiguity of feedback on anxiety, B = .75, SE = .05, t(\12) = 16.47,/? < .001, urges to 
seek reassurance, B = .73, SE = .05, t{ 172) = 13.539, p < .001, and urges to check, B = 
.78, SE= .05, f(172) = 15.56,/? < .001. 
Mediation analysis 1: Anxiety 
The first mediation analysis was conducted with participants' anxiety ratings as 
the outcome variable. Results showed that the total indirect effect (i.e., the sum of both 
mediation pathways) was significantly different from zero at/? < .05, B — .45, SE = .05, 
95% bootstrap CI of 0.35 to 0.56, indicating that taken together, perceived threat and 
responsibility mediated the effect of perceived ambiguity of feedback on anxiety. 
However, since the direct effect of perceived ambiguity on anxiety (after controlling for 
the proposed mediating effects) was significant, B - .30, SE = .04, /(172) = 6.65, p < 
.001, complete mediation did not occur. Examining the specific indirect effects, both 
perceived threat, B = .40, SE= .05, 95% bootstrap CI of 0.29 to 0.51, and perceived 
responsibility, B = .05, SE = .03, 95% bootstrap CI of 0.08 to 0.12, were found to have 
significant partial mediating effects on the relationship between ambiguity and anxiety. 
The positive direction of all of the above-listed coefficients is consistent with the 
hypothesis that low-ambiguous feedback led to decreases in perceived threat and 
responsibility, which, in turn, led to decreases in anxiety. 
Mediation analysis 2: Urges to seek reassurance 
Our second mediation analysis employed participants' urges to seek reassurance 
as the outcome variable. Again, the total indirect effect was significant, B = .39, SE = 
.06, 95% bootstrap CI of 0.28 to 0.52, which indicates that together, participants' 
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perceived threat and responsibility in the hypothetical scenarios mediated the effect of 
perceived ambiguity of feedback on their urges to seek reassurance. The direct effect of 
perceived ambiguity on urges to seek reassurance was also significant, B = .34, SE = .07, 
/(172) = 5.09,p < .001, indicating that only partial mediation occurred. Perceived threat 
was found to partially mediate the effect of ambiguity on urges to seek reassurance, B = 
.33, SE - .06, 95% bootstrap CI of 0.22 to 0.46, whereas perceived responsibility was not 
a significant mediator, B = .06, SE = .04, 95% bootstrap CI of 0.00 to 0.15. Thus, results 
suggested that lower levels of perceived ambiguity led to decreases in perceived threat 
and responsibility, which, in turn, may have (collectively) led to decreases in urges to 
seek reassurance. 
Mediation analysis 3: Urges to check 
In the third mediation analysis, participants' urges to check served as the outcome 
variable. Once again, the total indirect effect was significant, B = .44, SE = .06, 95% 
bootstrap CI of 0.33 to 0.56, and the direct effect of ambiguity on urges to check was 
significant, B = .33, SE = .05, /(172) = 6.03,/? < .001, indicating incomplete mediation. 
Perceived threat, B = .27, SE= .06, 95% bootstrap CI of 0.15 to 0.38, and perceived 
responsibility, B= .18, SE= .04, 95% bootstrap CI of 0.10 to 0.28, were both found to be 
significant partial mediators of ambiguity on urges to check. Therefore, the hypothesis 
that lower perceived ambiguity led to decreases in perceived threat and responsibility, 
which, in turn, led to decreases in urges to check, was supported. 
Notably, a comparison of indirect effect sizes revealed that the mediating effect of 
perceived threat was larger than that of perceived responsibility for anxiety (B = .40 vs. B 
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= .05, respectively), urges to seek reassurance (B = .33 vs. B = .06, respectively), and 
urges to check (B = .27 vs. B = AS, respectively). 
Discussion 
Consistent with our predictions, high (vs. low) levels of perceived threat in a 
series of imagined scenarios were associated with greater self-reported anxiety and 
compulsive urges. Likewise, high (vs. low) levels of perceived responsibility for 
preventing harm were associated with higher ratings of anxiety and greater urges to 
check. However, contrary to prediction, manipulations of responsibility did not 
significantly affect participants' urges to seek reassurance. In partial support of our 
hypotheses, low-ambiguous feedback regarding potential threats led to immediate and 
sizeable decreases in anxiety and compulsive urges, whereas ambiguous feedback did 
not. Although ambiguous feedback did not lead to significant increases in participants' 
anxiety and compulsive urges, it appeared to prevent decreases in these ratings when 
compared to non-ambiguous feedback. Importantly, our findings were consistent with 
the hypothesis that differential changes in perceived threat and perceived responsibility 
following high- vs. low-ambiguous feedback partially mediated this effect. 
The present findings are highly consistent with cognitive-behavioural 
conceptualizations of OCD (e.g., Rachman, 1997, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; van 
Oppen & Arntz, 1994). As would be predicted by Rachman's (2002) model of 
compulsive checking, perceived threat and responsibility for preventing harm appeared to 
act as "cognitive multipliers" for compulsive urges, as manipulations of these variables 
significantly influenced participants' anxiety, urges to check, and (in the case of threat 
only) urges to seek reassurance. Thus, our findings generally supported our first 
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hypothesis. However, while manipulations of perceived threat significantly affected all 
three dependent variables (i.e., anxiety, urges to check and urges to seek reassurance), 
perceived responsibility did not influence participants' urges to seek reassurance. This 
non-significant finding appears to contradict the hypothesis that OCD-related reassurance 
seeking is intended to spread responsibility for preventing harm to others (e.g., Rachman, 
2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989), and it is important to acknowledge this possibility. 
However, there are several possible alternative explanations for this result. 
First, even if inflated responsibility contributes to ERS behaviour, increases in 
responsibility for preventing harm may not play as large a role in eliciting urges to seek 
reassurance as urges to check. Following this reasoning, increases in perceived 
responsibility for harm may lead people to check potential sources of threat themselves, 
rather than to rely on reassurance from others. Particularly when perceived responsibility 
is high, reassurance seeking behaviour may be reserved for situations in which checking 
would be difficult (e.g., due to physical removal from the source of concern), and thus, 
reassurance seeking might be best understood as a 'backup-to-checking strategy'. 
Consequently, our responsibility manipulation may have had a limited influence on 
participants' urges to seek reassurance, relative to their urges to check. However, our 
data do not fully support this contention, as participants' urges to seek reassurance were 
comparable in strength to their urges to check across responsibility conditions (see Table 
4.2), suggesting that participants' preference for checking over reassurance seeking in 
threatening situations was slight. 
A second possibility is that, unlike OCD sufferers, our non-clinical sample did not 
possess maladaptive/inflated responsibility beliefs, and thus, should not have been 
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expected to react to high levels of responsibility with greatly increased urges to seek 
reassurance. However, this explanation is problematic, since (i) the responsibility 
manipulation had significant effects on participants' ratings of anxiety and urges to 
check, and (ii) previous studies that have manipulated responsibility in non-clinical 
samples (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 1995; Parrish & Radomsky, 2006) have found reliable 
effects in terms of compulsive urges and/or behaviour. 
A third potential explanation for this finding is that our responsibility 
manipulation was not as effective as our threat manipulation, thus limiting statistical 
power to detect the effect of responsibility on urges to seek reassurance. Consistent with 
this interpretation, the threat manipulation check yielded a large effect size, compared to 
a medium effect size for the responsibility manipulation check. In addition, while the 
main effect of perceived responsibility on urges to seek reassurance was not statistically 
significant, an inspection of means revealed that group differences were in the expected 
direction (i.e., participants in the high responsibility conditions reported higher urges to 
seek reassurance than those in the low responsibility conditions). This suggests that a 
more effective responsibility manipulation and/or a larger sample size may have yielded 
significant results. Yet, this interpretation still fails to explain why manipulations of 
perceived responsibility significantly influenced participants' self-reported anxiety and 
urges to check, but not their urges to seek reassurance. It is important to note that none of 
these potential explanations preclude the hypothesis that OCD-related reassurance 
seeking is (at least partially) intended to diminish responsibility for preventing harm. 
However, additional research is required to test whether a more salient manipulation of 
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responsibility (e.g., very high vs. very low or no responsibility) would lead to a significant 
effect in terms of participants' reassurance seeking urges and/or behaviour. 
This study aimed to determine how manipulations of feedback ambiguity impact 
upon people's anxiety and compulsive urges. Importantly, our findings provide strong 
and novel evidence that ambiguity of (re)assurance may be an important factor in the 
perseveration of checking and reassurance seeking behaviour, particularly in the context 
of OCD-related fears. Consistent with our hypotheses, higher levels of ambiguity were 
associated with the maintenance of threat-induced anxiety and compulsive urges (as 
compared to a decrease in these variables under conditions of low ambiguity). These 
effects were especially apparent under conditions of heightened threat (see Figures 4.2a-
4.2c), suggesting that a simultaneous increase in perceived threat and ambiguity may 
have a synergistic effect on compulsive urges and behaviour. 
In addition, results were consistent with a model in which perceived threat and 
responsibility partially mediated the effects of ambiguity of feedback on anxiety and 
compulsive urges (although responsibility was not a significant mediator for urges to seek 
reassurance). Notably, participants' threat appraisal mediated the effects of ambiguity on 
anxiety and compulsive urges to a greater degree than their perceived responsibility for 
preventing harm. Therefore, threat appraisals may be more important than perceived 
responsibility in determining people's cognitive (and perhaps behavioural) reactions to 
receiving ambiguous (re)assurance. These findings also suggest that perceived 
responsibility may play a greater role in maintaining checking vs. reassurance seeking 
behaviour. However, it is important to note that perceived threat and responsibility are 
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likely not orthogonal in nature (OCCWG, 2005); it would therefore be necessary to 
replicate these findings before affirmatively drawing this conclusion. 
Given recent evidence which suggests that IU may be highly relevant to OCD 
(Holaway et al., 2006; OCCWG, 1997, 2005; Steketee et al., 1998; Tolin et al., 2003), it 
is reasonable to suspect that OCD sufferers might respond to ambiguous/uncertain 
feedback regarding potential threats with greater anxiety and compulsive urges than did 
our non-clinical sample. Indeed, IU might exacerbate reassurance seeking and/or 
checking behaviour in OCD via three inter-related processes; individuals who 
demonstrate high IU (i) may be more likely than non-clinical individuals to interpret 
obsessional doubts regarding potential threats as indicative of real and intolerable risks 
(ii) might require that feedback regarding their fear-related doubts be clear and precise 
(i.e., non-ambiguous) in order to consider this reassurance "acceptable" (Constans, Foa, 
Franklin, & Mathews, 1995), and (iii) may be unable to tolerate the anxiety/discomfort 
evoked by feedback which is perceived as even slightly ambiguous or uncertain, thereby 
promoting ERS. Similarly, OCD sufferers may experience considerable distress if the 
reassurance provider displays any signs of irritation or annoyance with their repeated 
requests for reassurance ("How many times do I have to tell you ... I always lock the 
door before I leave the house! Why would I forget today?"), which may lead to further 
pleas for anxiety-reducing feedback (c.f, Benazon, 2000; Coyne, 1976; Joiner et al., 
1992, 1999). Consistent with this theory, recent evidence suggests that believability of 
feedback (due to a lack of perceived ambiguity and/or insincerity) is a common criterion 
for terminating reassurance seeking episodes (Parrish & Radomsky, 2009). Thus, it is 
possible that repeated reassurance seeking might lead to a "self-perpetuating mechanism" 
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akin to that described by Rachman (2002), whereby persistent requests for reassurance 
(driven in part by perceived threat, responsibility and/or IU) lead to increasingly 
dismissive and/or ambiguous feedback from others, which, in turn, leads to greater urges 
to seek (further) reassurance. However, further research is needed to test these 
predictions, and to further clarify the mechanisms by which ambiguity exerts its effects 
on anxiety and compulsive urges. 
The present findings have a number of potential clinical implications. First, as 
proposed by Rachman (2002), our results suggest that the motivations underlying ERS 
and compulsive checking may be similar in the context of potential threats, since there 
was corresponding variance in participants' urges to seek reassurance and their urges to 
check in the hypothetical scenarios across the threat, responsibility and ambiguity 
conditions6 (see Table 4.2). Accordingly, cognitive-behavioural interventions that are 
routinely employed to diminish compulsive checking in OCD (e.g., exposure and 
response prevention, behavioural experiments) should also be effective in reducing 
patients' persistent and maladaptive reassurance seeking (Clark, 2004; Salkovskis & 
Warwick, 1985; Steketee, 1993). In addition, our findings suggest that perceived threat, 
which has been established as a key factor in the onset and maintenance of compulsive 
checking (e.g., Arntz et al., 2007; Foa et al., 2002; Ladouceur et al., 1995; Lopatka & 
Rachman, 1995; Parrish & Radomsky, 2006; Shafran, 1997), may also contribute to the 
perseveration of reassurance seeking behaviour. Thus, therapists aiming to reduce their 
patients' ERS would be well-advised to employ strategies designed to decrease their 
exaggerated threat appraisals. Lastly, our results indicate that the tendency to interpret 
reassurance in a biased fashion (e.g., as ambiguous, uncertain, threatening, etc.) may be 
important to target in treatments aimed at reducing compulsive behaviour. 
Several limitations of this study warrant discussion. First, due to ethical and 
practical constraints, we employed a series of vignettes to examine how manipulations of 
threat, responsibility and ambiguity of feedback would affect non-clinical participants' 
anxiety and compulsive urges, rather than manipulating these variables in real-life 
situations. As such, the external validity of our results can be questioned, and hence, 
ecologically valid tests of the predictions outlined in this study are required to firmly 
establish the current findings in clinical (OCD) populations. Similarly, we relied solely 
on subjective ratings to test our hypotheses. It will be important for future research in 
this area to include behavioural and/or physiological indices of people's responses to 
increased threat, responsibility and ambiguity of feedback, as people's self-reported 
anxiety and compulsive urges may not always correspond with their actual behaviour. 
In addition, the current study assessed only the immediate effects of providing 
participants with ambiguous vs. low-ambiguous feedback regarding potential threats. 
Given the importance of negative long-term effects (e.g., increases in anxiety and 
compulsive urges, reinforcement of maladaptive beliefs) in perpetuating compulsive 
checking and other neutralization behaviour (see Rachman, 2002; Rachman, Shafran, 
Mitchell, Trant, & Teachman, 1996, Salkovskis, 1985, 1999), additional research that 
examines the long-term effects of both ambiguous and non-ambiguous feedback on 
anxiety and compulsive urges is needed. It would be especially informative to examine 
the specific time course/durability of these effects, as well as to investigate additional 
factors that might moderate these effects (e.g., quantity and consistency of feedback, 1U, 
84 
feedback expectancy, etc.). Furthermore, the mediation model proposed in this study (in 
which perceived threat and responsibility partially mediated the effects of feedback 
ambiguity on anxiety and compulsive urges) could not be established conclusively, as the 
mediating and dependent variable ratings were collected at the same point in time. 
Therefore, it will be important for future investigations to measure these variables at 
different time points, in order to fully understand these effects and firmly establish the 
direction of causality. Likewise, in the absence of a no-feedback condition, it was 
impossible to determine whether ambiguous feedback served to actively maintain high 
levels of anxiety and compulsive urges as proposed, as these ratings might have remained 
elevated even without the provision of ambiguous feedback. Lastly, the current 
investigation did not assess whether gender, ethnic and/or cultural factors affected 
participants' anxiety and compulsive urges in the hypothetical scenarios. Since these 
variables may be influenced by such factors (e.g., due to socio-cultural norms and 
expectations), future investigations should examine the role that gender, culture and 
ethnicity might play in promoting (or limiting) compulsive urges and behaviour. 
In summary, the present findings suggest that peoples' anxiety and compulsive 
urges in potentially threatening situations are influenced by a number of factors, 
including perceived threat, responsibility for preventing harm, and ambiguity of 
(re)assurance. Results also showed that perceived threat and ambiguous feedback might 
increase anxiety and compulsive urges in a synergistic manner, such that ambiguous 
(re)assurance may be particularly difficult to accept under conditions of high perceived 
threat. Taken together, these findings suggest that heightened perceptions of threat and 
responsibility play an important role in the onset and maintenance of checking and (for 
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threat only) ERS, while the provision of ambiguous feedback regarding potential threats 
may exacerbate these compulsive acts (via further increases in threat and responsibility) 
once they have already begun. Accordingly, cognitive-behavioural models of OCD 
would likely benefit from a greater focus on certain internal (e.g., IU) and external (e.g., 
others' responses to requests for reassurance) factors that are likely to influence OCD 
sufferers' anxiety and compulsive urges / behaviour. It is hoped that these findings will 
support future research aimed at gaining a better understanding of the mechanisms that 
underlie ERS and checking behaviour in OCD. 
CHAPTER 5 
General Discussion 
The present research had several objectives. My preliminary aim was to enquire 
about the cognitive, behavioural and affective processes involved in the perpetuation of 
ERS, specifically within the contexts of OCD and Depression. Given the purported 
functional equivalence between OCD-related reassurance seeking and compulsive 
checking (Rachman, 2002), the studies herein also sought to examine similarities and 
differences between ERS and repeated checking activity across a number of clinically-
relevant domains (i.e., content, precipitating factors, function and termination criteria). 
In addition, the current investigations were designed to test (both directly and indirectly) 
a number of theoretical predictions regarding cognitive and behavioural processes 
implicated in the onset and maintenance of these behaviours (e.g., Rachman, 2002; 
Salkovskis, 1985, 1999). 
Summary of findings 
Study 1 utilized a novel semi-structured interview (the ICCRS) to elucidate 
factors involved in the onset, maintenance, and termination of ERS and repeated 
checking in clinical (OCD and MDD) and non-clinical populations. This investigation 
was an initial attempt to bridge the gap between existing knowledge and theory regarding 
depressotypic ERS and the relatively less studied, yet commonly observed, OCD-related 
ERS using a mixed qualitative-quantitative approach. A component of the ICCRS 
required participants to provide ratings of cognitive and affective variables that were 
hypothesized as potential triggers of compulsive urges and behaviour (e.g., anxiety, 
sadness, perceived threat, perceived responsibility, perceived ambiguity, doubt). These 
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ratings, which were provided in relation to recalled episodes of ERS and repeated 
checking, were used to evaluate hypotheses derived from leading cognitive-behavioural 
theories of compulsive behaviour in OCD (e.g., Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1999) 
using quantitative methods of analysis. 
Importantly, this study found that OCD-related ERS and compulsive checking 
were highly similar with respect to content, triggers and function, in line with Rachman's 
(2002) assertion that these behaviours are functionally equivalent. In contrast, the 
principal focus of ERS differed in obsessive-compulsive vs. depressed individuals, who 
reported tendencies to seek reassurance about general threats vs. social or performance-
related threats, respectively. Other notable findings included the following: (i) clinical 
participants recalled experiencing considerable anxiety, perceived threat, perceived 
responsibility and perceived ambiguity (of feedback or information) at the onset of recent 
ERS and checking episodes, respectively (ii) OCD respondents reported a greater variety 
of concerns and potential triggers of ERS than for repeated checking episodes, (iii) 
quality of feedback (i.e., clear vs. ambiguous, believable vs. insincere) was reported to 
influence individuals' subsequent reassurance seeking behaviour, and (iv) interpersonal 
concerns (e.g., fear of embarrassment and/or rejection) were found to contribute to the 
termination of ERS episodes in both clinical groups. 
In Study 2, potentially threatening hypothetical scenarios were embedded in a 
series of vignettes to assess how manipulations of perceived threat, perceived 
responsibility and perceived ambiguity of feedback would impact upon non-clinical 
participants' anxiety and compulsive urges. Participants provided ratings of anxiety, 
urges to seek reassurance and urges to check in relation to each vignette (which contained 
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threat, responsibility and ambiguity of feedback manipulations). These ratings were 
collected at two points in time (i.e., pre- and post-ambiguity manipulation) in order to 
measure the unique effects of feedback quality (ambiguous vs. low-ambiguous) on the 
above-listed outcome variables. Consistent with leading cognitive-behavioural theories 
(e.g., Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1999), higher levels of perceived threat and 
responsibility led to greater anxiety and urges to check. Similarly, higher perceived 
threat led to greater urges to seek reassurance. Additionally, it was found that low-
ambiguous feedback led to significant decreases in anxiety and compulsive urges relative 
to ambiguous feedback, which appeared to maintain anxiety and urges evoked by the 
threatening scenarios. Lastly, our results revealed that the anxiogenic effects of 
ambiguity may be partially mediated by changes in perceived threat and (in the case of 
checking) perceived responsibility. 
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn based on these collective results. 
First, the primary focus and function of ERS appears to differ in OCD vs. Depression 
according to the distinct cognitive and behavioural processes that characterize these 
disorders (e.g., inflated responsibility/threat appraisals vs. preoccupation with 
• * S ? •-•• -
abandonment/loss/failure, respectively), as the type of threat (i.e., general vs. social) that 
elicited compulsive urges and behaviour reliably distinguished between these groups. 
Second, despite some apparent differences with respect to the range of triggering 
concerns and potential maintenance factors, it appears that OCD-related ERS can indeed 
be conceptualized as a functionally equivalent form of "checking by proxy" (Rachman, 
2002, p.629), as both of these behaviours were found to be primarily motivated by 
attempts to decrease anxiety and/or prevent general harm. Lastly, ambiguity of feedback 
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appears to be an important contributor to the maintenance of ERS, as low-ambiguous 
feedback regarding potential threats was found to significantly decrease anxiety and 
compulsive urges relative to ambiguous feedback. 
Clinical Implications 
In addition to the general conclusions outlined above, a number of clinical 
implications follow from the current findings. First, our results highlight the fact that 
although ERS is common among both OCD sufferers and depressed individuals, their 
primary motivation(s) for engaging in this behaviour tend to differ in subtle ways (e.g., to 
prevent general vs. social threats, respectively). Thus, clinicians might find it useful to 
enquire about the presence and function of ERS when formulating clients' difficulties, in 
order to effectively tailor treatment to their specific needs. Although some form of 
exposure and response prevention (ERP) would likely constitute a common element of 
any cognitive-behavioural interventions aimed at reducing ERS, supplemental treatment 
strategies employed in the contexts of OCD vs. Depression might differ in relation to the 
prominent concerns displayed by each group. For example, OCD sufferers may find 
cognitive strategies designed to reduce biased threat appraisals especially helpful, 
whereas depressed clients with social rejection fears may benefit from a particular focus 
on social skills training, given that these fears maybe realistic (e.g., Coyne, 1976; 
Haeffel, Voelz, & Joiner, 2007; Joiner, Alfano, & Metalsky, 1992) and less amenable to 
cognitive restructuring than the general harm-related fears that characterize OCD. 
Secondly, our findings indicate that the quality of feedback (i.e., clear vs. 
ambiguous) provided in response to requests for reassurance is likely to have a significant 
impact upon the recipient's subsequent anxiety and compulsive urges. Therefore, 
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individuals who are prone to ERS may respond to treatments that target potentially biased 
interpretations of feedback (e.g., as ambiguous or insincere), as well as those designed to 
increase tolerance of uncertainty (e.g., Dugas & Robichaud, 2006) and/or distress 
tolerance (e.g., Levitt & Cloitre, 2005; Linehan, 1993). Likewise, clinicians may find it 
helpful to collaborate with clients' family members and/or significant others, who could 
be advised to withhold reassurance from the client or to purposely provide ambiguous 
reassurance, with the explicit intent of facilitating exposure to uncertainty. 
Future directions 
Contrary to recent claims that ERS behaviour is uniquely associated with 
depression (Bums, Brown, Plant, Sachs-Ericsson, & Joiner, 2006; Joiner & Schmidt, 
1998), the present findings, in conjunction with previous research (e.g., Freeston & 
Ladouceur, 1997; Hadjistavropoulos, Craig, & Hadjistavropoulos, 1998; Salkovskis & 
Warwick, 1986; Tolin, 2001), suggest that ERS is better understood as a trans-diagnostic 
phenomenon. However, the only validated measure of ERS behaviour currently available 
is the Depressive Interpersonal Relationships Inventory (DIRI; Metalsky, Joiner, 
Potthoff, et ai, 1991), which includes a 4-item subscale that assesses respondents' 
tendency to seek reassurance as to whether others "truly care" about them. The narrow 
focus of this scale on one depressotypic manifestation of reassurance seeking (i.e., about 
one's "value" to others) is problematic, and has likely contributed to Joiner and 
colleagues' (Burns et al., 2006; Joiner & Schmidt, 1998) findings regarding the purported 
specificity of ERS to depression. Accordingly, there is a need for a valid and reliable 
measure of ERS that takes into account the broader contexts in which this behaviour is 
observed. Toward this aim, current efforts are underway to develop a novel self-report 
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measure of ERS behaviour. It is hoped that this scale will enable researchers to assess 
the presence and severity of respondents' reassurance seeking behaviour in relation to a 
broader array of concerns than was previously possible with the DIRI (Metalsky et al., 
1991). 
The present research suggests several additional directions for future work in this 
area. First, given the long-term detrimental effects associated with OCD-related 
compulsions and neutralizing behaviour (e.g., Rachman, 2002; Rachman, Shafran, 
Mitchell, Trant, & Teachman, 1996; Salkovskis, 1985, 1999), it will be important to 
study the long-term consequences of ERS (e.g., with respect to anxiety and compulsive 
urges) in the context of OCD and other anxiety disorders. Similarly, an examination of 
the long-term effects of ambiguous vs. non-ambiguous feedback on the above-listed 
variables would help to clarify the role of ambiguity in the perpetuation of ERS, and to 
guide interventions aimed at reducing this maladaptive behaviour. Studies which 
measure potential mediators of these effects (e.g., perceived threat and responsibility) 
across several time points would be particularly valuable in establishing the precise 
mechanisms by which interpersonal processes (e.g., feedback ambiguity) interact with 
cognitive, behavioural and affective variables to produce anxiety and compulsive urges 
overtime. 
Secondly, given that compulsive checking is exacerbated by increases in 
perceived responsibility which paradoxically occur following each check (Rachman, 
2002), and reassurance seeking is purportedly intended to decrease or distribute 
responsibility for harm to others (Salkovskis, 1985, 1999), a more detailed comparison of 
factors involved in the maintenance of ERS vs. compulsive checking is warranted. It will 
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also be important to examine the prevalence of ERS in other anxiety disorders, and to 
compare the content, triggers and function(s) of this behaviour across these disorders. 
In addition to the above enquiries, it would be interesting to examine how 
personality and other personal characteristics affect an individuals' choice of coping 
strategies. A prime example of this type of research is a recent study which found a 
positive relationship between attachment style and reassurance seeking behaviour in a 
non-clinical sample (Weardon, Perryman & Ward, 2006). Relatedly, future 
investigations could examine how reassurance seeking behaviour is influenced by stable 
factors such as sex and/or gender, personality, and culture vs. contextual/situational 
variables such as those employed in the current research (e.g., mood, perceived threat and 
responsibility). A final empirical question is how reassurance solicited from others 
differs from self-assurance in terms of onset, function and consequences. This could 
have important consequences for understanding the potential mechanisms underlying 
popular self-soothing statements and other 'self-talk' therapy techniques. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the current set of investigations sought to elucidate the mechanisms 
by which ERS is triggered and maintained in OCD and Depression. Clinical and non-
clinical participants were interviewed about their reassurance seeking and checking 
behaviour, and a series of experimental vignettes were utilized to examine how 
manipulations of perceived threat, perceived responsibility and perceived ambiguity of 
feedback impact upon individuals' anxiety and compulsive urges. It was concluded that 
OCD-related ERS and compulsive checking are highly related in terms of underlying 
concerns, precipitating factors (e.g., perceived threat) and motivations, whereas the 
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principal content and function of ERS appears to differ in OCD vs. Depression. 
Furthermore, the present research provided novel evidence to suggest that the provision 
of ambiguous reassurance may contribute to the persistence of reassurance seeking 
behaviour. Future research in this area should focus on examining the protracted effects 
of various types (e.g., ambiguous vs. non-ambiguous) of reassurance provision, as well as 




 There was trend toward a higher percentage of females in the HC vs. the OCD and 
MDD groups, p < . 10. 
2
 Inter-rater agreement for diagnoses was defined as follows: a) for each participant, both 
raters agreed on the principal diagnosis and group assignment, and b) where a diagnostic 
category score of 4 or higher was given by either rater, the other rater provided a severity 
score within a range of 1 (i.e., +/-1) of the other rater. 
3
 We do not report the main effect of ambiguity condition in our follow-up analyses, since 
participants' first set of ratings was collected prior to the ambiguity of feedback 
manipulation. 
4
 A 4-way mixed MANCOVA was conducted controlling for IUS scores, given that 
participants' scores on the IUS differed across the eight conditions. Results remained 
nearly identical, except in this analysis the main effect of time was no longer significant, 
F(3, 164) = 1.78, n.s., and there was a trend toward a significant time x responsibility x 
ambiguity condition interaction, F(3, 164) = 2.18,/? = .09. Thus, we did not control for 
IUS scores in any of the remaining analyses. 
5
 Low-ambiguous (but not ambiguous) feedback led to immediate and significant 
decreases in perceived threat [time 1 = 49.22(26.65), time 2 = 26.57(22.92)], F(l , 174) = 
85.83, p < .001, /' = .57, and perceived responsibility for preventing harm [time 1 = 
66.34(22.81), time 2 = 48.31 (27.78)], F(l, 174) = 47.06, p<. 001, r = . 46. 
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6
 Participants' urges to seek reassurance and urges to check were also strongly and 
significantly correlated at time 1, r = .80, p < .001, and time 2,r- .85,/? < .001. 
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OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER (OCD) RESEARCH 
Do you have unwanted intrusive thoughts, images or impulses? Do you repeat (e.g., check) 
things over and over again and/or seek reassurance repeatedly to feel less anxious or 
uncomfortable? Have you been diagnosed with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder? 
If you answered yes to any of these questions and you speak English on a daily basis, you may 
be eligible for a research study at the Fear and Anxiety Disorders Laboratory Psychology at 
Concordia University. Financial compensation will be offered. 
For more information please contact Stefanie at the Fear and Anxiety Disorders Laboratory at 
Concordia University: 
(514)848-2424 x.2199 
This research is being conducted by Dr. Adam Radomsky, Department of Psychology, 
Concordia University. 
DEPRESSION RESEARCH 
Have you been feeling sad, empty, or lost interest in your usual activities? Have you been 
diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder? Do you often seek reassurance from other people? 
If you answered 'yes' to these questions and you speak English on a daily basis, you may be 
eligible for a new time-limited research study at the Fear and Anxiety Disorders Laboratory at 
Concordia University. Financial compensation will be offered. 
For more information please contact Stella or Chris at the Fear and Anxiety Disorders 
Laboratory: (514)848-2424 ext.2199, c_parris@alcor.concordia.ca 
This research is being conducted by Dr. Adam Radomsky, Department of Psychology, 
Concordia University. 
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Appendix B: Interview for Compulsive Checking and Reassurance-Seeking Behaviour 
(ICCRS) 
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Participant ID#: Date: 
ICCRS 
Introduction: 
"Now I would like to ask you some questions about some behaviours that you may or 
may not engage in when you are feeling stressed, anxious, or depressed. Specifically, I 
would like to learn about some of the strategies you might use to cope with these 
feelings. Different sections of this interview focus on different types of coping behaviour 
and the order in which these will be covered has been randomly assigned. 
In one of these sections, I will be asking you some questions related to reassurance 
seeking behaviour. It is important that you understand what I mean by this; when I say 
reassurance seeking, this could mean asking other people to reassure you that things 
will be "OK", even though you have already received this information in the past 
Also, reassurance seeking can be more subtle, such as tentatively stating that things 
will be "OK" and feeling reassured if others do not tell you otherwise. It is important 
to note that reassurance seeking only refers to situations in which you have already 
received assurance or affirmation, and are seeking additional assurance. 
Some topics that people commonly seek reassurance about include the following: 
- Whether they have done something to harm or offend someone else (e.g., "Did 
I say something wrong?", "Are you sure I didn't cause our dinner guests to be 
sick?") 
- Whether or not others truly care about them (e.g., "Do you still love me?", 
"Are you mad at me?") 
- Whether or not they have completed an important task or duty properly, such 
as a work project, various home safety measures (e.g., "Did you see me lock the 
door?", "Is my work OK?") 
- Whether or not an object, event or situation is "safe" (e.g., "Do you think it's 
safe for us to be in this part of town?", "Has this hospital room been 
sterilized?") 
Do you have any questions about what I am referring to when I say "reassurance 
seeking"? 
-^ Answer any questions using variations of the definitions/examples provided above. 
Comprehension test: 
To ensure that I have been entirely clear in defining reassurance seeking for you, I would 
like you to tell me whether or not the following examples would constitute reassurance 
seeking, and if not, why not... 
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(a) You make a habit of asking your boss whether or not you are doing OK at work, even 
though your boss tells you each time that you are doing fine. 
Correct answer: yes 
(b) You notice a large mole on your arm after a day at the beach and go to the doctor to 
ask if it might be cancerous. She informs you that the mole is harmless, and you are 
satisfied with this response, so you don't worry about it anymore. 
Correct answer: no, because you only asked for assurance once, and did not seek 
additional reassurance. 
I will also be asking you some questions about repeated checking, which simply involves 
visually and/or physically checking that something is "OK" more than once. For 
example, some of the things that people say they check repeatedly include: 
- Aspects of their appearance 
- Whether or not they have completed a task or duty properly (e.g., locked the 
door, turned off the stove, completed a work/school assignment, etc.) 
- Whether or not they have caused harm in some way 
- Whether they have remembered to bring important objects or 
documents with them (e.g., passport, wallet, credit card, driver's license) 
Do you have any questions about what I am referring to when I say "repeated checking"? 
-^ Answer any questions using variations of the definitions/examples provided above. 
Comprehension test: 
To ensure that I have been entirely clear in defining repeated checking for you, I would 
like you to tell me whether or not the following examples would constitute repeated 
checking, and if not, why not... 
(a) You glance at the mirror on the way out the door to check that your hair looks OK 
Correct answer: no, because you only checked your hair once 
(b) After writing a letter, you check it 3 times for spelling and grammatical errors. 
Correct answer: yes 
Lastly, I will be asking you some questions about your exercise habits. For the purposes 
of this interview, exercise will be defined as any activity that you engage in that involves 
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prolonged (Le., > 5 minutes) and purposeful physical exertion. For the purposes of 
this interview, an activity is only considered to be exercise if part of the reason for 
engaging in the activity is to increase/maintain fitness. Examples include walking, 
running or jogging, playing sports, cycling, going to the gym, and swimming. 
Do you have any questions about what I am referring to when I say "exercise"? 
-> Answer any questions using variations of the definitions/examples provided above. 
Comprehension test: 
To ensure that I have been entirely clear in defining exercise for you, I would like you to 
tell me whether or not the following examples would constitute exercise, and if not, why 
not... 
(a) You see a large spider in the bathroom and your startle response causes you to jump 
Correct answer: no, because the activity (i.e., jumping) was not prolonged or purposeful 
(b) You decide to go for a 10-mintue jog after a long day at work/school 
Correct answer: yes 
Do you have any other questions before we continue? OK, let's begin..." 
SECTION I - REASSURANCE SEEKING 
"Now I would like to ask you some questions about reassurance seeking. The questions 
in this section are focused specifically on reassurance seeking; the sections on checking 
and exercise will follow." 
1. Initial Inquiry 
During the past 6 months, have you ever sought reassurance from another person, either 
directly or indirectly? 
YES NO (please circle response) 
If "yes", proceed to open-ended questions. 
If "no", probe further (see below); if still "no", proceed to checking section 
Probe example: "Have you sought reassurance regarding the quality of your work? 
How about asking someone to reassure you that they care about you? ... or making sure 
that you have not disappointed someone, or forgotten something important? Are you sure 
you have not sought reassurance at all during the last 6 months?" 
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IMAGINAL EXERCISE 
"I would like you to take a minute to remember the most recent situation or set of 
situations in which you felt compelled to seek reassurance." 
(Pause for a moment to allow participant to reflect...) 
"Let me know when you have a recent episode in mind ..." 
-> (Slowly cite the following verbatim...) "Before you tell me about it, I'd like you to 
close your eyes and try to remember the specific details of this situation, including where 
you were, what you were doing, who you were with, what you were thinking and feeling, 
and the events that led up to your seeking reassurance under these circumstances. Once 
you have these details in mind, I'd like you to tell me how the situation(s) unfolded. 
Again, what was happening, who were you with, how were you feeling, and what was 
going through your mind at that time?" 
-> Allow participant to recount general details, then probe for any details listed above 
that were not specified by participant: 
*N.B. - Make sure that the participant is describing a reassurance seeking episode! 
Place / situation (w/ whom?): 
Thoughts / feelings: 
"OK, if I understood you correctly ... (provide general summary) 
-> BE CAREFUL NOT TO PROVIDE LEADING STATEMENTS! lie., try to use 
the participant's exact words and do not make inferences!]) 
"I'd like you to keep this episode in mind as we go through the next section." 
OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS 
"Now 1 would like to ask you some more specific questions about what happens in 
situations where you most frequently decide to seek reassurance. When answering these 
questions, try to think about what typically happens in these situations. If you are having 
trouble doing this, you can refer back to the specific episode you just described to me 
instead." 
~> Check for understanding of instructions and proceed with interview: 
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1. Content 
(i) First, I would like to know what sorts of things you seek reassurance about most 
frequently. Keeping in mind that reassurance seeking involves seeking out assuring 
information on a given topic repeatedly (i.e., more than just once), what are you 
especially likely to seek reassurance about? 
Possible categories: 
a) Perceived threat (health / contamination) 
b) Perceived threat (safety / harm) 
c) Perceived threat (loss / rejection / abandonment) 
d) Personal responsibility for harm 
e) Personal performance / competence 
f) Personal worth (e.g., likeability / appearance / "normality") 
g) Meaning of obsessions 
h) Other (please explain): 
If participant is unsure, prompt: When you are looking for reassurance, what are some of 
the things that you want to be reassured about? 
* Once the participant has finished providing his/her spontaneous responses, use the 
following probe: 
Probe: Are there any other concerns you have that you often seek reassurance about? 
* If less than 3 response categories provided, probe until 3 categories provided, or until 
participant can think of no more. 
*Summarize: 
"OK, so if I understood you correctly, you tend to seek reassurance about (insert 
responses) most frequently. Is this correct?" 
(ii) If more than J response category provided (or if unsure), ask: Of the things you just 
mentioned, which would you say you seek reassurance about most frequently? 
-> (If unsure, ask: "which causes you the most distress?") 
Answer: 
2. Onset / triggers 
(i) What usually prompts you to seek assurance in the first place? In other words, what 




a) Unwanted thoughts / images / obsessions 
b) Negative mood (anxious) 
-> (specify: ) 
c) Negative mood (depressive) 
-> (specify: ) 
d) Perceived (health/contamination) threat / Physiology 
e) Doubt re: removal/reduction of perceived threat (safety/harm) 
f) Inability to check 
g) Perceived responsibility for preventing harm 
h) Doubt re: personal performance / competence 
i) Perceived threat of loss / rejection / abandonment 
j) Doubt re: personal worth (e.g., likeability, appearance, "normality") 
k) Perceived loss of control 
1) Doubt re: memory 
m) Doubt re: perception 
n) Physical environment / location 
o) Other (please explain): 
If participant is unsure, prompt: What changes in your thoughts and feelings typically 
occur just before you feel the urge to seek assurance? How about changes in your 
environment or the situation? 
* Once the participant has finished providing his/her spontaneous responses, use the 
following probe: 
Probe: Are there any other situations, thoughts or feelings that typically trigger your 
urges to seek assurance? 
* If less than 3 response categories provided, probe until 3 categories provided, or until 
participant can think of no more. 
*Summarize: 
"OK, so if I understood you correctly, your reassurance seeking is typically preceded by 
{insert responses). Is this correct?" 
(ii) If more than 1 response category provided (or if unsure), ask: Of the triggers you 
just mentioned, which would you say most frequently precedes your urges to seek 
reassurance? 




(i) What is your main motivation for seeking reassurance in the situation(s) you 
mentioned earlier (remindparticipant ofanswer(s) they gave to question 1, part i)l In 
other words, what do you want to happen with regard to your mood, thoughts, and/or the 
situation when you seek reassurance in this/these situations? 
Possible categories: 
a) Remove intrusive thought / reduce obsessions 
b) Decrease negative mood (anxious) 
-> (specify: ) 
c) Decrease negative mood (depressive) 
-> (specify: ) 
d) Prevent harm (health/contamination) 
e) Prevent harm (general safety) 
f) Prevent harm (loss/rejection/abandonment) 
g) Decrease responsibility for harm 
h) Achieve "just right" / completeness feeling 
i) Increase perceived control 
j) Receive attention / affection from others; increase self-esteem/self 
confidence 
k) To prevent checking 
1) To prevent harm (minor matters) 
m) Other (please explain): 
If participant is unsure, prompt: What do you hope will change if you get reassurance? 
* Once the participant has finished providing his/her spontaneous responses, use the 
following probe: 
Probe: Are there any other reasons that you have for seeking reassurance with regard to 
your mood, thoughts, and/or the situation? 
* If less than 3 response categories provided, probe until 3 categories provided, or until 
participant can think of no more. 
*Summarize: 
"OK, so if I understood you correctly, your primary reasons for seeking reassurance are 
(insert responses). Is this correct?" 
(ii) If more than 1 response category provided (or if unsure), ask: Of the answers you 
just gave, what would you say is the main reason that you seek reassurance? 




(i) Lastly, what causes you to stop seeking reassurance about something within a given 
episode? In other words, what thoughts, moods and/or situations tell you that you can or 
should stop? 
Possible categories: 
a) Physical / mental exhaustion 
b) Interpersonal concerns (may annoy others / cause embarrassment) 
c) Mood improves (anxious): 
d) Mood improves (depressive): 
e) Rationalization 
f) Achieve sense of control 
g) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (health/contamination) 
h) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (safety) 
i) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (loss/rejection/abandonment) 
j) Reduction in perceived responsibility for harm 
k) Effort/rules (e.g., asked as many times as can) 
1) No longer feel like continuing / boredom 
m) Achieve "just right" feeling/sense of "completeness" 
n) Time pressure 
o) Believe feedback 
p) Distraction 
q) Other (please explain): 
If participant is unsure, prompt: What sorts of cues, such as thoughts, emotions or 
events, let you know that you can or should stop asking for reassurance? 
* Once the participant has finished providing his/her spontaneous responses, use the 
following probe: 
Probe: Are there any other factors such as thoughts, moods or situations that cause you to 
stop seeking reassurance? 
* If less than 3 response categories provided, probe until 3 categories provided, or until 
participant can think of no more. 
*Summarize 
"OK, so if I understood you correctly, you tend to stop seeking reassurance when (insert 
responses). Is this correct?" 
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(ii) If more than 1 response category provided (or if unsure), ask: Of the factors you 
just mentioned, which is the most important in influencing your decision to stop seeking 
reassurance? 
Answer: 
"Now I'd like to ask you a few more questions about your reassurance seeking; some of 
which will be multiple choice and some of which will ask you to provide ratings on a 
scale of 0-100. You may find that some of the options in the multiple choice questions 
do not apply to you or that they sound strange, and you can just ignore these. Also, you 
should know that there isn't any right or wrong answer to these questions ... just answer 
with what you feel describes you best." 
CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS 
1. Form 
Which of the following options best describes how you typically go about obtaining 
reassurance? 
a) Ask for it directly (e.g., "Did I lock the door?", "Are you mad at me?") 
b) Seek it verbally, but indirectly (e.g., look for other's responses after saying 
things like: "I don't need to worry about you leaving me since you love 
me", "I locked the door, so we can leave now", "I noticed that we haven't 
been spending as much time together lately"; and assume that others will 
let you know if things will not be "OK") 
c) Derive reassurance through non-verbal means (e.g., by interpreting others' 
body language, mood, etc)? 
d) Other (please explain) 
2. Source of reassurance 
a) Who do you seek reassurance from most frequently? 
a) Spouse / romantic partner 
b) Friend(s) 
c) Authority figure(s) (e.g., expert(s) / boss) 
d) Parent(s) 
e) Child(ren) 
f) Colleague(s) / co-worker(s) 
g) Other (please give details): 
b) What leads you to seek reassurance most often from this/these individual(s)? 
a) Convenience 
b) Ability of individual to provide comfort 
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c) Trustworthiness / ability of individual to provide valuable information 
d) Ability of individual to take on or share responsibility 
e) Other (please explain): 
3. Frequency 
On average, how many times per week do you seek reassurance? In other words, 






f) 5 or more (specify): . 
4. Redundancy 
a) When seeking reassurance, what percentage of the time (0-100%) do you feel you 
already know the answer to your question? 
Answer: 
b) On average, how confident are you that you already know the answer to your 
question when seeking reassurance (on a scale of 0-100)? 
Answer: 
Elicit recall of recent reassurance-seeking scenario: 
"Now I would like you to think back to the scenario you described earlier in which you 
sought reassurance. Again, try to remember the specific details of this situation, 
including where you were, what you were doing, who you were with, what you were 
thinking and feeling, and the events that led up to your seeking reassurance under these 
circumstances." 
"For each of the following questions, please use the scale in front of you when providing 
your ratings. You'll notice that a 100-point scale is used, where 0 means none/not at all 
and 100 means the most/highest you could imagine. Feel free to use any number 
between 0 and 100; the numbers provided on the scale are just for your reference. Please 
answer each question according to how you felt in the moment, rather than what you 
currently think is logical." 
5. On a scale of 0-100, how much anxiety/discomfort did you feel about the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to seek reassurance? 
Answer: 
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6. On a scale of 0-100, how much sadness did you feel about the situation you were in at 
the moment when you decided to seek reassurance? 
Answer: 
7. On a scale of 0-100, how threatening/serious would you have rated the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to seek reassurance? 
Answer: 
8. On a scale of 0-100, how responsible did you feel for making sure that everything 
would be "OK" when you decided to seek reassurance? 
Answer: 
9. On a scale of 0-100, how would you have rated your mood when you decided to seek 
reassurance, where 0 is as negative as you can imagine, 50 is neutral, and 100 is as 
positive as you can imagine. 
Answer: 
10. When you were initially given assurance about your concern, how ambiguous (or 
unclear) did that feedback seem to you, on a scale of 0-100? 
Answer: 
11. On a scale of 0-100, how much did you doubt the sincerity/genuineness of the 
assurance you initially received when you decided to seek reassurance? 
Answer: 
12. On a scale of 0-100, how much did you doubt your memory of the initial feedback 
you received when you decided to seek reassurance? 
Answer: 
13. On a scale of 0-100, how much anxiety/discomfort did you feel about the situation 
you were in at the moment when you decided to stop seeking reassurance? 
Answer: 
14. On a scale of 0-100, how much sadness did you feel about the situation you were in at 
the moment when you decided to stop seeking reassurance? 
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Answer: 
15. On a scale of 0-100, how threatening/serious would you have rated the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to stop seeking reassurance? 
Answer: 
16. On a scale of 0-100, how responsible did you feel for making sure that everything 
would be "OK" when you decided to stop seeking reassurance? 
Answer: 
17. On a scale of 0-100, how would you have rated your mood when you decided to stop 
seeking reassurance, where 0 is as negative as you can imagine, 50 is neutral, and 100 is 
as positive as you can imagine. 
Answer: ' 
18. Which of the following options best describes how you sought reassurance? 
a) as much as you could 
b) until you didn't feel like seeking reassurance anymore 
c) both 
d) other (please provide details): 
19. Which of the following do you think best describes your motivation for seeking 
reassurance? 
a) to prevent something bad from happening 
b) to feel less responsible if something bad happens 
c) to alleviate anxiety / worry 
d) to alleviate sadness / guilt 
e) to achieve the sense that things are "just right" (e.g., to make things "click") 
f) to get love and/or attention 
g) other (please provide details): 
SECTION II - CHECKING 
"That concludes the section on reassurance seeking; now I would like to ask you some 
questions specifically about checking." 
1. Initial Inquiry 
During the past 6 months, have you ever repeatedly checked something? 
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YES NO (please circle response) 
If "yes", proceed to open-ended questions 
If "no", probe further (see below); if still "no", proceed to final section 
Probe example: "Have you repeatedly checked the quality of your work? How about 
checking your appearance repeatedly? ... or making sure that you haven't caused harm in 
some way? Are you sure you have not repeatedly checked at all during the last 6 
months?" 
IMAGINAL EXERCISE 
"I would like you to take a minute to remember the most recent situation or set of 
situations in which you felt compelled to check something." 
(Pause for a moment to allow participant to reflect...) 
"Let me know when you have a recent episode in mind..." 
-> (Slowly cite the following verbatim...) "Before you tell me about it, I'd like you to 
close your eyes and try to remember the specific details of this situation, including where 
you were, what you were doing, who you were with, what you were thinking and feeling, 
and the events that led up to your checking under these circumstances. Once you have 
these details in mind, I'd like you to tell me how the situation(s) unfolded. Again, what 
was happening, who were you with, how were you feeling, and what was going through 
your mind at that time?" 
-> Allow participant to recount general details, then probe for any details listed above 
that were not specified by participant: 
Place / situation (w/ whom?): 
Thoughts / feelings: 
"OK, if I understood you correctly ... (provide general summary) 
-> BE CAREFUL NOT TO PROVIDE LEADING STATEMENTS! [i.e., try to use 
the participant's exact words and do not make inferences!]) 
"I'd like you to keep this episode in mind as we go through the next section." 
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OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS 
"Now I would like to ask you some more specific questions about what happens in 
situations where you most frequently decide to check. When answering these questions, 
try to think about what typically happens in these situations. If you are having trouble 
doing this, you can refer back to the specific episode you just described to me instead." 
-> Check for understanding of instructions and proceed with interview: 
1. Content 
I'd like you to tell me about some of these instances in which you've checked. 
What sorts of things do you check most frequently? Keeping in mind that the type of 
checking we're interested in involves checking repeatedly (i.e., more than just once), 
what are you especially likely to check? 
Possible categories: 
a) Perceived threat (health / contamination) 
b) Perceived threat (safety / harm) 
c) Appearance 
d) Personal performance / "correctness" on a task 
e) Perceived threat (social / loss / rejection) 
f) Order / symmetry 
g) Other (please explain): 
If participant is unsure, prompt: What are some of the things that you often check? 
* Once the participant has finished providing his/her spontaneous responses, use the 
following probe: 
Probe: Are there any other concerns you have that you often check? 
* If less than 3 response categories provided, probe until 3 categories provided, or until 
participant can think of no more. 
*Summari_e: 
"OK, so if I understood you correctly, you tend to check (insert responses) most 
frequently. Is this correct?" 
(ii) If more than 1 response category provided (or if unsure), ask: Of the things you just 
mentioned, which would you say you check most frequently? 
-> (If unsure, ask: "which causes you the most distress?") 
Answer: 
2. Onset / triggers 
(i) What usually prompts you to check in the first place? In other words, what specific 
situations, thoughts and/or feelings typically trigger your urges to complete this initial 
check? 
Possible categories: 
a) Unwanted thoughts / images / obsessions 
b) Negative mood (anxious) 
-> (specify: ) 
c) Negative mood (depressive) 
-> (specify: ) 
d) Perceived (health/contamination) threat / Physiology 
e) Doubt/uncertainty re: removal/reduction of perceived threat (safety/harm) 
f) Doubt re: memory 
g) Doubt re: perception 
h) Perceived responsibility for preventing harm 
i) Doubt re: personal performance / competence 
j) Perceived threat of loss/rejection/abandonment 
k) Perceived loss of control 
1) Doubt re: personal worth (perceived abnormality / inferiority) 
m) Physical environment / location 
n) Inability to seek reassurance 
o) Previous checks trigger ritual 
p) Other (please explain): 
If participant is unsure, prompt: What changes in your thoughts and feelings typically 
occur just before you feel the urge to check? How about changes in your environment or 
the situation? 
* Once the participant has finished providing his/her spontaneous responses, use the 
following probe: 
Probe: Are there any other situations, thoughts or feelings that typically trigger your 
urges to check? 
* If less than 3 response categories provided, probe until 3 categories provided, or until 
participant can think of no more. 
*Summarize: 
"OK, so if I understood you correctly, your checking is typically preceded by {insert 
responses). Is this correct?" 
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(ii) If more than 1 response category provided (or if unsure), ask: Of the triggers you 
just mentioned, which would you say most frequently precedes your urges to check? 
-> {If unsure, ash "which causes you the most distress?") 
Answer: 
3. Function 
(i) What is your main motivation for checking in the situation(s) you mentioned earlier 
(remindparticipant of answer(s) they gave to question 1, part i)l In other words, what 
do you want to happen with regard to your mood, thoughts, and/or the situation when you 
check in this/these situation(s)? 
Possible categories: 
a) Remove intrusive thought / reduce obsessions 
b) Decrease negative mood (anxious) 
-> (specify: ) 
c) Decrease negative mood (depressive) 
-> (specify: ) 
d) Prevent harm (health/contamination) 
e) Prevent harm (general safety) 
f) Prevent harm (loss/rejection/abandonment) 
g) Achieve "just right" / completeness feeling 
h) Reduce doubt / uncertainty re: memory 
i) Decrease responsibility for harm 
j) To increase perceived control 
k) To prevent reassurance seeking 
1) To increase self-esteem / confidence 
m) To please others 
n) To prevent harm (minor matters) 
o) To reduce doubt regarding perception 
p) Other (please explain): 
If participant is unsure, prompt: What do you hope will change if you check? 
* Once the participant has finished providing his/her spontaneous responses, use the 
following probe: 
Probe: Are there any other reasons that you have for checking with regard to your mood, 
thoughts and/or the situation? 
* If less than 3 response categories provided, probe until 3 categories provided, or until 
participant can think of no more. 
*Summarize: 
"OK, so if I understood you correctly, your primary reasons for checking are {insert 
responses). Is this correct?" 
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(ii) If more than 1 response category provided (or if unsure), ask: Of the answers you 
just gave, what would you say is the main reason that you check? 
-^ {if unsure, ask: "what is the function most often served by checking? ") 
Answer: 
4. Termination 
Lastly, what causes you to stop checking within a given episode! In other words, what 
thoughts, moods and/or situations tell you that you can or should stop? 
Possible categories: 
a) Physical / mental exhaustion 
b) Interpersonal concerns (may annoy others) 
c) Mood improves (anxious) 
d) Mood improves (depressive) 
e) Rationalization 
f) Achieve sense of control 
g) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (health/contamination) 
h) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (safety) 
i) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (loss/rejection/abandonment) 
j) Reduction in perceived responsibility for harm 
k) Effort/rules (e.g., checked as many times as can) 
1) No longer feel like continuing / boredom 
m) Achieve "just right" feeling / sense of completeness 
n) Time pressure 
o) Distraction 
p) Other (please explain): 
If participant is unsure, prompt: What sorts of cues, such as thoughts, emotions or events, 
let you know that you can or should stop checking? 
* Once the participant has finishedproviding his/her spontaneous responses, use the 
following probe: 
Probe: Are there any other factors such as thoughts, moods or situations that cause you to 
stop checking? 
* If less than 3 response categories provided, probe until 3 categories provided, or until 
participant can think of no more. 
*Summarize 
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"OK, so ifl understood you correctly, you tend to stop checking when (insert responses). 
Is this correct?" 
(ii) If more than 1 response category provided (or if unsure), ask: Of the factors you 
just mentioned, which is the most important in influencing your decision to stop 
checking? 
Answer: 
"Now I'd like to ask you a few more questions about your repeated checking; some of 
which will be multiple choice and some of which will ask you to provide ratings on a 
scale of 0-100. You may find that some of the options in the multiple choice questions 
do not apply to you or that they sound strange, and you can just ignore these. Also, you 
should know that there isn't any right or wrong answer to these questions ... just answer 
with what you feel describes you best." 
CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS 
1. Frequency 
On average, how many times per week do you check? In other words, how many 






f) 5 or more (specify): 
2. Redundancy 
a) When checking, what percentage of the time (0-100%) do you feel you already know 
what you will find? 
Answer: 
b) On average, how confident are you that you already know what you will find when 
checking (on a scale of 0-100)? 
Answer: 
Elicit recall of recent checking scenario: 
"Now I would like you to think back to the checking scenario you described earlier. 
Again, try to remember the specific details of this situation, including where you were, 
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what you were doing, who you were with, what you were thinking and feeling, and the 
events that led up to your checking under these circumstances." 
"For each of the following questions, please use the scale in front of you when providing 
your ratings. You'll notice that a 100-point scale is used, where 0 means none/not at all 
and 100 means the most/highest you could imagine. Feel free to use any number 
between 0 and 100; the numbers provided on the scale are just for your reference. Please 
answer each question according to how you felt in the moment, rather than what you 
currently think is logical." 
3. On a scale of 0-100, how much anxiety/discomfort did you feel about the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to re-check? 
Answer: 
4. On a scale of 0-100, how much sadness did you feel about the situation you were in at 
the moment when you decided to re-check? 
Answer: 
5. On a scale of 0-100, how threatening/serious would you have rated the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to re-check? 
Answer: 
6. On a scale of 0-100, how responsible did you feel for making sure that everything 
would be "OK" when you decided to re-check? 
Answer: _ _ 
7. On a scale of 0-100, how would you have rated your mood when you decided to 
check, where 0 is as negative as you can imagine, 50 is neutral, and 100 is as positive as 
you can imagine. 
HI 
Answer: 
8. When you initially checked, how ambiguous (or unclear) did the information gained 
from that check seem to you, on a scale of 0-100? 
Answer: 
9. On a scale of 0-100, how much did you doubt your memory of your initial check when 
you decided to check again? 
Answer: 
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10. On a scale of 0-100, how much anxiety/discomfort did you feel about the situation 
you were in at the moment when you decided to stop checking? 
Answer: 
11. On a scale of 0-100, how much sadness did you feel about the situation you were in at 
the moment when you decided to stop checking? 
Answer: 
12. On a scale of 0-100, how threatening/serious would you have rated the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to stop checking? 
Answer: 
13. On a scale of 0-100, how responsible did you feel for making sure that everything 
would be "OK" when you decided to stop checking? 
Answer: 
14. On a scale of 0-100, how would you have rated your mood when you decided to stop 
checking, where 0 is as negative as you can imagine, 50 is neutral, and 100 is as positive 
as you can imagine. 
Answer: 
15. Which of the following options best describes how you checked? 
a) as much as you could 
b) until you didn't feel like checking anymore 
c) both 
d) other (please provide details): 
16. Which of the following do you think best describes your motivation for checking? 
a) to prevent something bad from happening 
b) to feel less responsible if something bad happens 
c) to alleviate anxiety / worry 
d) to alleviate sadness / guilt 
e) to achieve the sense that things are "just right" (e.g., to make things "click") 
f) to get love and/or attention 
g) other (please provide details): _____ 
SECTION III - EXERCISE 
1. Initial Inquiry 
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During the past 6 months, have you ever exercised? 
YES NO (please circle response) 
If "no", probe further; if still "no", proceed to final section 
CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS 
1. Frequency 






f) 5 or more (specify): 
Elicit recall of recent exercising scenario: 
"Now I would like you to think of the most recent time in which you exercised. Try to 
remember the specific details of this situation, including where you were, what you were 
doing, who you were with, what you were thinking and feeling, and the events that led up 
to you exercising under these circumstances. Once you have the image in mind, describe 
it to me." 
Note details: 
"Again, for each of the following questions, please use the scale in front of you when 
providing your ratings. Feel free to use any number between 0 and 100; the numbers 
provided on the scale are just for your reference. Please answer each question according 
to how you felt in the moment that you were exercising, rather than what you currently 
think is logical." 
2. On a scale of 0-100, how much anxiety/discomfort did you feel about the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to exercise? 
Answer: 
3. On a scale of 0-100, how much sadness did you feel about the situation you were in at 
the moment when you decided to exercise? 
Answer: 
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4. On a scale of 0-100, how threatening/serious would you have rated the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to exercise? 
Answer: 
5. On a scale of 0-100, how responsible did you feel for making sure that everything 
would be "OK" when you decided to exercise? 
Answer: 
6. On a scale of 0-100, how would you have rated your mood when you decided to 
exercise, where 0 is as negative as you can imagine, 50 is neutral, and 100 is as positive 
as you can imagine. 
Answer: 
7. On a scale of 0-100, how much anxiety/discomfort did you feel about the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to stop exercising? 
Answer: 
8. On a scale of 0-100, how much sadness did you feel about the situation you were in at 
the moment when you decided to stop exercising? 
Answer: 
9. On a scale of 0-100, how threatening/serious would you have rated the situation you 
were in at the moment when you decided to stop exercising? 
Answer: 
10. On a scale of 0-100, how responsible did you feel for making sure that everything 
would be "OK" when you decided to stop exercising? 
Answer ________________________ 
11. On a scale of 0-100, how would you have rated your mood when you decided to stop 
exercising, where 0 is as negative as you can imagine, 50 is neutral, and 100 is as positive 
as you can imagine. 
Answer: 
12. Which of the following options best describes how you exercised? 
a) as much as you could 
b) until you didn't feel like exercising anymore 
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c) until you had finished your usual routine 
d) other (please provide details): 
13. Which of the following do you think best describes your motivation for exercising? 
a) to prevent something bad from happening 
b) to feel less responsible if something bad happens 
c) to alleviate anxiety / discomfort 
d) to alleviate sadness / depression 
e) to achieve the sense that things are "just right" (e.g., to make things "click") 
f) to get love and/or attention 
g) other (please provide details): 
SECTION IV - REFLECTION 
Finally, is there anything important related to your reassurance seeking or checking that 
we have not yet discussed? Is there anything important related to the onset, maintenance 
or termination of your reassurance seeking or checking that we have not yet talked about? 
Answer: 
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Appendix C: ICCRS guidelines and trouble-shooting instructions 
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ICCRS - Supplementary Instructions for Interviewer 
Introduction: 
The aims of this section are to familiarize participants with the goals of the interview, as 
well as to ensure that they understand the concepts of interest (i.e., checking, reassurance 
seeking). It is essential that participants clearly understand what is implied by the terms 
"repeated checking" and "reassurance seeking". The definitions and examples provided 
can be repeated and paraphrased as many times as necessary to ensure participants' 
comprehension. 
Comprehension tests: If participants answer a question incorrectly, correct them, 
explaining why they were incorrect, and test them with a second, similar example. 
-> If a participant asks about the difference between repeated checking and reassurance 
seeking, you should respond by saying; "As you have noticed, there are some similarities 
between repeated checking and reassurance seeking. However, by definition, reassurance 
seeking involves soliciting feedback from another individual (either directly or 
indirectly), while checking is a physical act that can be completed in isolation. Does that 
help to clarify the difference between these behaviours?" 
-> In the unlikely event that participants are unable to understand the meaning of 
reassurance seeking, repeated checking or exercise even after substantial efforts to 
explain these concepts, the interview should be terminated, and participants should be 
debriefed, thanked for their time and compensated. 
I) Initial Inquiry: 
Please ensure that you probe participants if they respond negatively to the initial inquiry 
(i.e., say that they have not engaged in the behaviour of interest during the past 6 
months). However, if a participant insists that they have not checked/sought reassurance 
even after probing, accept their response and proceed to the next section. 
II) Imaginal Exercise: 
The aims of this section are to: (i) ensure that participants not only understand the 
concepts of interest (i.e., reassurance seeking, checking) on an intellectual level, but that 
they can also provide pertinent examples from their own lives, (ii) facilitate participants' 
responses to the ensuing questions by reminding them of this/these pertinent example(s) 
which they can use as a point of reference, and (iii) enhance reliability of recall (i.e., 
decrease memory distortion) via imagery. 
* Encourage participants to recall a specific instance of a general scenario. For example, 
if a participant states that s/he usually re-checks whether or not s/he locked the door 
properly, ask them to try to recall the most recent time this occurred. 
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Trouble-shooting: If a participant is having a hard time recalling an episode, ask them to 
think back to the episode that they had in mind when they said "yes" to the initial inquiry. 
*N.B. - It is important to ensure that participants recall an episode in which they sought 
reassurance, rather than simply asking for information/assurance on a single occasion. 
Double-check this if in doubt. 
Summary: When providing a summary of the participant's recalled episode, recount all 
of the details that were probed for (place, situation, mood, thoughts, who participant was 
with), and use the participant's own words whenever possible. 
-> IMPORTANT: Do not make inferences or provide leading statements in 
summary! (For example, if the participant says that they checked after a long day at 
work, do not summarize by inferring that they were stressed from work ... unless you 
have probed and they have given you these details) 
III) Open-Ended Questions: 
Aims: The goal of this section is to collect information about various aspects of 
reassurance seeking and checking behaviour using open-ended questions (*N.B. — 
closed-ended questions should not be used). Each question focuses on a domain of 
interest (e.g., content, triggers, function, etc.). There are two parts to each question. In 
part (i), participants are encouraged to provide as many responses as they can think of. 
As such, multiple response categories may be provided. Part (ii) asks participants to 
indicate the most important (i.e., frequently occurring) factor identified in part (i) of each 
question. 
After participants respond, circle each category that applies. If one or more of their 
responses does not fit one of the categories provided, circle "other" and write in a brief 
description of their response (attempting to use participants' own words). 
Prompting guidelines: Prompts are to be used if a participant is having trouble 
understanding the questions as stated. They basically just rephrase the same question. 
In addition, if a participant's response is clearly inconsistent with one or more responses 
provided on earlier questions, it is important to carefully (and tactfully) point this out to 
the participant in order to "ensure that you understand the participant clearly". 
Similarly, if a participant's prior response(s) imply that their current responses may be 
incomplete, you are encouraged to remind them of their earlier response in an attempt to 
solicit a more complete response to the current question. 
-> (e.g., if a participant states that they often seek reassurance about their performance at 
work in the "content" section, but then mention nothing about work in the "trigger" 
section, you should remind them of their earlier response and say "earlier you mentioned 
that you often seek reassurance about your work performance; what prompts you to seek 
reassurance in these situations? ) 
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Probing guidelines: After participants have answered part (i) of each question, they 
should be probed at least once using the probes provided in the interview (e.g., "Are there 
any other reasons you check?") to ensure completeness of answers. 
-If participants spontaneously provide 3 or more response categories, it is only necessary 
to probe for further responses once. 
-If participants provide less than 3 response categories, probe until either: a) 3 response 
categories have been provided, or b) participants state that they cannot think of any other 
responses. 
In addition, if a participant's response implies that an affective state influences their 
behaviour, probe until you get a concrete emotional descriptor. 
-> (e.g., if a participant states that their checking is prompted by "feeling bad / uneasy", 
you could ask: "Please be more specific ... what do you mean by feeling bad?") 
Similarly, if a participant's response seems broad, vague, or ambiguous, probe further 
and ask for clarification with examples (even if you can place their response in one of the 
broad categories). In the reassurance seeking section, ask for specific examples of what 
the participant actually said whenever appropriate (e.g., "When you were on the phone 
with your friend seeking reassurance, what were some of the things you actually said / 
asked her? ") 
-> Final responses should be concrete and unambiguous (e.g., if a participant states 
that they check "so that bad things won't happen ", you could ask: " What bad thing(s) 
specifically are you trying to prevent? ") 
-> Golden rule: You (and coders) should only be able to interpret participants' 
responses in 1 way! 
For the "function" question in the reassurance seeking and checking sections, make sure 
that the participant is referring to the function of reassurance / repeated checking, rather 
than initial feedback / checks. 
-> (e.g., if a participant states that the function of reassurance seeking / checking is to 
"obtain information ", you could say to the respondent; "Remembering that reassurance 
seeking / repeated checking occurs after you have already received assurance / checked 
once, what is the purpose of seeking additional reassurance / checking again? ") 
*N.B. - If a participant provides a response that implies that their earlier responses 
were incomplete, you should quickly go back and clarify whether another response 
should be recorded for the earlier question (s) 
-> (e.g., if a participant says that thoughts about her apartment burning down trigger her 
checking in the "Context/triggers" section, but did not mention checking any potential 
sources of fire in the "Content" section, you should point this out and ask what she 
checks in association with her fire prevention concerns (then add her response to the 
"Content" section)" 
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TV) Closed-Ended Questions: 
Aims: The goal of these sections is to test predictions regarding various mechanisms 
hypothesized to contribute to reassurance seeking and checking behaviour. 
Questions in this section are presented in one of two formats: (i) forced-choice multiple 
choice, or (ii) subjective ratings. Participants should be encouraged to pick only one 
response for multiple choice questions; if they choose "other", make sure to write their 
response in the space provided (using their words). 
The "frequency" question should be posed as an open-ended question (i.e., do not present 
the choices; instead, allow participants to respond freely and circle the category that 
applies). 
*N.B.- If a participant seems to be providing extreme/exaggerated ratings (e.g., ratings 
> 95 or < 5) , it is acceptable to query the participant: 
-> (e.g., If participant says their anxiety/discomfort was 100 when they checked, you 
might say; "So when you decided to check, you were feeling the most anxiety/discomfort 
you could possibly imagine; just as much as you might expect to experience if you were in 
a life or death situation? ") 
IV) Reflection Questions: 
Aims: The goal of this section is to allow participants to reflect on their responses to 
earlier questions and to let the experimenter know if there is anything important in 
relation to their checking and/or reassurance seeking that has not yet been discussed. 
Additional Instructions 
As the interviewer for this study, your primary role is to collect as much pertinent 
information as possible, while keeping participants focused on the questions of interest. 
It is essential that you follow the standardized protocol in the same manner for each 
participant in order to minimize the impact of potential confounds. In addition, it is very 
important that you utilize open-ended prompts and probes whenever appropriate, so that 
coders need not make any inferences while coding the interview data. 
If, at any point during the interview, you notice that a participant is growing tired, 
impatient, etc., you should suggest taking a short (e.g., 5-min.) break before continuing 
with the study, in order to maximize the reliability and validity of participants' responses. 
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Appendix D: ICCRS Integrity Check 
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Participant #: 
Interview Integrity Check Scoring System 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction script 
-> Deviation from script? 
Definition of reassurance seeking (RS) 
-^ Deviation from script? 
Examples of RS 
-> Deviation from script? 
Probe for understanding of RS definition? 
Comprehension test script for RS (part a) 
-^ Deviation from script? 
Deviation from scripted feedback? 
If present, what was said: 
Comprehension test script for RS (part b) 
-^ Deviation from script? 
Deviation from scripted feedback? 
If present, what was said: 
Definition of repeated checking (CC) 
Examples of CC 
-^ Deviation from script? 
Probe for understanding of CC definition? 
Comprehension test script for CC (part a) 
-^ Deviation from script? 
Deviation from scripted feedback? 
If present, what was said: 
Comprehension test script for CC (part b) 
-> Deviation from script? 
Deviation from scripted feedback? 
If present, what was said: 
Definition of exercise (EX) 
Examples of EX 
-^ Deviation from script? 
Probe for understanding of EX definition? 
Comprehension test script for EX (part a) 
-^ Deviation from script? 
Deviation from scripted feedback? 
If present, what was said: 
Present Absent 
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Comprehension test script for EX (part b) 
-> Deviation from script? 
Deviation from scripted feedback? 
If present, what was said: 
CHECKING SECTION (open-ended) 
Introduction script 
Deviation from script? 
Initial inquiry script 
Deviation from script? 
Use of leading or coercive probes? 
If present, what was said: 
Imaginal exercise script (CC) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of leading or coercive probes? 
If present, what was said: 
Adding inferences or making assumptions? 
If present, what was said: 
Provides summary of place/situation 
Provides summary of thought(s)/feeling(s) 
Provides summary of precipitant(s) 
Adding inferences or making assumptions during summary? 
If present, what was said: 
Introduction to open-ended questions script 
Deviation from script? 
Content question script (part i) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of closed-ended question? 
If present, what was said: 
Deviation from prompt instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Probe for additional responses 
Deviation from probe instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
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Provides summary of CC content area(s) 
Content question script (part ii) 
Deviation from script? 
Onset/trigger question script (part i) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of closed-ended question? 
If present, what was said: 
Deviation from prompt instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Probe for additional responses 
Deviation from probe instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Provides summary of CC onset/trigger(s) 
Onset/trigger question script (part ii) 
Deviation from script? 
Function question script (part i) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of closed-ended question? 
If present, what was said: 
Deviation from prompt instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Probe for additional responses 
Deviation from probe instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Provides summary of CC function(s) 
Function question script (part ii) 
Deviation from script? 
Termination question script (part i) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of closed-ended question? 
If present, what was said: 
Deviation from prompt instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Probe for additional responses 
Deviation from probe instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
144 
Provides summary of CC termination factor(s) 
Termination question script (part ii) 
Deviation from script? 
CHECKING SECTION (closed-ended) 
Introduction script 
Deviation from script? 
Elicitation of recall script 
Deviation from script? 
REASSURANCE SEEKING SECTION (open-ended) 
Introduction script 
Deviation from script? 
Initial inquiry script 
Deviation from script? 
Use of leading or coercive probes? 
If present, what was said: 
Imaginal exercise script (CC) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of leading or coercive probes? 
If present, what was said: 
Adding inferences or making assumptions? 
If present, what was said: 
Provides summary of place/situation 
Provides summary of thought(s)/feeling(s) 
Provides summary of precipitant(s) , 
Adding inferences or making assumptions during summary? 
If present, what was said: 
Introduction to open-ended questions script 
Deviation from script? 
Content question script (part i) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of closed-ended question? 
If present, what was said: 
Deviation from prompt instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Probe for additional responses 
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Deviation from probe instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Provides summary of RS content area(s) 
Content question script (part ii) 
Deviation from script? 
Onset/trigger question script (part i) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of closed-ended question? 
If present, what was said: 
Deviation from prompt instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Probe for additional responses 
Deviation from probe instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Provides summary of RS onset/trigger(s) 
Onset/trigger question script (part ii) 
Deviation from script? 
Function question script (part i) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of closed-ended question? 
If present, what was said: 
Deviation from prompt instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Probe for additional responses 
Deviation from probe instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Provides summary of RS function(s) 
Function question script (part ii) 
Deviation from script? 
Termination question script (part i) 
Deviation from script? 
Use of closed-ended question? 
If present, what was said: 
Deviation from prompt instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
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Probe for additional responses 
Deviation from probe instructions? 
If present, what was problematic: 
Provides summary of RS termination factor(s) 
Termination question script (part ii) 
Deviation from script? 
REASSURANCE SEEKING SECTION (closed-ended) 
Introduction script 
Deviation from script? 
Elicitation of recall script 
Deviation from script? 
EXERCISE SECTION 
Initial inquiry script 
Deviation from script? 
Use of leading or coercive probes? 
If present, what was said: 
Elicitation of recall script 
Deviation from script? 
REFLECTION SECTION SCRIPT 
Deviation from script? 
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Key phrase(s) Time Category(ies) Rationale 
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Question Key phrase(s) Time Category(ies) Rationale 
Termination 
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Appendix F: ICCRS Coding Guide 
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Interview (ICCRS) Coding Guide 
Instructions for Coders — Interview Study 
General Instructions: 
It is essential that you become familiar with the categorization guides presented below 
before you begin coding data for the study. 
A response category is a category in which participants' responses can be allocated, 
based on their thematic content. Each response category conveys a specific and unique 
theme that differentiates it from other categories. 
A coding unit is a portion of a participant response that clearly falls within a given 
response category. It typically consists of a statement that conveys a single, thematic 
message or meaning. 
* If a participant's response contains 2 or more code-able units (i.e., if it's content falls 
under 2 or more categories) for part (i) of a given question, each category that applies 
should be coded. 
* If a single response (i.e., coding unit) simultaneously falls under 2 or more categories 
(based on the criteria outlined below), it is acceptable to code both categories for a single 
response (e.g., "I check to relieve my anxiety and sadness"). 
Coding process instructions: 
Please use the following guidelines when coding participants' responses to open-ended 
questions on the ICCRS: 
Please transcribe participants' responses using the coding sheets provided. Key phrases 
(i.e., non-redundant phrases that answer the question directly) from each coding unit 
should be transcribed verbatim on the coding sheets. If unsure, err on the side of 
transcribing too much of the participants' responses. Next to each key phrase (or set of 
related phrases), please clearly mark the time stamp (displayed on the screen), the 
category to which it was assigned, and a brief (~ 5 - 10 words) rationale for your 
category choice (e.g., "referred to a desire to alleviate sadness ", "mentioned fear of 
rejection, but no concerns re: internal character flaws "). 
*N.B. - Any responses (i.e., coding units) which do not clearly fit into the categories 
listed below should be assigned to the "other" category, and should be accompanied by a 
brief transcribed summary of the response. 
If in doubt re: which of 2 or more categories to assign a key phrase to, transcribe the text 
verbatim (with the time marker) and mark "uncertain" in the "category" column of the 
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coding sheets with an indication of the categories considered and a rationale in the 
"rationale" column. 
I. Guidelines for coding responses to questions on Reassurance Seeking: 
1. Content 
a) Perceived threat (health / contamination) 
Any reference to concerns re: illness/"cleanliness" of either oneself or others. This 
might be in response to anxiety/worry re: physical signs or symptoms, potential 
sources of contamination, etc. (e.g., "Do I have a disease?", "Am I dirty?", "You 
don't look well, are you sure you are feeling OK?", "I constantly look for more 
information on the internet to reassure myself that I'm not ill", etc.) 
b) Perceived threat (safety / harm) 
Any reference to concerns re: harm occurring to either one's self or others, which 
does not include concerns re: contamination/illness, or loss, rejection or 
abandonment. This might include concerns re: the potential for physical injury, 
financial loss or other harms (including hassles), due to flood, fire, theft, negligence, 
etc. (e.g., "Did you lock the door?", "Are you sure I didn't run over anybody?", "Did 
you remember your passport?", etc.) 
c) Perceived threat (loss / rejection / abandonment) 
Any reference to concerns re: personal loss, rejection, or abandonment within the 
context of relationships. This might include worries re: social rejection, loss of 
affection from one's partner/friends, or abandonment (e.g., "Are you mad at me?", 
"Do you still love me?", "Do you think I said something wrong to offend her?", 
"Promise me you won't leave me", etc.) 
d) Personal responsibility for harm 
Any reference to concerns re: personal responsibility for any type of harm 
occurring (e.g., "Do you think it was my fault?", "Are you sure I won't get blamed if 
I make a mistake?", etc.) 
e) Personal performance / competence 
Any reference to concerns re: personal performance, competence or ability, as 
measured by the quality and/or wisdom of one's decisions, observable actions or 
performance (e.g., "Do you like my work?", "Am I making the right decision?", "Are 
you sure my speech was OK?", "Do you think I can handle this job?", etc.) 
f) Personal worth (e.g., like ability / appearance / "normality") 
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Any reference to concerns re: personal worth / value. This might include concerns 
that one is not likeable or is somehow characteristically flawed, defective and/or 
abnormal (i.e., not an "external" threat) (e.g., "Do I look OK?", "Do you think I'm 
fat/ugly?", "I guess you wouldn't have stayed with me this long if I was really a 
freak, right?", etc.) 
g) Meaning of obsessions 
Any reference to concerns re: the meaning of one's unwanted thoughts, images and/or 
impulses (e.g., "Does having these thoughts mean I'm evil / going crazy, etc.?") 
2. Onset / triggers 
a) Unwanted thoughts / images / obsessions 
Any reference to intrusive thoughts, images or impulses that the respondent is 
distressed by, and which compels them to seek reassurance (e.g., aggressive, sexual 
and/or blasphemous obsessions, bizarre impulses towards inappropriate public 
displays; "Does having these thoughts mean I'm going crazy?", etc.) 
b) Negative mood (anxious) 
Any reference to anxious moods, including fear, stress, worry, etc., that trigger 
reassurance seeking. 
c) Negative mood (depressive) 
Any reference to depressive moods, such as sadness, guilt, shame, helplessness, 
hopelessness, despair, etc., that trigger reassurance seeking. 
d) Perceived (health/contamination) threat /Physiology 
Any reference to perceived present threat to one's health or physical well-being. 
This might include perceived indicators of illness (e.g., lumps, moles, cough), 
doubts/concerns about cleanliness/contamination (for fear of contracting an illness) 
and/or physiological sensations, such as heart palpitations, trembling, sweating, 
dizziness, etc. (e.g., "Is this mole cancerous?", "Are you sure I'm not having a heart 
attack?", etc.) 
e) Doubt re: removal/reduction of perceived threat (safety/harm) 
Any reference to concerns / doubts regarding potential threats to the safety (financial, 
physical, etc.) of oneself or others. This might include doubting whether one has 
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properly locked the door/windows, turned off the stove, remembered important 
documents, etc. 
f) Inability to check 
Any reference to one's constrained ability to physically and/or visually check a 
threatening object or situation. 
g) Perceived responsibility for preventing harm 
Any reference to concerns re: personal responsibility for preventing harm, and/or the 
consequences of one's failing to live up to their responsibilities. 
h) Doubt re: personal performance / competence 
Any reference to concerns / doubts that one has performed adequately enough on 
some task or duty (e.g., at work/school, parenting, sports, etc.) to satisfy others' 
and/or one's own personal standards, or doubts regarding one's capabilities (e.g., to 
make decisions, etc.). 
i) Perceived threat of loss /rejection /abandonment 
Any reference to concerns / doubts re: the possibility of personal loss, rejection, or 
abandonment within the context of relationships. This might include worries re: 
social rejection, loss of affection from one's friends/partner, or abandonment from a 
lover 
j) Doubt re: personal worth (e.g., likeability, appearance, "normality") 
Any reference to concerns / doubts re: one's personal worth / value. This might 
include concerns that one is not likeable, attractive, or is somehow characteristically 
flawed, defective and/or abnormal (i.e., not an "external" threat) 
k) Perceived loss of control 
Any reference to concerns / doubts re: the possibility of a loss of control (including 
fears of "going crazy", losing all sense of reality, etc.) 
I) Doubt re: memory 
Any reference to concerns / doubts that one's memory of previous events and/or 
assurances may be inaccurate (N.B. - this category only refers to doubts re: one's 
memory) 
m) Doubt re: perception 
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Any reference to concerns / doubts re: the accuracy of one's perception (e.g., visual, 
auditory) of previous events and/or assurances 
n) Physical environment / location 
Any reference to a particular place (e.g., home, work, etc.) that serves as a 
consistent and unique trigger for compulsive urges. 
3. Function 
a) Remove intrusive thought / reduce obsessions 
Any reference to desire to reduce and / or remove intrusive thoughts, images or 
impulses (e.g., "I seek reassurance to help me stop obsessing about things.") 
b) Decrease negative mood (anxious) 
Any reference to a desire to alleviate anxious mood(s) (e.g., anxiety, fear, doubt, 
worry, uncertainty) 
c) Decrease negative mood (depressive) 
Any reference to a desire to alleviate depressive mood(s) (e.g., sadness, guilt, 
hopelessness, despair) 
d) Prevent harm (health/contamination) 
Any reference to a desire to reduce / remove perceived threat to one's own or others' 
health (e.g., prevent illness from "contamination"; "I want to make sure that I / my 
family won't get cancer / hepatitis, etc.") 
e) Prevent harm (general safety) 
Any reference to a desire to reduce / remove perceived threat to the safety (financial, 
physical, etc.) to oneself or others (e.g., prevent theft, fire, flood, job loss, accidents, 
etc.; "I want to ensure that my house won't burn down /1 won't get fired /1 won't 
accidentally hurt anyone, etc.") 
f) Prevent harm (loss/rejection/abandonment) 
Any reference to a desire to reduce / remove perceived threat of personal loss, 
rejection and/or abandonment (e.g., "I want to make sure that my partner won't 
leave me") 
g) Decrease responsibility for harm 
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Any reference to a desire to reduce or disperse one's personal responsibility for 
preventing something bad from happening (e.g., "I don't want people to blame me if 
something wrong happens). 
h) Achieve "just right" / completeness feeling 
Any reference to a desire to achieve an internal feeling of "completeness", or a 
"just right" feeling ("I just have to keep asking until I feel like I have asked enough). 
i) Increase perceived control 
Any reference to a desire to increase one's perceived control over a situation and/or 
their own mental or physical state 
j) Receive attention / affection from others; increase self-esteem / self-confidence 
Any reference to a desire to receive positive attention or affection from others and/or 
increase self-esteem (e.g., "I just want him to show me that he cares", "It makes me 
feel better about myself when other people reassure me", "I want to get more 
attention from my partner", etc.). 
k) To prevent checking 
Any reference to a desire to substitute reassurance seeking for checking (e.g., 
"Because completing the check myself would take too long") 
I) Prevent harm (minor matters) 
Any reference to a desire to reduce the likelihood of minor hassles / inconveniences 
to oneself or others (e.g., to prevent wasting time, effort, or small sums of money, 
etc.) 
4. Termination 
a) Physical / mental exhaustion 
Any reference to physical or mental exhaustion (e.g., "After a while, I just get too 
tired to keep seeking reassurance") 
b) Interpersonal concerns (may annoy others / cause embarrassment) 
Any reference to concerns re: social inappropriateness (e.g., "I don't want other 
people to see me constantly seeking reassurance", "I know that my partner will get 
angry if I keep on asking") 
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c) Mood improves (anxious): 
Any reference to an alleviation of anxious mood (e.g., anxiety, fear, 
doubt/uncertainty, worry) 
d) Mood improves (depressive): 
Any reference to an alleviation of depressive mood (e.g., sadness, guilt, hopelessness, 
despair) 
e) Rationalization 
Any reference to rational self-talk re: the futility of reassurance seeking (e.g., "After 
a while, I realize that seeking reassurance isn't helping, so I tell myself to stop") 
f) Achieve sense of control 
Any reference to perceived sense of control over the situation/one's emotions, etc. 
(e.g., "I stop seeking reassurance once I know that I've regained control over the 
situation/my emotions") 
g) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (health/contamination) 
Any reference to the reduction or removal of a perceived threat to one's own or 
others' health. This might include feeling more certain that one has cleaned properly, 
is not having a heart attack, etc. (e.g., "I can stop once I'm sure that I'm not having a 
heart attack", "I can stop once I know that I've taken all the precautions I can to 
protect myself from illness") 
h) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (safety) 
Any reference to the reduction or removal of a perceived threat to the safety 
(financial, physical, etc.) of oneself or others. This might include feeling more 
certain that one has properly locked the door/windows, turned off the stove, 
remembered important documents, etc. (e.g., "I can stop once I'm sure that I've, 
locked the door properly", "I can stop once I know that I've taken all the precautions 
I can to avoid any hassles") 
i) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (loss/rejection/abandonment) 
Any reference to the reduction or removal of a perceived threat re: the possibility of 
persona] loss, rejection, or abandonment within the context of relationships. This 
might include feeling more certain that social rejection, loss of affection from one's 
friends/partner, or abandonment from a lover will not occur (e.g., "I stop once I can 
be sure that my partner won't leave, at least for now", "I'm able to stop if people 
convince me that they care about me by showing me") 
j) Reduction in perceived responsibility for harm 
Any reference to a reduction in one's perceived responsibility for preventing harm 
(e.g., "Once I have done everything I can to make sure that I won't be responsible for 
anything bad that might happen, I can stop asking for reassurance", "If someone else 
reassures me, they share the responsibility if something goes wrong, so I don't have 
to ask anymore") 
k) Effort/rules (e.g., asked as many times as can) 
Any reference to internal rules or criteria (e.g., re: amount of effort expended) (e.g., 
"I can only stop once I've sought reassurance from 3 different people") 
I) No longer feel like continuing / boredom 
Any reference to boredom or a lack of desire to continue seeking reassurance (e.g., 
"After a while, I just don't feel like seeking reassurance anymore") 
m) Achieve "just right" feeling / sense of "completeness" 
Any reference to an internal "just right" feeling or sense of "completeness" (e.g., 
"Something just 'clicks' in me, and lets me know that I can stop", "After a while, it 
just 'feels right'") 
n) Time pressure 
Any reference to time pressure from external sources (e.g., "I usually only stop when 
I'm rushed and have to go somewhere or do something else") 
o) Believe feedback 
Any reference to believing (re)assurance or ceasing to question the sincerity / 
genuineness of the (re)assurance. 
p) Distraction 
Any reference to terminating reassurance-seeking due to distraction (e.g., " I was 
asking my partner for reassurance when I got a phone call, and after I got off the 
phone, I was able to go on with my day") 
Guidelines for coding responses to questions on Checking: 
1. Content 
a) Perceived threat (health / contamination) 
161 
Any reference to concerns re: illness/"cleanliness" of either oneself or others. This 
might be in response to anxiety/worry re: physical signs or symptoms, potential 
sources of contamination, etc. (e.g., Checking "cleanliness" of objects or 
environments, checking moles, rashes, pulse, etc.) 
* N.B. - searching for information re: illness on internet is better conceptualized as 
reassurance seeking than "checking" (unless it involves re-checking/re-reading info, 
already found), and should not be coded here. 
b) Perceived threat (safety / harm) 
Any reference to concerns re: harm occurring to either one's self or others, which 
does not include concerns re: contamination/illness. This might include concerns 
re: the potential for physical injury, financial loss or other harms (including hassles), 
due to flood, fire, theft, negligence, etc. (e.g., Checking locks, stove, windows, 
envelopes; checking whether one caused an accident, remembered important 
documents, etc.) 
c) Appearance 
Any reference to checking personal appearance (e.g., Checking hair, makeup, skin 
blemishes, etc.) 
d) Personal performance / "correctness" on a task 
Any reference to checking personal performance, competence or ability, as 
measured by the quality of one's observable actions or performance (e.g., Checking 
school and/or work assignments, spelling/grammar in letters, videotaping and 
reviewing speeches, performances, etc.) 
e) Perceived threat (loss / rejection / abandonment) 
Any reference to concerns re: personal loss, rejection, or abandonment within the 
context of relationships. This might include worries re: social rejection, loss of 
affection from one's partner/friends, or abandonment (e.g., checking for tangible 
signs of infidelity [e.g., lipstick on collar], letters, emails, etc.) 
f) Order / symmetry 
Any reference to checking items, objects and/or environments to ensure order and/or 
symmetry. 
2. Onset / triggers 
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a) Unwanted thoughts /images / obsessions 
Any reference to intrusive thoughts, images or impulses that the respondent is 
distressed by, and which compel them to check (e.g., aggressive, sexual and/or 
blasphemous obsessions, catastrophic thoughts/images related to "making a 
mistake'Vforgetting, etc.) 
b) Negative mood (anxious) 
Any reference to anxious moods, including fear, stress, worry, etc., that trigger urges 
to check. 
c) Negative mood (depressive) 
Any reference to depressive moods, such as sadness, guilt, shame, helplessness, 
hopelessness, despair, etc., that trigger checking. 
d) Perceived (health/contamination) threat /Physiology 
Any reference to a perceived present threat to one's (or someone else's) health or 
physical well-being. This might include perceived indicators of illness (e.g., lumps, 
moles, cough), doubts/concerns about cleanliness/contamination (for fear of 
contracting an illness) and/or physiological sensations, such as heart palpitations, 
trembling, sweating, dizziness, etc. (e.g., "I constantly check my pulse when I feel hot 
or dizzy to make sure 1 won't faint). 
e) Doubt re: removal/reduction of perceived threat (safety/harm) 
Any reference to concerns / doubts regarding potential threats to the safety (financial, 
physical, etc.) of oneself or others. This might include doubting whether one has 
properly locked the door/windows, turned off the stove, remembered important 
documents, etc. 
J) Doubt re: memory 
Any reference to concerns / doubts that one's memory of previous events and/or 
checks may be inaccurate (e.g., "I check when I can't remember if 1 checked 
already") 
N.B. - this category only refers to doubts re: one's memory 
g) Doubt re: perception 
Any reference to concerns / doubts re: the accuracy of one's perception (e.g., visual, 
auditory) of previous events and/or checks 
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h) Perceived responsibility for preventing harm 
Any reference to concerns re: personal responsibility for preventing harm, and/or the 
consequences of one's failing to live up to their responsibilities. 
i) Doubt re: personal performance / competence 
Any reference to concerns / doubts that one has performed adequately enough on 
some task or duty (e.g., at work/school, etc.) to satisfy others' and/or one's own 
personal standards (e.g., doubting calculations, spelling, grammar, etc.), or doubts 
regarding one's capabilities (e.g., to make decisions). 
j) Perceived threat of loss / rejection / abandonment 
Any reference to concerns / doubts re: the possibility of personal loss, rejection, or 
abandonment within the context of relationships. This might include worries re: 
social rejection, loss of affection from one's friends/partner, or abandonment from a 
lover (e.g., doubting loyalty of others, etc.) 
k) Perceived loss of control 
Any reference to concerns / doubts re: the possibility of a loss of control (including 
fears of "going crazy", losing all sense of reality, etc.) 
I) Doubt re: personal worth (perceived abnormality, inferiority) 
Any reference to concerns / doubts re: one's personal worth / value. This might 
include concerns that one is not likeable, attractive, or is somehow characteristically 
flawed, defective and/or abnormal (i.e., not an "external" threat) 
m) Physical environment / location 
Any reference to a particular place (e.g., home, work, etc.) that serves as a 
consistent and unique trigger for compulsive urges. 
n) Inability to seek reassurance 
Any reference to one's constrained ability to seek reassurance about a threatening 
object Or situation. 
o) Previous checks trigger ritual 
Any reference to previous checks triggering a ritual or "activating" a set of internal 




a) Remove intrusive thought / reduce obsessions 
Any reference to desire to reduce and / or remove intrusive thoughts, images or 
impulses (e.g., "I check to help me stop obsessing.") 
b) Decrease negative mood (anxious) 
Any reference to a desire to alleviate anxious mood(s) (e.g., anxiety, fear, 
doubt/uncertainty, worry) 
c) Decrease negative mood (depressive) 
Any reference to a desire to alleviate depressive mood(s) (e.g., sadness, guilt, 
hopelessness, despair) 
d) Prevent harm (health/contamination) 
Any reference to a desire to reduce / remove perceived threat to one's own or others' 
health (e.g., prevent illness from "contamination"; "I want to make sure that I / my 
family won't get cancer / hepatitis, etc.") 
e) Prevent harm (general safety) 
Any reference to a desire to reduce / remove perceived threat to the safety (financial, 
physical, etc.) to oneself or others (e.g., prevent theft, fire, flood, job loss, accidents, 
etc.; "I want to ensure that my house won't burn down / I won't get fired / I won't 
accidentally hurt anyone, etc.") 
f) Prevent harm (loss/rejection/abandonment) 
Any reference to a desire to reduce / remove perceived threat of personal loss, 
rejection and/or abandonment (e.g., checking partner's clothes for lipstick traces, 
etc.) 
g) Achieve "just right"' /completeness feeling 
Any reference to a desire to achieve an internal feeling of "completeness", or a 
"just right" feeling ("I just have to keep checking until I feel like I have checked 
enough). 
h) Reduce doubt/uncertainty re: memory 
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Any reference to a desire to reduce doubts re: one's memory for previous checks 
and/or the events that led to checking (e.g., "I just can't remember if I've already 
checked or not") 
i) Decrease personal responsibility for harm 
Any reference to a desire to reduce or disperse one's personal responsibility for 
preventing something bad from happening. 
j) Increase perceived control 
Any reference to a desire to increase one's perceived control over a situation and/or 
their own mental or physical state 
k) To prevent reassurance seeking 
Any reference to a desire to substitute checking for reassurance seeking (e.g., "I 
check myself so that I don't have to bother other people with my worries") 
I) Increase self-esteem /self-confidence 
Any reference to a desire to increase self-esteem and/or confidence (e.g., "I just want 
to know for sure that I did a good job", etc.). 
m) To please others 
Any reference to a desire to ensure that others are pleased with one's actions and/or 
performance. 
n) Prevent harm (minor matters) 
Any reference to a desire to reduce the likelihood of minor hassles / inconveniences 
to oneself or others (e.g., to prevent wasting time, effort, or small sums of money, 
etc.) 
o) Reduce doubt regarding perception 
Any reference to a desire to reduce doubt regarding one's perception (e.g., "I had to 
check to make sure 1 saw / heard it correctly") 
4. Termination 
a) Physical / mental exhaustion 
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Any reference to physical or mental exhaustion (e.g., "After a while, I just get too 
tired to keep checking") 
b) Interpersonal concerns (may annoy others / cause embarrassment) 
Any reference to concerns re: social inappropriateness (e.g., "I don't want other 
people to see me constantly checking", "I know that my family will get angry if I 
keep on checking") 
c) Mood improves (anxious): 
Any reference to an alleviation of anxious mood (e.g., anxiety, fear, 
doubt/uncertainty, worry) 
d) Mood improves (depressive): 
Any reference to an alleviation of depressive mood (e.g., sadness, guilt, hopelessness, 
despair) 
e) Rationalization 
Any reference to rational self-talk re: the futility of checking (e.g., "After a while, I 
realize that repeatedly checking isn't helping, so 1 tell myself to stop") 
f) Achieve sense of control 
Any reference to perceived sense of control over the situation/one's emotions, etc. 
(e.g., "I stop checking once I know that I've regained control over the situation/my 
emotions") 
g) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (health/contamination) 
Any reference to the reduction or removal of a perceived threat to one's own or 
others' health. This might include feeling more certain that one has cleaned 
adequately, is not having a heart attack, etc. (e.g., "I can stop checking once I'm sure 
that I'm not having a heart attack", "I can stop once I know that I've taken all the 
precautions I can to protect myself from illness") 
h) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (safety) 
Any reference to the reduction or removal of a perceived threat to the safety 
(financial, physical, etc.) of oneself or others. This might include feeling more 
certain that one has properly locked the door/windows, turned off the stove, 
remembered important documents, etc. (e.g., "I can stop checking once I'm sure that 
I've locked the door properly", "I can stop once I know that I've taken all the 
precautions I can to avoid hassles") 
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i) Perceived reduction / removal of threat (loss/rejection/abandonment) 
Any reference to the reduction or removal of a perceived threat re: the possibility of 
personal loss, rejection, or abandonment within the context of relationships. This 
might include feeling more certain that social rejection, loss of affection from one's 
friends/partner, or abandonment from a lover will not occur (e.g., "I stop once I can 
be sure that my partner won't leave, at least for now", "I'm able to stop if people 
convince me that they care about me by showing me") 
j) Reduction in perceived responsibility for harm 
Any reference to a reduction in one's perceived responsibility for preventing harm 
(e.g., "Once I have done everything I can to make sure that I won't be responsible for 
anything bad that might happen, I can stop checking", "If someone else checks, they 
share the responsibility if something goes wrong, so I don't have to check anymore") 
k) Effort/rules (e.g., asked as many times as can) 
Any reference to internal rules or criteria (e.g., re: amount of effort expended) (e.g., 
"I can only stop once I've checked 3 times") 
I) No longer feel like continuing/ boredom 
Any reference to boredom or a lack of desire to continue seeking reassurance (e.g., 
"After a while, I just &ori\feel like checking anymore") 
m) Achieve "just right" feeling / sense of "completeness" 
Any reference to an internal "just right" feeling or sense of "completeness" (e.g., 
"Something just 'clicks' in me, and lets me know that I can stop", "After a while, it 
just 'feels right'") 
n) Time pressure 
Any reference to time pressure from external sources (e.g., "I usually only stop when 
I'm rushed and have to go somewhere or do something else") 
o) Distraction 
Any reference to terminating checking due to distraction (e.g., " I was checking when 
I got a phone call, and after I got off the phone, I was able to go on with my day") 
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Vignette 1 
High threat, high responsibility version 
You and your partner have planned a romantic evening to celebrate his/her recent 
promotion at work. As part of your plans, you enjoy a candle-lit dinner together at home 
before going out to the theatre. During dinner, you each have a few glasses of wine and 
lose track of the time. You soon realize that you will be late for your play if you do not 
hurry, so you rush to get your things together and ask your partner to call a taxi while you 
offer to turn off the lights and blow out the candles. As you are turning off the lights in 
the kitchen, your partner informs you that the taxi will be arriving in two minutes and 
he/she reminds you to blow out the candles before you go. When the taxi arrives, you 
run out the door to meet it and barely arrive to the theatre on time. On the way home 
from the theatre, the taxi driver has the local news on the radio and the reporter 
announces that there was a house fire in your neighbourhood. Suddenly, your heart 
begins to race, as you can't remember blowing out the candles after dinner and fear that 
the fire described on the radio may have occurred at your home. 
Low threat, high responsibility version 
You and your partner have planned a romantic evening to celebrate his/her recent 
promotion at work. As part of your plans, you enjoy a candle-lit dinner together at home 
before going out to the theatre. During dinner, you each have a few glasses of wine and 
lose track of the time. You soon realize that you will be late for the play if you do not 
hurry, so you rush to get your things together and ask your partner to call a taxi while you 
offer to turn off the lights and blow out the candles. As you are blowing out the candles, 
your partner informs you that the taxi will be arriving in two minutes and he/she reminds 
you to turn off the lights before you go. When the taxi arrives, you run out the door to 
meet it and barely arrive to the theatre on time. On the way home from the theatre, the 
taxi driver has the local news on the radio and an energy conservation lobbyist is being 
interviewed. She claims that there is currently a local hydro shortage and is asking 
listeners to try to limit their use of electricity for the next couple of weeks. As you are 
listening, you realize that you can't remember turning off the lights in the living room 
and wonder if you wasted electricity while you were gone. 
High ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your partner whether or not they saw you blow out the 
candles/turn off the lights, and they respond by hesitating for a moment, and saying: "I 
think I might have ... Anyways, everything is probably fine." 
Low ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your partner whether or not they saw you blow out the 
candles/turn off the lights, and they respond by saying matter-of-factly: "Don't worry; I 
remember seeing you blow out the candles/turn off the lights." 
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High threat, low responsibility version 
You and your partner have planned a romantic evening to celebrate his/her recent 
promotion at work. As part of your plans, you enjoy a candle-lit dinner together at home 
before going out to the theatre. During dinner, you each have a few glasses of wine and 
lose track of the time. You soon realize that you will be late for the play if you do not 
hurry, so you rush to get your things together and call a taxi while your partner offers to 
turn off the lights and blow out the candles. As your partner is turning off the lights in 
the kitchen, you inform them that the taxi will be arriving in two minutes and remind 
them to blow out the candles before you go. When the taxi arrives, you run out the door 
to meet it and barely arrive to the theatre on time. On the way home from the theatre, the 
taxi driver has the local news on the radio and the reporter announces that there was a 
house fire in your neighbourhood. Suddenly, your heart begins to race, as you wonder if 
your partner remembered to blow out the candles after dinner, and fear that the fire 
described on the radio may have occurred at your home. 
Low threat, low responsibility version 
You and your partner have planned a romantic evening to celebrate his/her recent 
promotion at work. As part of your plans, you enjoy a candle-lit dinner together at home 
before going out to the theatre. During dinner, you each have a few glasses of wine and 
lose track of the time. You soon realize that you will be late for the play if you do not 
hurry, so you rush to get your things together and call a taxi while your partner offers to 
turn off the lights and blow out the candles. As your partner is blowing out the candles, 
you inform them that the taxi will be arriving in two minutes and remind them to turn off 
the lights before you go. When the taxi arrives, you run out the door to meet it and barely 
arrive to the theatre on time. On the way home from the theatre, the taxi driver has the 
local news on the radio and an energy conservation lobbyist is being interviewed. She 
claims that there is currently a local hydro shortage and is asking listeners to try to limit 
their use of electricity for the next couple of weeks. As you are listening, you wonder if 
your partner remembered to turn off the living room lights, to avoid wasting electricity 
while you were gone. 
High ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your partner whether or not they remembered to blow out the 
candles/turn off the lights, and they respond by hesitating for a moment, and saying "I 
think 1 might have ... Anyways, everything is probably fine." 
Low ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your partner whether or not they remembered to blow out the 
candles/turn off the lights, and they respond by saying matter-of-factly: "Don't worry; I 
remember blowing out the candles/turning off the lights/' 
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Vignette 2 
High threat, high responsibility version 
You have been asked to house-sit for a wealthy friend while he is away on a business trip. 
Your friend insisted that you watch his home, as it contains some very valuable items, 
and he feels that you are the only person he can trust with this responsibility. Before 
leaving on his trip, he told you to make yourself at home while he is away and to feel free 
to entertain friends while enjoying the pool, backyard deck, etc. So, one evening, you 
have a couple of friends over for a barbeque before heading out to see a movie together. 
After enjoying dinner on the deck, you offer to wash the dishes while your friends relax 
outside for a few minutes. While you are cleaning up, one of your friends pops her head 
in the door to tell you that you will all be late for the movie if you don't leave soon. You 
tell her that you will meet the two of them at the car after you brush your teeth and lock 
up. You promptly rush upstairs to brush your teeth, and run outside to meet your friends. 
As you pull into the parking lot at the movie theatre, you suddenly get the feeling that 
you may have forgotten to lock the front door before leaving the house, which might 
result in the home being robbed of some very rare and expensive items (e.g., artwork, 
stereo, etc.). 
Low threat, high responsibility version 
You have been asked to watch over a friend's apartment while he visits his family for a 
few days. Even though your friend's apartment is very small and cheaply furnished (e.g., 
he uses milk crates for furniture), he insisted that you watch over his place while he is 
away, as he feels that you are the only person he can trust to watch his home during his 
absence. Before leaving, he told you to make yourself at home while he is away and to 
feel free to entertain friends. So, one evening, you have a couple of friends over before 
heading out to see a movie together. It turns out to be a hot and humid night, and the 
apartment does not have air conditioning, so the three of you sit out on the steps of the 
fire escape and have a couple of drinks. You then tell your friends that you need to spend 
a couple of minutes cleaning up before you leave. While you are cleaning up, one of 
your friends pops her head in the door to tell you that you will all be late for the movie if 
you don't leave soon. You ask your friends to wait a minute while you empty the 
garbage and lock up. You promptly rush down the hall to empty the garbage, and meet 
up with your friends by the elevator next to the apartment. As you arrive at the movie 
theatre, you suddenly get the feeling that you may have forgotten to lock the front door 
before leaving the apartment. However, your friend does not really have any valuable 
possessions, and you can't think of anything in the apartment that anyone would want to 
steal. 
High ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your friends whether or not they remember seeing you lock 
the door. They glance at each other briefly and one of them shrugs, saying: "Ummm ... I 
think so." 
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Low ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your friends whether or not they remember seeing you lock 
the door. They look at each other affirmatively while nodding 'yes'. One of them adds: 
"Don't worry; I remember seeing you lock it". 
High threat, low responsibility version 
One of your friends has been asked to house-sit for a wealthy neighbour while he is away 
on a business trip. The neighbour insisted that your friend watch his home, as it contains 
some very valuable items, and he feels that your friend is the only person he can trust to 
watch his home during his absence. Before leaving on his trip, he told your friend to 
make herself at home while he is away and to feel free to entertain friends while enjoying 
the pool, backyard deck, etc. So, one evening, your friend invites you and a mutual 
companion over for a barbeque before heading out to see a movie together. After 
enjoying dinner on the deck, your friend offers to wash the dishes while the two of you 
relax outside for a few minutes. While your friend is cleaning up, your companion pops 
their head in the door to tell her that you will all be late for the movie if you don't leave 
soon. Your friend says that she will meet the two of you at the car after she brushes her 
teeth and locks up. She promptly rushes upstairs to brush her teeth, and runs outside to 
meet you. As you pull into the parking lot at the movie theatre, you suddenly get the 
feeling that your friend may have forgotten to lock the front door before leaving the 
house, which might result in the home being robbed of some very rare and expensive 
items (e.g., artwork, stereo, etc.). 
Low threat, low responsibility version 
One of your friends has been asked to watch over a neighbour's apartment while he visits 
his family for a few days. Even though the neighbour's apartment is very small and 
cheaply furnished (e.g., he uses milk crates for furniture), he insisted that your friend 
watch over the place while he is away, as he feels that your friend is the only person he 
can trust to watch his home during his absence. Before leaving, he told your friend to 
make herself at home while he is away and to feel free to entertain friends. So, one 
evening, your friend invites you and a mutual companion over before heading out to see a 
movie together. It turns out to be a hot and humid night, and the apartment does not have 
air conditioning, so the three of you sit out on the steps of the fire escape and have a 
couple of drinks. Your friend then tells you that she needs to spend a couple of minutes 
cleaning up before you leave. While she is cleaning up, your companion pops his head in 
the door to tell her that you will all be late for the movie if you don't leave soon. She 
asks you both to wait a minute while she empties the garbage and locks up. She promptly 
rushes down the hall to empty the garbage, and meets up with you by the elevator next to 
the apartment. As you arrive at the movie theatre, you suddenly get the feeling that your 
friend may have forgotten to lock the front door before leaving the apartment. However, 
your friend's neighbour does not really have any valuable possessions, and you can't 
think of anything in the apartment that anyone would want to steal. 
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High ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your friend whether or not she remembered to lock the door, 
and she says: "Ummm ... I think so." 
Low ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your friend whether or not she remembered to lock the door, 
and she says: "Don't worry; I remember locking it" 
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Vignette 3 
High threat, high responsibility version 
You and your partner decide to take a two-week winter vacation in the Caribbean. The 
day before your departure, you notice that the kitchen faucet has started dripping 
uncontrollably. You find that you are able to slightly reduce the amount of dripping if 
you shut off the taps very tightly, but you do not have time to get the faucet properly 
fixed before you leave. The next morning, as you are getting ready to go out the door, 
your partner comments that they can hear the faucet dripping. Although your partner 
reminded you to pull the plug out of the sink when you finished the dishes, you wonder if 
you remembered to do so, and imagine how terrible it would be to return from your 
vacation and find that your house was accidentally flooded because you forgot. To make 
matters worse, you just had an expensive new hardwood floor installed in the kitchen and 
it would be completely ruined in the event of a flood. 
Low threat, high responsibility version 
You and your partner decide to take a two-week winter vacation in the Caribbean. The 
day before your departure, you notice that the kitchen faucet has started dripping 
uncontrollably. You find that you are able to slightly reduce the amount of dripping if 
you shut off the taps very tightly, but you do not have time to get the faucet properly 
fixed before you leave. The next morning, as you are getting ready to go out the door, 
your partner comments that they can hear the faucet dripping. You wonder if you 
remembered to shut the taps as tightly as possible like your partner asked you to, as you 
would waste more water than necessary during your trip if you forgot to do so. 
High ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your partner whether or not you shut the taps tight 
enough/pulled the plug out of the sink, and he/she says: "Uhhh ... probably... but you 
would know better than me..." 
Low ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your partner whether or not you shut the taps tight 
enough/pulled the plug out of the sink, and he/she says: "Yeah, I'm sure you did. I 
remember it clearly." 
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High threat, low responsibility version 
You and your partner decide to take a two-week winter vacation in the Caribbean. The 
day before your departure, you notice that the kitchen faucet has started dripping 
uncontrollably. You find that you are able to slightly reduce the amount of dripping if 
you shut off the taps very tightly, but you do not have time to get the faucet properly 
fixed before you leave. The next morning, as you are getting ready to go out the door, 
you can hear the faucet dripping. Although you reminded your partner to pull the plug 
out of the sink when they finished the dishes, you wonder if they remembered to do so, 
and imagine how terrible it would be to return from your vacation and find that your 
house was accidentally flooded because they forgot. To make matters worse, you just 
had an expensive new hardwood floor installed in the kitchen, and it would be completely 
ruined in the event of a flood. 
Low threat, low responsibility version 
You and your partner decide to take a two-week winter vacation in the Caribbean. The 
day before your departure, you notice that the kitchen faucet has started dripping 
uncontrollably. You find that you are able to slightly reduce the amount of dripping if 
you shut off the taps very tightly, but you do not have time to get the faucet properly 
fixed before you leave. The next morning, as you are getting ready to go out the door, 
you can hear the faucet dripping. You wonder if your partner remembered to shut the 
taps as tightly as possible like you asked them to, as he/she would waste more water than 
necessary during your trip if he/she forgot to do so. 
High ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your partner whether or not he/she shut the taps tight 
enough/pulled the plug out of the sink, and he/she says: "Uhhh ... I think 1 probably did." 
Low ambiguity feedback 
Now, imagine that you ask your partner whether or not he/she shut the taps tight 
enough/pulled the plug out of the sink, and he/she says: "Yeah, I'm sure I did. I 
remember it clearly." 
"Filler" vignette 1 
You decide to shop at a new supermarket that has opened up in your neighbourhood. As 
you pass by the dairy aisle, you remember that you need to buy some ricotta cheese for 
the lasagne you plan to make the next day. Since you are trying to eat healthy, you 
decide to buy the low-fat cheese. You are happy to find that the price of some of the 
cheese has been reduced. However, it is unclear whether the low-fat cheese is on special, 
or only the regular cheese. You are slightly annoyed that the sign is not clear, but grab a 
large container of low-fat ricotta anyways. Later, when you get to the cash, you notice 
that the person in front of you is buying regular-fat ricotta, and that they save $1.50 
because of the special. You start to wonder if the low-fat is also on special, and realize 
that if you ask the cashier now, you could run back and exchange the cheese without 
losing your place in line. 
Feedback for filler vignette #1 
Now, imagine you ask the cashier whether the low fat ricotta is on special, and he says: 
"Yep! All of the ricotta cheese has been reduced." 
"Filler" vignette 2 
You are taking a difficult, but interesting, class as an elective in your academic program. 
A few weeks into the term, your professor informs the class that the upcoming midterm 
exam will count for 40% of the final grade, and that no make-up exams will be given. 
She also informs you that students' marks on the test will be posted in the hallway 
outside of her office within four days following the exam. After taking the test, you feel 
fairly confident about your performance, but you are not sure that you managed to 
achieve a B+, which was your goal going into the exam. A couple of days following the 
test, you run into a classmate in the hallway, who suggests that you check to see if the 
grades have been posted yet. When you get to the professor's office, there is a large 
group of students huddled around the billboard where the grades are posted. You gently 
push your way through the crowd to check how you did on the test. The grades are 
posted according to student numbers and are printed in a small font, so it is hard to tell if 
you are reading the correct grade from where you are standing, but there are several other 
students behind you waiting to check their grades. From where you are standing, it looks 
like you got an A-, but the grade above the one you are looking at is a B, and the one 
below it is a B-. 
Feedback for filler vignette #2 
Now, imagine you ask your friend what grade they think you got, and they say: "The 
class average was a B, and you generally do better than average, so you probably got an 
A-." 
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Study 1 Consent Form for Clinical Participants 
CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by Chris 
L. Parrish, M.A., of the Psychology Department at Concordia University, (514) 848-2424 
x2199, c_parris@alcor.concordia.ca. This research is supervised by Adam S. Radomsky, 
Ph.D., Associate Professor, adam.radomsky@concordia.ca . 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of this study is to examine psychological factors 
involved in reassurance seeking and checking behaviour. 
B. PROCEDURES 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will first be asked to complete an interview in 
order to assess your emotional state. The interview will consist of questions related to your 
overall mood, and should last about 1-2 hours. After a short break, you will then be asked to 
complete a second interview that focuses specifically on people's coping responses in 
anxiety-provoking situations. This interview will consist of several questions related to 
reassurance seeking and checking behaviour, and it will be videotaped for coding purposes. 
The interview should take approximately 60-80 minutes to complete. 
Next, you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire package which includes several 
measures of anxious and depressive symptomatology. Finally, you will be fully informed 
about the purpose of the study as well as our hypotheses. The entire study should take about 
3-4 hours to complete. After you have finished filling out the questionnaires, you will be 
provided with an explanation of the purpose of this study, as well as our experimental 
hypotheses. For your participation, you will be paid $50. 
C. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
I understand that 1 am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in this 
study at any time, without any negative consequences whatsoever. I understand that a 
portion of the study will be videotaped. I understand that all information obtained will be 
kept strictly confidential and will be stored under lock and key for a period of seven years 
after which it will be shredded. Access to this information will be made available only to 
restricted members of Dr. Radomsky's research team. I understand that to ensure my 
confidentiality all data will be coded by number only and will be kept separate from my 
name. I understand that data from this study may be published, but that no identifying 
information will be released. 
If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to ask the experimenter, or to 
contact our lab at Concordia University: (514) 848-2424, ext. 2199. 
Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Concordia University 
Chris L. Parrish, MA, Concordia University 
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I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
NAME (please print) 
SIGNATURE 
Sex: M / F (pleasecircle) AGE: 
WITNESS SIGNATURE 
DATE 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact 
Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 
514.848.2424, x. 7481 or by email at Adela.Reid@Concordia.ca. 
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Study 1 Consent Form for Non-Clinical Participants 
CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by Chris 
L. Parrish, M.A., of the Psychology Department at Concordia University, (514) 848-2424 
x2199, c_parris@alcor.concordia.ca. This research is supervised by Adam S. Radomsky, 
Ph.D., Associate Professor, adam.radomsky@concordia.ca . 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of this study is to examine psychological factors 
involved in reassurance seeking and checking behaviour. 
B. PROCEDURES 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will first be asked to complete an interview in 
order to assess your emotional state. The interview will consist of questions related to your 
overall mood, and should last about 30-50 minutes. You will then be asked to complete a 
second interview that focuses specifically on people's coping responses in anxiety-provoking 
situations. This interview will consist of several questions related to reassurance seeking and 
checking behaviour, and it will be videotaped for coding purposes. The interview should 
take approximately 40-70 minutes to complete. 
Next, you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire package which includes several 
measures of anxious and depressive symptomatology. Finally, you will be fully informed 
about the purpose of the study as well as our hypotheses. The entire study should take about 
2-2.5 hours to complete. After you have finished filling out the questionnaires, you will be 
provided with an explanation of the purpose of this study, as well as our experimental 
hypotheses. For your participation, you will receive 3 credits for the Concordia University 
Psychology undergraduate participant pool. (Students who are ineligible for the participant 
pool will receive 3 entries into a draw for a cash prize). 
C. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in this 
study at any time, without any negative consequences whatsoever. I understand that a 
portion of the study will be videotaped. I understand that all information obtained will be 
kept strictly confidential and will be stored under lock and key for a period of seven years 
after which it will be shredded. Access to this information will be made available only to 
restricted members of Dr. Radomsky's research team. I understand that to ensure my 
confidentiality all data will be coded by number only and will be kept separate from my 
name. I understand that data from this study may be published, but that no identifying 
information will be released. 
If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to ask the experimenter, or to 
contact our lab at Concordia University: (514) 848-2424, ext. 2199. 
Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Concordia University 
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Chris L. Parrish, MA, Concordia University 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
NAME (please print) 
SIGNATURE 
Sex: M / F (please circle) AGE: 
WITNESS SIGNATURE 
DATE 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact 
Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 
514.848.2424, x. 7481 or by email at Adela.Reid@Concordia.ca. 
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Study 2 Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by 
Chris L. Parrish, M.A., of the Psychology Department at Concordia University, (514) 
848-2424 x2199, c_parris@alcor.concordia.ca. This research is supervised by Adam S. 
Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor, adam.radomsky@concordia.ca. 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of this study is to examine psychological factors 
that are associated with fear, anxiety and related behaviour. 
B. PROCEDURES 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to read a series of vignettes that 
describe different hypothetical scenarios and to provide a number of subjective ratings 
regarding the emotions and thoughts that you would expect to experience if you were 
placed in the situations presented. You will also be asked to complete a number of 
questionnaires that assess your mood and beliefs. The whole study should take 
approximately 50-80 minutes to complete. After you have finished filling out the 
questionnaires, you will be provided with an explanation of the purpose of this study, as 
well as our experimental hypotheses. For your participation, you will receive 2 credits for 
the Concordia University Psychology undergraduate Participant Pool. 
C. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in 
this study at any time, without any negative consequences whatsoever. I understand that 
all information obtained will be kept strictly confidential and will be stored under lock 
and key for a period of seven years after which it will be shredded. Access to this 
information will be made available only to restricted members of Dr. Radomsky's 
research team. I understand that to ensure my confidentiality all data will be coded by 
number only and will be kept separate from my name. I understand that data from this 
study may be published, but that no identifying information will be released. 
If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to contact our lab at 
Concordia University: (514) 848-2424, ext. 2199. 
Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Concordia University 
Chris L. Parrish, MA, Concordia University 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
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If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please 
contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 
514.848.2424, x. 7481 or by email at Adela.Reid@Concordia.ca. 
